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It would not be an exaggeration to say that modern Spain has been built upon two 
myths: partly around the myth of national reconciliation and the consensus of the 
transition, and partly around the myth of Europe.1 First, the transition to democracy was 
thought to have left behind the sharp ideological divisions that led to the Civil War 
(1936-1939), and the repressive dictatorship of Francisco Franco (1939-1975). Second, 
Europe and the European Community (EC)2 represented the principles of liberty, 
pluralism, and economic progress to which Spain should aspire in order to break with the 
dictatorial past, to recover national self-respect, and to reinvent itself.3 After the Spanish 
Constitution of 1978, which defines Spain as a Social and Democratic State (Estado 
Social y Democrático de Derecho), the arrival of Felipe González’s socialist party 
(Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE) to the government in 1982 led the country 
into a frantic attempt to reach the socio-economic levels of its European neighbors. 
                                                 
1 See Carlos Closa, The Domestic Basis of Spanish European Policy and the 2002 Presidency, tr. 
Stephen J. Wilkins, 16 Notre Europe, European Studies (2001), http://www.notre-europe.eu; 
Pablo Jáuregui, “National Pride and the Meaning of ‘Europe’: a Comparative Study of Britain 
and Spain,” in Whose Europe? The Turns Towards Democracy, eds. Dennis Smith and Sue 
Wright, (Oxford: Balckwell, 1999), pp. 275-287; Antonio Moreno Juste, “Del ‘problema de 
España’ a la ‘España europeizada’: excepcionalidad y normalización en la posición de España en 
Europa,” in La política exterior de España 1800-2003, ed. Juan Carlos Pereira (Barcelona: Ariel, 
2003), pp. 295-317. 
2 The term EC refers to the period before the Treaty on European Union, popularly known as the 
Maastricht Treaty, which came into force on 1 November 1993. The treaty created the current 
European Union (EU) and led to the establishment of the European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU). 





Democracy thus became synonymous with Europeanization, progress, and 
modernization. When Spain finally entered the EC in 1986, the fact was celebrated as the 
culmination of both modernity and democracy.4  
In spite of this dominant narrative, Spain is said to have undergone two other 
transitions since. The first, under the government of Partido Popular (PP), was led by 
Prime Minister José María Aznar (1996-2004), the second, under the current socialist 
government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (2004-present). In a book published in 
1994, Aznar nicknamed his legislature “the second transition,” as a way of saying that the 
earlier government had failed to complete the process of economic modernization and 
corresponding democratization.5 To this end, his government established as its main 
priority the integration into the European Economic and European Union (EMU, 
achieved in 1999), and implemented neoliberal economic policies of privatization and 
deregulation towards the consolidation of a free market economy.  
Nevertheless, Aznar’s years in office coincided with the emergence of grass roots 
organizations for the recovery of the memory of the victims of Franco’s dictatorship, 
such as the Asociación para la Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica (Association for 
the Recuperation of Historical Memory). During the Spanish transition no trials were 
conducted to judge those responsible for the crimes committed during Franco’s regime, 
and, unlike in other countries, no truth commissions were created to investigate them. 
The ARMH revealed that about 30.000 people had been executed under Francoism, and 
that their bodies remained buried in unmarked mass graves in different parts of Spain. 
                                                 
4 For some political observers, Spanish democracy was consolidated after the democratic general 
elections of 1982, after the failed coup d’état of 1981. 






They demanded to locate and exhume the bodies in order to give them a proper burial, 
honor their memory, and repair their dignity. Aznar refused to support the work of this 
Association concerning the recovery of the past, on the basis that doing so would shatter 
the unwritten consensus of the transition and endanger democracy. Certainly, his attitude 
was in tune with the hegemonic discourse of the transition and the idea that leaving the 
past untouched had helped to overcome the political in-fighting that resulted in the Civil 
War. One of the aims of this dissertation is to challenge this hegemonic discourse by 
locating Spain’s wounds not in the past, but in the present of a society that claims to have 
overcome them.6 
After Aznar’s (government) downfall in 2004, three days after the tragic Madrid 
bombings of March 11, Rodríguez Zapatero’s coming to power was, like his predecessor, 
also nicknamed a “second transition.” This time, however, the label referred not to an 
incomplete economic reform but to “a new phase of democratic development.”7 In 
contrast to Aznar, the current Prime Minister Zapatero undertook the task of what he 
called the “unfinished business” of Spain’s transition, and addressed for the first time the 
debt the State owed Franco’s victims. During his first term (2004-2008), the socialist 
government passed significant laws to recognize the rights of oppressed minorities and 
victims who suffered persecution or imprisonment under Francoist laws. These include 
the Same-sex Marriage Law (Ley 13/2005), granting the status of and all the rights of 
                                                 
6 For an excellent analysis of the notion of a “wounded culture” see Moreiras-Menor Cristina, 
Cultura Herida: Literatura y Cine en la España Demócratica (Madrid: Libertarias, 2002). 
7 Grimond, J. The Second Transition, The Economist, (June 26, 2004). See also: Encarnación, 
Omar G., Spanish Politics. Democracy After Dictatorship (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2008); 
Powell, Charles, A Second Transition, or More of the Same? Spanish Foreign Policy under 
Zapatero Vol. 14  South European Society and Politics 4, (December, 2009), pp. 519-536; 
Woodworth, Paddy, Spain’s “Second Transition” Reforming Zeal and Dire Omens 22 World 





married couples to same-sex partners;8 and the Law of Historical Memory (Ley 52/2007), 
which condemns the Francoist uprising as illegitimate, grants some economic 
compensations to the victims, and bans symbols and monuments that glorify Franco and 
his regime from public spaces.9  
One could argue that, if Aznar’s government saw the post-Franco democratic 
settlement as the final destination for the nation, Zapatero’s government saw it as a point 
of departure.10 Indeed, the laws that have been mentioned are a good point of departure 
towards a more democratic and egalitarian state, but more remains to be done: for 
example, as I will argue in chapter 2, the Law of Historical Memory fails to challenge the 
hegemonic discourse of the transition and connect itself with the antecedent democratic 
regime of the Second Republic (1931-1936), all of which undermines its declared goal of 
closing the wounds and create a so-called “democratic memory.” Therefore, this 
dissertation wishes to intervene in contemporary debates concerning the quality, 
challenges, and gaps of the Spanish democracy. 
Re-Imagining Justice: A Study of Ethics, Politics, and Law in Contemporary 
Spain wishes to unearth some of these democratic deficits through a comparative analysis 
of contemporary Spanish novels and films vis-á-vis legal texts that reflect on this time 
period.  I argue that these cultural texts have the capacity not only of subverting 
prevailing notions of community, memory, identity, gender, responsibility, truth, and 
justice that dominate and structure the legal and economic systems, but they also help us 
                                                 
8 Ley 13/2005, de 1 de julio, por la que se modifica el Código Civil en materia de derecho a 
contraer matrimonio (BOE n. 157). 
9 Ley 52/2007, de 26 de diciembre, por la que se reconocen y amplían derechos y se establecen 
medidas en favor de quienes padecieron persecución o violencia durante la guerra civil y la 
dictadura. (BOE n. 310). 





to visualize alternative or unrealized possibilities to reformulate all those notions. More 
concretely, I analyze Alex de la Iglesia’s film La Comunidad (Common Wealth, 2000) as 
a way of showing how both neoliberal economic policies and a politics of consensus lead 
(against what the proponents of these policies claim) to alienation, exclusion, and 
ultimately to an enfeebled concept of democracy. From a different perspective, Antonio 
Muñoz Molina’s novel Beltenebros (Prince of Shadows, 1989) tries to give voice to the 
traumatic or “unclaimed experience” of its protagonist, who undergoes a process of 
confronting his past and taking responsibility for it. In this way, the novel confronts the 
ghosts of the past in a way that the Law of Historical Memory (2007) fails to do properly. 
Finally, Pedro Almodóvar’s film Tacones Lejanos (High Heels, 1991) calls attention to 
the need of the law (embodied in the film by the figure of the judge) to recognize and 
respect the singularity of the Other as other. This entails in the film a conception of 
justice based on an ethics of alterity that does not reduce the heterogeneity and difference 
of the other in the name of moral universals. Through the critical examination of these 
deficits in law, democracy, politics, and ethics, I aim to show alternative images, and thus 
to re-imagine all these notions concerning the Spanish and the larger European contexts.  
Re-Imagining Justice is situated in the cross-disciplinary context of Law and 
Humanities, which places law within the humanities rather than within the more 
traditional context of the social or empirical sciences. In a foundational text, James Boyd 
White suggests that law should be regarded not as a system of rules or a set of social 
policies, but rather as a culture of argument and meaning-formation, by which he means 





community.11 The examination of law’s “meaning-making” processes (for example, the 
use of certain language, metaphors, and legal rhetoric) can reveal that law operates under 
forms of gender bias, structures of domination, and inequality, which is essential for any 
practice of law. Thus, legal scholars have increasingly turned to the humanities looking 
for new ways of understanding and rethinking law and legal practice, leading to an 
explosion of movements such as Law and Literature12, Law and Film13, Law and 
Theater14, Law and Music15, Law and Culture16, and Feminist and Critical Race Theory.17 
                                                 
11 White, James Boyd, The Legal Imagination: Studies in the Nature of Legal Thought and 
Expression (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973). See also, among others: Heracles’ 
Bow Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law (University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); 
Justice as Translation: an Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism (The University of Chicago 
Press, 1990); From Expectation to Experience: Essays on Law and Legal Education (Ann Arbor: 
The Univ. of Michigan Press, 1999); Living Speech. Resisting the Empire of Force (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
12 See, among many others: Aristodemou, Maria, Law & Literature: Journeys from Her to 
Eternity, (Oxford University Press, 2000); Nussbaum, Martha, Poetic Justice. The Literary 
Imagination and Public Life (Bacon Press Boston, 1995); Weisberg, Richard, Poetics, and other 
strategies of Law and Literature, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); West, Robin, 
Narrative, Authority and Law (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996) and Caring 
for Justice, (New York University Press, 1997). 
13 See, for instance, Fludernik, Monika and Greta Olson, In the grip of the law: trials, prisons, 
and the space between, eds. (Frankfurt am main; New York : P. Lang, 2004); Kamir, Orit, 
Framed: Women in Law and Film (Durham: Duke UP, 2006); Leslie J. Moran et al., Law’s 
Moving Image eds. (London ; Portland, Or.: Cavendish Publishing, 2004); Machura, Stefan & 
Peter Robson Law and Film: Introduction, eds., (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001); Sarat, 
Austin et al. Law on the Screen, eds., (Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
14 See: Hibbitts, Bernard, “Coming to Our Senses: Communication and Legal Expression in 
Performance Cultures,” Emory Law Journal 41 (fall 1992), pp. 875–6, and “Making Motions: 
The Embodiment of Law in Gesture,” Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 6 (1995), pp. 51–
81; Nielsen, Lara D. “Institutionalizing Ensembles: Thinking Theatre, Performance, and ‘the 
Law’” Law, Culture and the Humanities 2008; 4; 156; Stone Peters, Julie, “Legal Performance 
Good and Bad” Law, Culture and the Humanities 2008. 
15 See: Balkin, J.M., and Sanford Levinson, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 139 (1991), pp. 1597–1658, and Interpreting Law and Music: 
Performance Notes on ‘The Banjo Serenader’ and ‘The Lying Crowd of Jews,’ Cardozo Law 
Review 20 (May/July, 1999), p. 1513. 
16 See: Post, Robert ed., Law and the Order of Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1991); Sarat, Austin and Thomas R. Kearns, Law in the Domains of Culture (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1998); Ewick, Patricia and Susan S. Silbey, The Common Place of 
Law: Stories from Everyday Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); and Young, 





Despite the diversity of their research methods and analysis, these movements share the 
view that law is both ingrained in a specialized culture, with its own technical way of 
seeing and understanding the world, and additionally part of broader political, social, and 
cultural forces that must also be taken into account. As Robin West suggests, “[a] full 
understanding of law requires a general knowledge of the culture from which the law 
emerged.”18  
Alongside legal texts, then, I analyze literary and visual texts that offer a 
jurisprudential examination and commentary on democracy and political action (chapter 
1), memory and responsibility (chapter 2), and legal performance and ethics of otherness 
(chapter 3). However, there is an overarching idea that connects them all, which is the 
idea of justice as individual and social aspiration. The texts that I have chosen all fall 
under Linda Hutcheon’s rubric of “postmodern fiction:”19  
1) They are self-reflexive and they self-consciously “acknowledge their existence 
as representation—that is, as interpreting (indeed as creating) its referent, not as offering 
direct and immediate access to it.”20 By highlighting the meaning-making process as 
constructed and mediated, these texts de-naturalize some of the categories that structure 
and frame social relations (i.e., market economy, liberal democracy, national community, 
gender).21 For example, La Comunidad invites us to reflect about how the so-called 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 See, among others: Delgado, Richard, Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge ed. 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995); Henderson, Lynne, Legality and Empathy 85 
Michigan Law Review 6 (June 1987), pp.1574–1653; Minow, Martha, Foreword [to the Supreme 
Court 1986 Term]: Justice Engendered, 101 Harvard Law Review (1987): 10-95. Minow, Martha 
L., and Elizabeth V. Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10 Cardozo Law Review 37 (1988): 37-76. 
18 West, Caring for Justice, supra at 183. 
19 Hutcheon, Linda, Politics of Postmodernism (New Accents, New York: Routledge, 1989).  
20 Id., at 34. 





“consensus democracy” hides mechanisms of exclusion that undermine the concepts both 
of consensus and of democracy. 
2) They emphasize the narrative and discursive construction of reality and invite 
us to consider the intervention (and distortions) of memory, perception, and imagination 
as fundamental components in this construction. For instance, Beltenebros presents a 
subjective and chaotic narrative of the memories of its protagonist in order to explore the 
part of his life which is absent or repressed. The novel foregrounds the processes of 
interpretation, selection, and creation behind the act of narrating and creating a given 
version of history. The same questions can be asked about the Law of Historical 
Memory: how and in what ways the Law “remembers” (or “forgets”), that is, what kind 
of narratives of the past it validates, and which ones it doesn’t consider or leaves out. 
3) These texts acknowledge and draw attention to the process of subject-
formation, representing it “as something in process, never fixed and never as 
autonomous, outside history. It is always a gendered subjectivity, rooted also in class, 
race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation.”22 By exposing the politics behind the dominant 
representations of the self and the other in law, these texts de-naturalize and challenge the 
assumption that subjectivity is coherent, self-sufficient and the source of meaning and 
action.23 For example, Tacones Lejanos presents a judge whose “identity” is constructed 
through multiple performances, in which he adopts different roles and perspectives in 
order to respond to the ethical call and the needs of the other. 
The narrative construction of truth, the contingency of meaning, the social and 
cultural mediation of subjectivity, and so forth, can all be considered part of postmodern 
                                                 






view of the world.24 As applied to law, the traditional legal standards of neutrality, 
objectivity, rationality, stability, and autonomy are replaced by the postmodern values of 
anti-essentialism, fragmentation, plurality, fluidity, contextuality, contingency, and loss 
of fixed foundations. However, I will try to show that these texts do not deny but rather 
call for emancipation, ethical responsibility, and judgment, and hence distance 
themselves from the more negative attributes associated with postmodernism.25 Instead, 
they come closer to what Richard Sherwin has labeled “postmodern narratives of 
justice.”26  
The dissertation is structured in three chapters. The first chapter rethinks the 
notions of political community and democracy in Alex de la Iglesia’s film La Comunidad 
                                                 
24 The debates about postmodernism(s) have been discussed extensively elsewhere. See, for 
instance: Anderson, P. The Origins of Postmodernity (London: Verso, 1998; Barker Francis, 
Peter Hulme, and Margaret Iveson, eds Postmodernism and the Re-reading of Modernity 
(Manchester: Manchester UP, 1992); Bauman, Z. Intimations of Postmodernity (London : 
Routledge, 1992); Degli-Esposti, Cristina, Postmodernism in the Cinema. Ed. Cristina Degli-
Esposti (NY: Berghahn Books,1998); Denzin, Norman K., The Cinematic Society. The Voyeur’s 
Gaze (London: Sage Publications, 1995); Docherty, Thomas, ed Postmodernism: A Reader 
(Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf 1993); Eagleton, Terry, The Illusions of Postmodernism 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1989); Harvey, David The Condition of Postmodernism (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1990); Jameson, Fredric, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism 
(Durham:Duke UP, 1991); Herrero-Olaizola, Alejandro, Narrativas híbridas: parodia y 
postmodernismo en la ficción contemporánea de las Américas (Madrid : Editorial Verbum, 
2000); Rosenau, Pauline Marie, Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads, and 
Intrusions, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992). 
25 As Costas Douzinas and RonnieWarrington indicate, “the allegations against alternative 
readings are well known: postmodernism and deconstruction are at least indifferent and at worst 
destructive of ethics and politics; they have shown knowledge to be so many facets of value, thus, 
undermining the ability to found the ethical response; they have tediously repeated that texts 
accept an infinite number of interpretations, thus, disqualifying any promise of a politics based on 
hermeneutical consensus; they have attacked the dialectic of subject and object, original and 
copy, inside and outside, thus weakening the claim of the sovereign self to stand in judgment in a 
community of reason. And as all reality has been reduced to the playful ruses of an aberrant and 
undecidable textuality, a night of reason in which ‘all cows are black,’ responsibility has 
allegedly gone on permanent retirement.” Justice Miscarried: Ethics, Aesthetics and the Law 
(Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1995), at 7. 
26 Sherwin, Richard K., When Law Goes Pop: The Vanishing Line Between Law and Popular 






(2000), and places it in the context of the anxieties generated by Spain’s integration in the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999. Taking as a point of departure Jean 
Baudrillard’s critique of the consumer society and Jacques Rancière’s critical account of 
neoliberal “politics of consensus,” I explore the shortcomings of both market economy 
and of liberal democracy. By exposing the (neo)liberal promises of equality, freedom, 
and economic growth as fallacies, and unmasking the market and State’s mechanisms of 
depoliticization (alienation, exclusion, and the logics of “us” vs. “the others”), the film 
undermines the equation of market economy = freedom = equality = democracy. In its 
place, the film proposes a model of democracy that is contingent, and open, and operates 
not as a mechanism of institutionalization, but rather as a force of destabilization. In this 
view, democracy can never be fully consolidated, for it relies on episodic disruptions of 
the established order and the continual renewal of the actors and the forms of democratic 
actions. Going beyond Rancière’s political thought, I articulate an ethics of political 
action that combines the respect for the singularity of the other with the democratic 
demand for equality and emancipation.  
The second chapter addresses the recovery of the historical memory of the victims 
of Franco’s dictatorship, in light of the recent Spanish “Law of Historical Memory” 
(2007) and Antonio Muñoz Molina’s novel Beltenebros (1989). This chapter focuses on 
the ethico-political relationship between memory and justice in the sense proposed by 
Walter Benjamin and Jacques Derrida. By the recovery of the historical memory, I refer 
to the act of interrupting the official version of history, in which the memories of the 
crimes and injustices suffered by the victims of Franco’s repression have no place. The 





public and collective experience—the shared memory of their victimization. Molina’s 
novel addresses the “injustice” of forgetting, by bringing to light the “specters” that have 
been doubly victimized, first by Franco’s repressive regime, and then by the Pacto del 
Olvido (Pact of Forgetfulness) of the transition, of which even the current law of 
historical memory does not take proper notice. Focusing on the law’s “rhetorical 
strategies,” i.e., a series of recurring words, images, and expressions, I argue that, 
contrary to its declared purposes, the law becomes a “site of commemoration” for the 
Spanish transition, and hence reproduces an official version of history which has been 
particularly insensitive to the memory of the victims. The law’s re-appropriation of the 
“spirit of the Transition” reveals Spain’s deep fear of confronting the ghosts of the past, a 
fear that continues still today.  
In the third and final chapter, I read Pedro Almodóvar’s film Tacones Lejanos as 
a postmodern jurisprudential text that rethinks law, judgment, and justice through an 
ethics of otherness rather than through an ethics of care.27 In contrast to Orit Kamir’s 
feminist reading of the film, I argue that High Heels’ embodiment of law (in the figure of 
the on-screen Judge) proposes an understanding of “law as a queer performance,” which 
responds effectively to the ethical demands of those marginal subjects who have been 
traditionally excluded from the law—for example, the Francoist Ley de Vagabundos y 
Maleantes (Vagrancy Act) declared homosexuality illegal in 1953. By re-imagining law 
from a queer perspective, the film undermines the hierarchy that privileges masculinity, 
                                                 
27 Postmodern jurisprudence turns to Nietzsche, Foucault, Lacan, Lyotard, Levinas, Derrida, and 
Rorty. Even though to call some of these thinkers postmodern is not accurate, legal scholars have 
included their work within the framework of postmodern jurisprudence. Contemporary legal 
scholars writing about law and justice from a postmodern perspective include, among others: J.M. 







heterosexuality and patriarchy upon which legal episteme is grounded and recognizes and 
includes new subjectivities. High Heels integrates the actions of the on-screen judge 
within the aesthetic realm of the viewer, and, in so doing, forces the viewer to respect and 
be responsive to the call of the other. The chapter closes with a brief reference to the 
recent legal changes in favor of the recognition of rights of the LGBT community in 






CHAPTER 1  
 
Politics and Democracy in Alex de la Iglesia’s La Comunidad 
We are said to be living through the end of political divisions, of 
social antagonisms and utopian projects; entering into an age of 
common productive effort and free circulation, of national 
consensus and international competition. Instead of utopian 
islands and millenarian dreams, the belated wisdom of our times 
offers more accessible earthly paradises and more imminent 
deadlines: Europe or the Centre, 1993 or the year 2000. 
Jacques Rancière—On the Shores of Politics 
There is no democracy without respect for irreducible singularity 
or alterity, but there is no democracy without the ‘community of 
friends,’ . . . without the calculation of majorities, without 
identifiable, stabilizable, representable subjects, all equal. 
Jacques Derrida—The Politics of Friendship 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Taking as points of departure Jean Baudrillard’s critique of consumer society and 
Jacques Rancière’s critical account on the European “politics of consensus,” this chapter 
looks at the ways in which Alex de la Iglesia’s film La Comunidad (Common Wealth, 
2000) rethinks the notions of democracy and politics within the context of Spain’s 
integration into the European Monetary Union (EMU).1 The film establishes the system 
of neoliberal economic policies as the basic grid of Spanish government and examines 
                                                 
1 Alex de la Iglesia’s La Comunidad was a Spanish box-office hit in 2000. The film received 
fifteen Goya nominations and won in three categories: Best Actress (Carmen Maura), Best 
Supporting Actor (Emilio Gutiérrez Caba), and Best Special Effects (Félix Bergés, Raúl 





the ways the intersection between market economy and politics and the reduction of the 
decision-making process to an oligarchy raise questions about the quality of the resulting 
democracy.2 In a combination of black comedy, thriller, and horror film, La Comunidad 
tells the story of temporary real estate agent Julia (Carmen Maura), who, tempted by the 
luxury of the apartment she is trying to sell, decides to spend a night there with her 
husband Ricardo (Jesús Bonilla). Her building is inhabited by a community of neighbors 
who have agreed to patiently wait for one of them to die in order to steal his money won 
in the quiniela (soccer pools), which has been stashed somewhere in his apartment for 
decades. Julia finds the money serendipitously, and decides to keep it for herself. In turn, 
the community decides it will go to any lengths (including murder) to prevent her from 
doing so. I interpret this greedy and violent community as an allegory for what Rancière 
has called “consensus democracy.” Opposing this community, I believe, is an alternative 
“political community” constituted in the bond, based on trust, which is formed between 
Julia and Charlie (Eduardo Antuña), who appears as a mentally challenged young 
neighbor. This odd and improbable couple ends up confronting the old community and 
escaping unscathed, whereupon the rest of the neighbors kill each other. In this way, the 
film places the possibility for political emancipation in the action of ordinary people, 
which opens up a democratic space based on both equality and difference.  
My analysis is divided into five sections. I begin with a brief overview of the Spanish 
neoliberal politics of the nineties in relation to Rancière’s critical account of the 
European “politics of consensus.” In the second and third sections, I examine the film’s 
exposure of the false promises of (neo-) liberalism and the shortcomings of liberal 
                                                 
2 See Paul M. Heywood, “Corruption, Democracy, and Governance in Spain,” in The Politics of 





democracy. In so doing, the film unmasks the mechanisms by which both the power of 
wealth and the State’s power come together to prevent political action.3 In the fourth 
section, I take Rancière’s political thought a step further and examine the relationship 
between an ethics of otherness (in the Levinasian sense) and a politics of emancipation. 
My goal is to articulate an ethics of political action that combines respect for the 
singularity of the other with the democratic demand for equality.4 In the final section, I 
analyze the community of working-class madrileños shown in the film’s last scene, 
arguing that this is not in fact a return to the former consensus democracy. By placing 
this community in the horizon of a forthcoming European Monetary Integration, the film 
suggests that democracy can only be sporadic, and never fully consolidated.  
 
I. THE NEOLIBERAL “POLITICS OF CONSENSUS”  
  Spain’s accession into the European Community in 1986 took place the same 
year that the EC signed the Single European Act (SEA), aiming at achieving an internal 
single market by 31 December 1992. The SEA established that all member states were 
expected to have removed all internal trade frontiers and to assure “the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital” before the established deadline (art. 13).5 For the 
next six years, the PSOE’s (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) new challenge became to 
fulfill the EC requirements of market liberalization. In 1992, when the deadline came to a 
                                                 
3 For an interesting analysis of Rancière’s political thought in relation to Alain Badiou’s and 
Etienne Balibar’s politics of emancipation, see: Nick Hewlett, Badiou, Balibar, Rancière Re-
thinking Emancipation (London: Continuum, 2007). 
4 Cf. Michel Hardt and Antonio Negri, Commonwealth, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2009).  







term, very high rates of unemployment, economic recession, police scandals, and 
governmental corruption hit Spain’s politics and economy. Among the PSOE’s large list 
of corruption scandals were: the so-called “Juan Guerra case” at the beginning of the 
1990s, in which the then-deputy prime minister’s brother had abused his official authority 
to obtain private economic gains; and also the government’s alleged link to the illegal 
dirty war against the Basque terrorist group ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna, meaning 
Country and Liberty) from 1983-87, led by the GAL (anti-terrorist liberation groups).6 In 
addition, this political and economic crisis coincided with a rise of “Euro-skepticism,” 
triggered by the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark that very same year. For 
the first time after Franco’s death, the image of the celebrated Spanish democracy was in 
question, and the erstwhile political discourse concerning Spain’s position within the EU 
started being reassessed.7 After losing the absolute majority in the general elections of 
1993, partly because of the economic and political crisis, the Socialists’ discourse 
towards European integration took a more utilitarian stance: the material efforts made by 
Spain to meet the now Maastricht Convergence Criteria (inflation rates, government 
deficit and debt, etc.), in order to gain entry into the European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU), were now viewed as deserving economic compensation. 8    
                                                 
6 In 1994, Mariano Rubio, former governor of the bank of Spain accused of tax fraud, and Luis 
Roldán, head of the Civil Guard, were arrested for misappropriations of funds. See Paul M. 
Heywood, Corruption, Democracy, and Governance in Spain, supra. After one decade of 
Socialist government, 1992 also marked the peak of Spain’s economic modernization; at least, 
that was the image Spain presented to the rest of the world: with the Barcelona Olympic Games, 
the World Exhibition in Seville, the Fifth Centenary of the Discovery, the completion of the 
Single Market, and the declaration of Madrid as the cultural capital of Europe.  
7 Carlos Closa, The Domestic Basis of Spanish European Policy and the 2002 Presidency, tr. 
Stephen J. Wilkins, 16 Notre Europe, European Studies (2001), http://www.notre-europe.eu  at 
14. See, for instance: J. Sinova and J. Tussell, El secuestro de la democracia (Barcelona: Plaza y 
Janés, 1990); Richard, Gillespie, The Continuing Debate on Democratization in Spain 46 
Parliamentary Affairs 4 (1993), pp. 534-548.  





This utilitarian discourse hardened when, in 1996, after 20 years in the opposition, the 
conservative Popular Party (Partido Popular, PP), led by Prime Minister José María 
Aznar, came to power.9 Aznar established the defense of the national interests and the 
incorporation of Spain into the EMU as his main priorities. The emergence of Aznar 
coincided with the resurgence of a Spanish nationalist discourse that was said to have 
disappeared with the end of Franco’s regime and the consolidation of democracy.10 In 
Aznar’s view, the sovereignty of the nation state was the basis for the European 
integration process. For him, Spain is “one of the most ancient nations of Europe” (a 
nation forged in the fifteenth century under the Catholic Kings’ monarchy) and the 
European project should always remain compatible with respect to the (Spanish) national 
identity.11 This compatibility could only be achieved by both the establishment of 
common rules that protect the national interests of all state members, and by obtaining 
agreement among all members. “The rule of consensus” (la regla del consenso) thus 
                                                 
9 As Balfour points out, under Aznar’s government, the PP was hierarchically organized and 
highly specialized. Aznar constructed a centralized, presidentialist party, concentrating all the 
party’s resources in his own hands. Balfour, Sebastian, “The Reinvention of Spanish 
Conservatism. The Popular Party Since 1989,” ed. Sebastian Balfour, The Politics of 
Contemporary Spain (New York, Routledge, 2005), pp. 146-168, at 149-150. 
10 As Xosé-Manoel Núñez Seixas observes, “[a]s every state nationalism which develops within 
the frontiers of a political community . . . , Spanish nationalism does not always act as such, 
under the form of a political organization or a social movement ascribed to a visible nationalist 
creed. On the contrary, it may be identified as a political ideology which permeates the agency of 
diverse socio-political actors, as well as a social sentiment of identity which is shared by the 
population, as an imagined community. The presence of state nationalism may be diluted, but it is 
persistent, while the intensity of its expression varies according to the presence of external and 
internal enemies.” Xosé-Manoel Núñez Seixas, What is Spanish nationalism today? From 
legitimacy crisis to unfulfilled renovation (1975-2000) Vol. 24, Ethnic and Racial Studies No. 5 
(September 2001), pp. 719–752 at 720. 
11 José María Aznar, España. La segunda transición (Madrid, Espasa Calpe, 1994) at 29 and 162-





“should be the basic criterion for the adoption of the fundamental decisions that affect the 
common politics.”12 
It is important to mention that Aznar sees Spain as a single (no matter how pluralistic, 
multicultural, diverse, multilingual, and heterogeneous) nation.13 In his view, the 
National State requires some basic unity among all Spaniards: a common history, 
language, and project. Hence, the peripheral nationalisms (Catalan, Basque, and Galician) 
contradict the idea of a Spanish national community, thereby threatening the integrity and 
unity of the nation.14 Ironically, after the elections of 1996, Aznar had to negotiate the 
parliamentary support of two peripheral nationalist parties, Catalan Convergència I Unió 
(CIU) and the Basque Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), in order to become prime 
minister. The political discourse of solidarity, respect, and diversity that characterized his 
electoral campaign was transformed after he won the 2000 elections by an absolute 
majority, acquiring a stronger Spanish nationalist tone, as he no longer needed the 
support of his earlier allies.  
In the economic sphere, the PP government accelerated the European policies of 
economic liberalization, already initiated under the PSOE government, in order to fulfill 
both the Maastricht Convergence Criteria and the conditions established by the 1997 
Growth and Stability Pact. The incorporation of Spain into the EMU was achieved in 
1999, which led to the introduction of the Euro in 2002.15 The defining feature of Aznar’s 
                                                 
12 Aznar, supra, 168. 
13 Id., at 29.  
14 Id., at 31-39. 
15 See, for instance: Farrell, Mary, Spain in the E. U.: The Road to Economic Convergence. 
(Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); Sofía A Pérez, “Constraint or Motor? 
Monetary Integration and a Social Model in Spain” in Euros and Europeans. Monetary 
Integration and European Model of Society, eds. Andrew Martin and George Ross (Cambridge, 





government was its neoliberal perspective on European integration:16 To strengthen 
economic growth, the European Union should be based on market liberalization and 
competitive economy.17 Aznar’s neoliberal program is best reflected in a joint proposal, 
presented with Tony Blair in the Lisbon Summit of 2000, in which both prime ministers 
established as the “main objective for Europe: higher growth, higher employment, 
modernization of the economies.”18 In this joint proposal, Aznar and Blair claimed that 
the role of governments has changed: their new role is to create the conditions for 
business to boost job creation and combat social exclusion, without imposing rigid 
economic and social regulations to the market. On the contrary, governments should 
avoid any interference in market decisions, on the premise that the liberation of the 
European economy (free market, deregulation, open competition, privatization) will 
benefit a greater proportion of the population. Both prime ministers conclude, in a 
populist tone, that European leaders “will be judged by their ability to manage the intense 
changes that run Europe.” For this reason, if governments are to succeed, they “must do 
everything possible to explain these changes and seek the support of the real rulers of 
Europe: the citizens themselves.”19 Aznar identifies economic growth and free market as 
synonymous with social well-being and democracy. As mentioned in the introduction, his 
legislature (1996-2004) was nicknamed “the second transition” (the title of a book he 
                                                 
16 Closa, supra at 27. 
17 See: “Primera iniciativa común de un presidente español y un primer ministro británico. Aznar 
y Blair harán hoy una propuesta conjunta para crear empleo en la UE. A través de una carta 
firmada por ambos y dirigida a los demás gobernantes europeos.” El Mundo, Monday, 30 
November 1998, http://www.ucm.es/cgi-bin/show-
prensa?mes=11&ano=1998&dia=30&art=1&tit=b 
18 José María Aznar and Tony Blair, “El crecimiento, objetivo esencial para Europa,” El Mundo 






published in 1994) as a way of saying that the PSOE government had failed to complete 
the process of economic modernization, and, therefore, to consolidate democracy.20  
 In Disagreement, Jacques Rancière refers to the European neoliberalism of the 
1990s as “the end of politics,” as the reduction of politics (as a set of practices) to the 
[idea of] management and administration of economic interests and necessities.21 
Rancière observes that the collapse of the Soviet system in the 1990s provoked an 
“internal weakening” of the very same liberal democracy that was proclaimed to have 
triumphed over so-called totalitarian systems. The end of the socialist project made 
possible the establishment of an agreed-upon vision (at the core of the so-called Western 
democracies) that viewed the global market economy and “the unlimited power of 
wealth” as inevitable historical necessities for our world and its future. 22 The neoliberal 
vision, as Brett Levinson puts it, “naturally” established the market as “the destiny of 
man: inevitable and necessary.”23 Faced with this incontrovertible logic, the 
government’s task is to create the adequate conditions for ensuring the optimization of 
interests and gains for all. 24 In this way, Rancière points out, Marx’s once-scandalous 
observation that governments are mere servants of international capital “is no longer the 
shameful secret hidden behind the ‘forms’ of democracy; it is the openly declared truth 
by which our governments acquire legitimacy.”25 
                                                 
20 Balfour, supra at 154.  
21 Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, 1995, tr. Julie Rose (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1999) at 86.  
22 Jacques Rancière, Hatred of Democracy, 2005, tr. Steve Corcoran (New York: Verso, 2006) at 
77. 
23 Brett Levinson, Market and Thought. Meditations on the Political and Biopolitical (New York:  
Fordham University Press, 2004) at 2.  
24 Rancière, Hatred, supra at 77. 





In this process of legitimization, Rancière further argues, the demonstration that 
governments only ever do what is required by strict necessity in a world dominated by 
the constraints and caprices of the global market depends on a demonstration of 
powerlessness: maximizing the pleasure of individuals is only possible on the basis of 
their acknowledged incapacity to manage themselves.26 Put differently, the State’s 
authority lies in the depoliticization of the people. Those who deny this necessity or 
protest against it are, according to this logic, representative of an obsolete ideology and 
therefore against progress.27 The removal of conflict and dispute serves as proof of the 
State’s capacity to solve problems and manage the interests of the population, understood 
as “a single, objectivizable totality.”28 Rancière concludes that, rather than ensuring the 
institutional mechanisms that guarantee the sovereignty of the people, politics became a 
matter of coming into agreement on the proper “management of the local consequences 
of global economic necessity.”29  
Rancière distinguishes the same process of depoliticization in the European Union. In 
his view, the emergence of transnational institutions such as the EMU or European 
Council distances the people, as the former and their leaders are not accountable to the 
latter. The French referendum held in May 2005 to decide whether France should ratify 
the European Constitutional Treaty illustrates this unaccountability well. When the 
majority voted “no” to the treaty, the oligarchs and their experts attributed the rejection to 
                                                 
26 Id. 
27 Rancière, Hatred, supra at 86. 
28 Id. at 78. 
29 Jacques Rancière, Introducing Disagreement, 9 Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities 3 
(2004), pp. 3-9 at 4. For Rancière, the “ineluctable economic necessity is comprised of nothing 
but the collusion of two specific necessities: ‘the limitless growth of wealth; and the growth of 





the ignorance of the people.30 People’s dissent was conveniently labeled “populism.” 
According to Rancière, populism is nothing other than “the convenient name under which 
is dissimulated the exacerbated contradiction between popular legitimacy and expert 
legitimacy, that is, the difficulty the government of science has in adapting itself to 
manifestations of democracy and even to the mixed form of representative system.”31 As 
a result of this, the European Lisbon Treaty was signed by the state members on 13 
December 2007 and entered into force on 1 December 2009 without contemplating the 
option of a new referendum.32  
My aim in what follows is to examine critically the neoliberal politics of consensus of 
the nineties in light of La Comunidad, as well as the reemergence of the Spanish 
nationalism that is said to have disappeared with the end of Franco’s regime and the 
consolidation of democracy. 
 
II. THE POWER OF THE MARKET: CONSUMPTION AND ALIENATION 
In the opening credits sequence, a tracking-along shot of the pavement in close-up 
is followed by a tilt-up shot (reminiscent of the flight of a bird) that shows a majestic 
building with a cat in one of its windows. The camera then follows the cat into the 
interior of a dark room with piles of trash, filthy water, and finally a decomposed corpse 
                                                 
30 Rancière, supra at 79. 
31 Id. at 80. 
32 The European Lisbon Treaty amends both the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht, 1992) 
and the Treaty establishing the European Community (Rome, 1957). The Treaty needed to be 
ratified by all state members, but not by its citizens (of the 27 EU members, only Ireland is 
required by its constitution to hold a referendum). The Treaty was initially rejected by Ireland in 
referendum, after which a second referendum was held reversing the result. See Treaty of Lisbon, 






on which the cat starts nibbling. The sequence closes with an image of the cat dissolving 
into a spiral, at the center of which appears a face that, as the credits indicate, belongs to 
the film protagonist actress Carmen Maura. The camera isolates her face at the left of the 
frame and reveals the object of her terrorized look: fifteen people that, as the title of the 
film points out, are La Comunidad (The Community). This sequence marks the centrality 
of the building in the film, and it anticipates a series of contrasts between exterior and 
interior, outside and inside, community and individual, as well as the restriction, 
claustrophobia, and stalking that run throughout.  
After the credits sequence, the film opens with an image of Julia talking on her cell 
phone with her husband. She is wearing a white raincoat and umbrella that visually single 
her out against any other passersby. Julia is in front of the majestic building, and she 
plans to sell one of its apartments. As she approaches the building to meet her new 
clients, she finds the card of a joker (with binocular) on top of a sewer with the name 
Madrid written on it (as shown by a close-up). The moment Julia opens the building’s 
door, as if she were opening the entrails of the city of Madrid, she finds a dirty foyer with 
filthy walls, damp stains, and a trash container with the name of the street: “Carrera de 
San Jerónimo 14”—purposely the same street of the Congreso de los Diputados (Spanish 
parliament). Located at the heart of the city (and of Spain), the building’s majestic façade 
masquerades the “dark” reality, which, as implied by the dead body and the images of the 
sewer and trash, pervades Spanish society.33 Despite the poor conditions of the interior of 
the building, Julia focuses on the “superb advantages” of its location: “You can go 
anywhere from here,” she tells her clients.  
                                                 
33  See Mercedes Maroto Camino, ‘Madrid me Mata’: Killing the Husband in Alex de la Iglesia’s 
La Comunidad (2000) and Pedro Almodóvar’s ¿Qué he Hecho yo para Merecer Esto? (1984), 





 The film begins by offering a rather bleak image of Spain. In a way that echoes 
Baudrillard’s vision of the “consumer society,” the film portrays a society immersed in 
the logic of the market: its inhabitants, whether real estate agents, middle class clients, or 
petty workers, equate prestige, power, and happiness with acquisition and consumption, 
without realizing that, in so doing, they are contributing instead to their own alienation.34 
In The Consumer Society, Baudrillard argues that consumption “is an active, collective 
behavior: it is something enforced, a morality, an institution.” 35 It is a whole system of 
values that has become naturalized, not by fulfilling individuals’ desires for comfort, 
satisfaction and social status, he argues, but rather, 
by training them in the unconscious discipline of a code, and competitive 
cooperation at the level of that code; it is not by creating more creature comforts, 
but getting them [to] play by the rules of the game. [. . . ] The consumer defines 
himself by his choice within a ‘game’ played between different models or, in 
other words, by his combinatorial involvement in that game. It is in this sense that 
consumption is ludic and that the ludic dimension of consumption has gradually 
supplanted the tragic dimension of identity.36  
 
Through TV advertising and mass media, “the logic of consumption” confers 
commodities not merely a use-value and economic exchange-value, but, most 
                                                 
34 Jean Baudrillard, The Consumer Society. Myths and Structures, [La Société de Consommation, 
1970] (London: Sage publications, 1998) at 191. As Gabriel and Lang remark, the word 
“consumerism” can acquire different meanings to different people in different contexts. They 
discern five different meanings: 1) consumerism as a moral doctrine. It is the essence of the good 
life and a vehicle for freedom, power and happiness. 2) Consumerism as the ideology of 
conspicuous consumption. It supplants religion, work, and politics as the mechanism by which 
social position and prestige are achieved. 3) Consumerism as an economic ideology for global 
development. It is seen as the pursuit of ever higher standards of living and therefore as a key 
feature of international trade and aid to foreign policy. 4) Consumerism as a political ideology. 
The modern state appears as both a guarantor of consumer rights and as a provider of goods and 
services. And finally, 5) Consumerism as a social movement seeking to promote and protect the 
rights of consumers. Yiannis Gabriel and Tim Lang, The Unmanageable Consumer. 
Contemporary Consumption and its Fragmentations (London: Sage Publications, 1995), at 8-9. 
Throughout this chapter, I use the term “consumerism” in all these different meanings but the last 
one. 
35 Baudrillard, supra at 81.  





significantly, a sign-value: a sign of status differentiation.37 By acquiring and displaying 
material goods, individuals attempt to differentiate themselves from others, that is, to 
gain prestige, status, and identity. For instance, the man who drives a Mercedes in the 
film (Antonio Pesadas) differentiates himself by his style, his way of consuming. This 
process of differentiation is experienced as one of freedom and choice, rather than as 
“one of being forced to be different, of obeying a code.”38 In their competition for social 
status, individuals contribute to maintaining a hierarchical social structure of privilege 
and domination: they condemn themselves to occupy a relative position within the order 
of differentiation.39 By keeping everyone in his or her place, the market system makes 
sure that individuals do not question their role as consumers: “[m]otives, desires, 
encounters, stimuli, the endless judgments of others, continual eroticization, information, 
[and] the appeals of advertising . . . make up a kind of abstract destiny of collective 
participation, set against a real background of generalized competition.”40 This is the 
double strategy of the growth society: an ideological logic based on social 
homogenization and a concrete social logic based on structural differentiation.41 For 
Baudrillard, then, alienation cannot be overcome because “it is the very structure of 
market society.”42  
 The first part of the film illustrates these processes of alienation and social 
homogenization, while undermining the myths of the consumer society. That is, it shows 
the ways in which the logic of consumption governs individuals’ values and attitudes, 
                                                 
37 Id. at 61.  
38 Id.  
39 Id. at 53-54. 
40 Baudrillard, supra at 65. 
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fantasies and drives, as well as their social relations, and transforms them into “alienated 
consumers.” The first compelling example in the film comes from its protagonist Julia 
and her husband, Ricardo. Their problems begin when Julia finds the apartment she is 
trying to sell so luxurious that she decides to spend a night there with her husband. The 
apartment, with a TV, leather sofa, king-sized waterbed, and even a Jacuzzi and a Finnish 
sauna, symbolizes everything she lacks and desires to possess: prestige, luxury, and 
social standing. The inaccessible apartment holds the promise of bridging the distance 
between what Julia is, and the fantasy of what she would like to be. Its fancy decoration 
and material comforts, its central location, and the overwhelming perfection it radiates 
“are thinly disguised narcissistic delusions transferred onto the idealized commodity.”43 
Thus, in the next scene, Julia is seen wearing an elegant pink suit and happily cooking 
dinner in the kitchen of the luxurious apartment, hoping to fulfill, at least momentarily, 
her fantasy of social status.  
 Julia’s delusions are interrupted with the arrival of her husband. Ricardo 
complains that, when he was getting a cab after work, he met Antonio Pesadas—a former 
co-worker of the insurance company that made them redundant following its downsizing 
four years earlier. Ricardo says that Pesadas is now a taxi driver, whereas he is a mere 
bouncer in a disco. His encounter with Pesadas has made him aware of his precarious 
employment and economic situation: amidst a society where people compete to reaffirm 
their social status, Ricardo creates a sense of who he is by comparing his lifestyle and 
social standing with that of Pesadas, and having drawn the shorter stick, the comparison 
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makes him feel inferior, envious, and frustrated. With his self-esteem and pride hurt, he is 
unable to share Julia’s excitement about the apartment. To make things worse, their 
romantic night is utterly ruined when cockroaches start falling down on his face from a 
crack in the ceiling while he is attempting to use the waterbed with Julia. A cutaway from 
the bedroom to the outside shows viewers that someone dressed in Darth Vader apparel 
and with heavy breathing is spying on them with binocular. Ricardo’s suspicions that 
they are not alone are confirmed. The apparent perfection of the apartment is as false as 
the promises that Julia, as a real estate agent, sells her clients and pretends to live herself.  
The film does not offer any lesser negative image of the inhabitants of the 
wrecked building. The first time they appear on screen is when the fire department enters 
into the building, alerted by Julia’s last couple of clients about the water leak from the 
apartment above. Their first appearance is visually linked to a series of images previously 
shown on a TV program that Ricardo and Julia are watching after their experience with 
the cockroaches. The TV shows a couple of vultures in close-up, looking for prey from a 
tree [Picture 1], while a voice-over coming from the TV program comments on the 
images: “The vulture, nature’s gravedigger, devours the dead. When one vulture finds a 
carcass, twenty more appear to share it. A voracious jackal joins them. The somber party 
continues until nothing’s left.” Mise-en-scène and cinematography connect these TV 
images with the entrance of the neighbors on the screen as follows: First, in a low angle 
shot that echoes the image of the two vultures looking for prey from a tree, Encarna 
(María Asquerino) and Paquita (Marta Fernández Muro) are seen wearing dark 





closer to viewers so that their excitement can be noticed when they look towards the old 
man’s apartment, hoping he is finally dead [Picture 2].  
       
Picture 1.1     Picture 1.2 
Then, eager to know that it is not a false alarm, the rest of the neighbors gather around, 
like vultures before a carcass, in front of the old man’s apartment: Ramona (Terele 
Pávez); Charlie, who turns out to be the heavy-breathing character dressed in Darth 
Vader apparel, and his controlling mother Dolores (Kiti Manver), who slaps him on the 
face for coming out “dressed like a drag queen!”; Julián Chueca (Manuel Tejada); and 
Hortensia (Paca Gabaldón). The old man is on the other side of the door and they want to 
be the first to know whether he is dead or alive. It is only after a fireman mistakes Julia 
for the community’s administrator (on vacation in EuroDisney, Paris) that the neighbors 
shift their attention from the old man’s apartment to Julia. Then, they begin to question 
her in a medium close-up [Pictures 3 and 4]:  
     





The importance of the scene goes in two opposite but connected directions: on the 
one hand, it visually highlights the contrast between community and individual. The 
neighbors position Julia as the intruder (the jackal), who does not belong to the 
community—they assume she is the new owner of the apartment that is for sale—and 
threaten to seize their common wealth (the carcass—I will return to this later). This draws 
attention to their similarity: the neighbors’ values and attitudes, their drives and desires, 
are governed by the same logic of consumerism as Julia’s. These similarities are made 
apparent after the discovery of the old man’s decomposed body inside the reeking 
apartment, along with piles of garbage, rats, flies, a broken pipe, and an abandoned cat. 
Thrilled, Domínguez (Enrique Villén), one of the neighbors, digs through the old man’s 
garbage, while singing a pirate song: “Fifteen men on a dead man’s chest. . . .” In a 
similar fashion, shortly after, Julia stealthily takes the old man’s “lost” wallet, which has 
fallen from the corpse while the paramedics remove it. Inside it she finds a mysterious 
encrypted map that, with the help of a TV advertisement, she is able to decipher; it leads 
her back to the old man’s apartment. Inside, while she sings the same pirate song as 
Domínguez, she finds 300 million pesetas in garbage bags stashed under the tiles. 
Evocative of the pirate song, the fifteen neighbors of the community and Julia, the 
vultures and the jackal, share the same monetary ambition. Finding the money marks a 
turning point in everyone’s lives and will trigger a progressive intra-communal war that 
will lead to its disintegration as we shall later on this chapter.  
But before that, the money also provokes a domestic dispute that leads to the 
rupture of Julia and Ricardo’s marriage. After an unsuccessful attempt to escape with the 





the possibilities it could grant her (“I could live off the interest and never work again. I 
could go around the world as many times as I can take.”) [Pictures 5 and 6]. 
     
Picture 1.5    Picture 1.6 
Julia’s materialistic dreams are interrupted once again with the arrival of her 
husband. This time, Ricardo enters with his tuxedo torn apart and with his face wounded. 
He complains that he has quit the disco because he has been beaten and humiliated. Julia 
tries to tell him about her stroke of luck, but Ricardo shuts her off and replies that, since 
he has nothing, he prefers not to imagine anything. At this precise moment, a TV 
advertisement with the catchphrase, “The strongest drug isn’t speed. It’s MONEY,” 
displays a series of images of expensive cars and beautiful women, forcing him to 
imagine, precisely, the things he cannot afford. Then, Julia asks Ricardo whether he 
prefers a Rover or a Mercedes. Ricardo responds:  
In this life, we’ll never put our asses in one of those. Unless, we catch Pesadas’ 
taxi. . . . You always say I have no character . . . Always looking over my 
shoulder . . . Always saying people can’t put up with me . . . [I’ve] kept our thing 
afloat. . . . Our relationship, the bills, the rent, everything! . . . We used to live off 
of my salary, but now you have to work, too, and never stop rubbing my face in it 
so that I know you’re in charge now. . . . I can’t buy an Audi or Mercedes . . . I 
don’t want to stay in this flat because it’s what we’ll never have! You don’t 
realize that. I’ll never have this flat or that car or a girl like the one in the ad! . . . 
At least I recognize my limitations and don’t expect strokes of luck.  
 
[En esta vida tu y yo no vamos a poner el culo en un asiento de esos ni de coña, al 
menos que cojamos el taxi de Pesadas. El mamón tenía un Mercedes. . . . Yo no 
tengo carácter, tú lo dices siempre. . . . Todo el día mirándome por encima del 





a flote. . . . Lo nuestro, nuestra relación, las facturas, el alquiler, ¡todo! Antes 
vivíamos de mi sueldo y no había ningún problema, pero ahora . . . tú te pones a 
trabajar en la inmobiliaria y aprovechas cualquier oportunidad para restregarme la 
mierda para que quede bien claro que tú eres la que manda ahora. . . . Yo no 
puedo comprarme ni un Audi ni un Mercedes. . . . Sabes porque no quiero 
quedarme en este piso ¡porque es exactamente lo que no vamos a tener nunca! Y 
tú no te das cuenta. Yo no puedo ni soñar con un piso como este ni con un coche 
como ese ni con una tía como la del anuncio. . . . Por lo menos reconozco mis 
límites, no me paso la vida esperando un golpe de suerte como tú.]  
 
The TV advertising’s promise that prestige, beauty, and power lie in money produces 
contradictory effects: while, on the one hand, it increases Ricardo’s frustration and 
discontent, on the other hand, it frees Julia’s aspirations and ambitions. This double effect 
reveals that “[t]he very process of production of aspirations is inegalitarian, since 
resignation at the bottom end of the social scale and freer aspirations at the top compound 
the inequality of objective possibilities of satisfaction.”44 After his encounter with 
Pesadas, Ricardo has resigned himself to his precarious social and economic position, 
assuming that he cannot achieve what he thinks is beyond his reach. His resignation 
(provoked by his humiliation) prevents his sharing Julia’s materialistic dreams, for he 
doesn’t have the money to make them come true, and such hopelessness makes him feel 
inferior, inadequate, and useless. In contrast, the moment Ricardo leaves the apartment 
and she has all the money for herself, Julia’s individualism runs amok. She gets rid of 
everyone and everything, including her husband, her clients and, therefore, her job. For 
instance, when confronted about her absent husband, she first explains that twenty soccer 
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so in spectacular fashion. That is to say, it always calls in their friends and relations, the group, 
and society, all hierarchical ordered within the process of reading and interpretation, the process 





hooligans with metal bats have beaten him; then, she concocts a tall tale about an 
accident involving a truck full of chemicals that has left his face disfigured; and finally, 
she lies and says that he has died of a heart attack. Julia, in other words, sets herself free 
to pursue her own interests and pleasures without the interference of others.  
 The first part of the film undermines the mythical market equation of 
growth=affluence= equality=democracy by unmasking a darker social reality: inflated 
housing prices that individuals cannot afford (i.e., Julia’s first couple of clients run away 
after discovering the high price of the apartment), downsizing, unemployment, inequality 
(of wealth, status, aspirations, opportunities, etc.), and dissatisfaction.45 The logic of 
consumption (i.e., through real estate agencies, TV advertising) confers on individuals 
the illusion of freedom, choice, and sovereignty, while concurrently imposing its own 
social imperatives of privilege and competition oblivious of any other ethical concerns.46 
In this way, the market system shapes society in its own image. It reduces democracy to 
economy and consumption, and, as Iris M. Young points out, encourages individuals “to 
think of themselves primarily as consumers.”47 In a society where money is the “strongest 
drug,” individuals like Julia become, like “addicts,” “unable to live without self-
delusions, mediated by material goods, which ultimately aggravate [their] condition.”48 In 
devoting their daily life to consumption, individuals are trapped in a market system that 
produces their own alienation.  
                                                 
45 See Burkhard Pohl, “El Lado Oscuro de la Nación:” La Comunidad (Alex de la Iglesia, 2000) 
in Miradas Glocales: Cine Español en el Cambio de Milenio, eds. Burkhard Pohl and Jörg 
Türschmann (Madrid: Iberoamerica, 2007), pp. 119-138 at 128-129.  
46 Baudrillard, supra at 82.  
47 Iris M. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1990) at 71. 





As Julia is about to leave the apartment with the money, Cuban dancer and 
charmer Oswaldo (Roberto Perdomo), another neighbor from the community, invites her 
to a party at his house (a party organized by the neighbors with the sole purpose of 
obtaining information about the money). Lured by Oswaldo’s charms, Julia accepts the 
invitation and postpones her escape plans. As she happily takes a shower, the camera 
shows Charlie dressed in Darth Vader costume spying on her with his binocular and 
masturbating while he repeats the words “La fuerza … la fuerza” (“The Force”). Little 
does she suspect that the fancy apartment will become her prison and the community of 
neighbors, her jailers—determined to do anything to prevent her from getting away with 
“their” money.49 
  
III. THE POWER OF THE STATE: CONSENSUS AND EXCLUSION    
In Disagreement, Rancière refers to the contemporary politics of consensus or 
consensus democracy as “postdemocracy.” He uses this term to denote the state practice 
that precludes democratic action— paradoxically, in the name of democracy.50 Ideally, 
consensus democracy “is a reasonable agreement between individuals and social groups . 
. . [that is] a way for each party to obtain the optimal share that the objective givens of the 
situation allow them to hope for and which is preferable to conflict.” 51 However, 
according to Rancière, its actual meaning can be rephrased as “a democracy that has 
                                                 
49 Peter Buse, Núria Triana-Toribio, Andrew Willis, The Cinema of Alex de la Iglesia 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007) at 132. 
50 Rancière, Disagreement, supra at 101-102. 
51 Id. at 102. This reflects John Rawls’s notion of “distributive justice,” according to which, “[t]he 
justice of a social scheme depends essentially on how fundamental rights and duties are assigned 
and on the economic opportunities and social conditions in the various sectors of society.” A 





eliminated the appearance, miscount, and dispute of the people and is thereby reducible 
to the sole interplay of state mechanisms and combinations of social energies and 
interests.”52 Consensus democracy provides a totalizing and objectifying account of the 
population and presupposes the inclusion of all parties with their corresponding 
problems, claims, and opinions. By creating the illusion of completeness, consensus 
democracy masks the effacement of the demos—those who are outside the count, the part 
of those who have no part.53 Consensual democracy—“the government practice and 
conceptual legitimization of a democracy after the demos” 54—eliminates the traces of 
(social) dissensus, conflict, and division by projecting a totalizing image of what can be 
perceived and expressed. This organization or “regime of the perceptible” is what 
Rancière calls the police, or the police order.55 
For Rancière, the “order of the police” is a given configuration of the sensible that 
defines ways of being, thinking, doing, seeing, saying, arguing, feeling, and having 
within the community. At the same time, it produces policing norms that determine who 
is included or excluded, who is counted or not counted, whose words are significant or 
insignificant, who is entitled to govern or not, and what is normal or abnormal.56 In this 
police order, everyone has an assigned place, identity, and function. Thus, consensus 
                                                 
52 Id. 
53 Rancière, Introducing Disagreement, supra at 5.  
54 Rancière, Disagreement, supra at 102. 
55 By the term police, Rancière does not refer to the petty police, the representative agent of law 
and order. Neither does he use it in Michel Foucault’s sense of the term, for whom the police are 
a matter of governmentality, that is to say, “the art of government.” See Foucault, 
“Governmentality” in Michel Foucault. Power.The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, ed. 
James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley et al, Volume 3. (New York: The New Press, 2000), pp. 
201-222. 
56 Rancière, Disagreement, supra at 29. For Rancière, “[b]efore signifying a norm or morality, the 
word ethos signifies two things: ethos is the dwelling and the way of being, the way of life 
corresponding to this dwelling.” The Ethical Turn of Aesthetics and Politics, Vol. 7 Critical 





does not mean, according to Rancière, a reasonable agreement in which parties discuss 
their problems, build up their interests, and allocate their shares; rather, it is the 
contemporary strategy of reducing politics to the activity of policing, a “set of procedures 
whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the organization of 
powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for legitimizing this 
distribution.”57 The underlying police order maintains and is predicated upon such 
consensus, but this entails, inevitably, according to Rancière, the disappearance or 
effacement of “politics.”58 Politics “ceases . . . wherever the whole of the community is 
reduced to the sum of its parts with nothing left over.”59 Rancière defines politics as 
antagonistic to the police. Politics occurs whenever the fixed distribution of the sensible 
and the counting of the parts and parties of society are disrupted by those who have no 
part in that distribution, that is, in the existing order of domination.60  
The community of neighbors of La Comunidad can be read as an allegory of this 
contemporary state of affairs that Rancière calls postdemocracy. In examining the 
formation of this community and the ties that bind it, its forms of domination and 
structure, the kind of individuals and power relations it produces, I distinguish two 
contrasting perspectives: the first is perceived in the rhetoric of the community, which is 
the language the community creates to present itself to the outer world, and symbolizes 
the way it would like to be perceived. The second is the perspective the film invites 
viewers to adopt. This view will reveal that behind the idyllic image that the community 
                                                 
57 Id. at 28.  
58 Rancière, Disagreement, supra at 102. 
59 Id. at 123. 





presents lies a hierarchical community based on inequality and injustice that prevents any 
ethical relations among its members.  
A. The Idyllic Community: the Commitment to the “Common Good”  
At the fake welcome party, Julia is introduced for the first time to the community’s 
administrator, Emilio (Emilio Gutiérrez Caba), who has cancelled his vacation after the 
discovery of the old man’s body. Their conversation takes place in a medium close-up, 
while the rest of the neighbors pretend to dance around them. When Julia asks if all the 
people at the party are neighbors, Oswaldo responds proudly that they are a very tight 
community, and that they all are interested in the common good. Emilio confirms that 
they have known each other for many years, as most of them have lived there all their 
lives (Ramona was born there, and Emilio moved there when he was a child). The only 
one who did not share an interest in the common good, Paquita and Encarna remark, was 
the old man: they tell Julia that that the old man went crazy after winning the lottery and 
was always alone in his apartment, seemingly because he was too afraid to go out. As if 
to dispel these fears, Oswaldo says that the neighbors are all like a family, and that he 
feels lucky to live in the building. The scene closes with an image of the whole 
community pretending cheerfully to sing and dance together around Oswaldo and Julia. 
After the party, Julia invites Oswaldo to her apartment longing to satisfy the desires 
her husband has left unfinished. They go to the bedroom and begin to kiss, when Julia 
suddenly hears some noises coming from the living room. She comes out of the bedroom 
to find that all neighbors have entered the apartment to search for the money, like so 





only reason for Oswaldo’s interest in her was so that he could unlock the door for them. 
Angered, Julia throws them out, and holds on to the suitcase with the money.  
  
     Picture 1.7                                             Picture 1.8 
As demonstrated by this incident, the neighbors will try to prevent Julia’s leaving the 
building by any means necessary, while at the same time offering her a series of 
rhetorical arguments legitimizing their “right” to the money.” However, the true 
intentions of the community are soon discovered. Domínguez enters the elevator with 
Julia and warns her that the neighbors are trying to kill him because she had told them he 
had the money—in fact Julia had only told them, during the party, that Domínguez was 
with her in the old man’s apartment—but it is clear that the community does not trust 
him. Domínguez explains in close-up—while holding a knife to her neck—that the 
neighbors had agreed to share the old man’s money after his death. Each one shared in 
the duty of watching the old man day and night to make sure he did not escape with the 
money. Domínguez reveals that the engineer, the former resident of Julia’s apartment, did 
not want to accept the rules of the community and suddenly “disappeared.” He explains 
that the community was held together by the dream of sharing the money one day, but 
now that Julia has it, the community is doomed. As they try to exit the elevator in order to 
escape, Julia insists on taking the suitcase first. Domínguez complains that “greed will 





between floors and is brutally cut in half. Julia is able to save the suitcase, but is faced by 
Hortensia, another neighbor who also tries to stop her. In an extreme close-up, Hortensia 
tells Julia that everything was Emilio’s idea. She explains that the old man didn’t enjoy 
his money and that they just didn’t want it to revert to the tax administration after his 
death. If they worked together patiently, Emilio convinced them, they would eventually 
get the money without hurting anyone. Hortensia explains that they signed an agreement 
whereby each party had the right to an equal share of the old man’s money. “Emilio is an 
accountant, he understands it,” she adds.   
 The neighbors appointed Emilio as their administrator to protect and maintain 
their common interests. Emilio’s expertise as an accountant qualified him as the person 
most capable of managing everyone’s interests and distributing shares and roles. Since 
the beginning, the neighbors have relied on his managerial ability in order to satisfy their 
expectations and maximize their wealth (without cheating anyone). Emilio’s authority 
thereby rests upon his expert knowledge to rule the community along with the neighbors’ 
disposition to be ruled by him.61 This “elitist” order of domination, in which the members 
of the community follow the decisions of the leader, is clearly seen when the neighbors, 
who have joined Julia and Hortensia in the staircase, turn to Emilio after trying 
unsuccessfully to convince Julia to give them the money. In his role as their leader, 
Emilio takes action and forces Julia into the engineer’s apartment to prevent her escape.62  
                                                 
61 Rancière, Hatred, supra at 52. In Book III of The Laws, as Rancière observes, Plato enumerates 
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the community. Id. at 39-40.  
62 In the precedent scene, two policemen arrive (later viewers learn that Charlie has called them) 
to the crime scene, where Domínguez’s body lies dead. Julia tries all sorts of tricks to leave the 





In a sort of long monologue, Emilio proudly explains the ethos of the community 
and blames Julia for its current state of disarray and chaos. Emilio is seen from a low 
camera angle, visually highlighting his authority, while Julia, seen from Emilio’s superior 
point of view, appears visually smaller and inferior:  
We wanted you to be one of us, to share the luck of living in this building. We 
even threw you a party. And how do you thank us? Laughing at us and what’s 
worse, trying to run off, playing dirty. Domínguez died because you double-
crossed him! . . . Domínguez didn’t deserve to end up like that! God! Do you 
know how many years I’ve been behind this project, getting these people 
together? I’ve turned down jobs, well-paying jobs, just to stay here. I knew things 
would fall apart without me. . . . A treat for the kids. My first vacation in 20 years, 
and you appear and fuck everything up! Who do you think you are? I’ll tell you. 
You’re a lying whore who hasn’t a penny! This isn’t even your flat! But that 
doesn’t matter. I feel sorry for your kind. . . . You people think only of yourselves. 
You probably don’t have a family, either. You people don’t want responsibilities. 
You just want to live in the present. . . . Well, we are different here. This is a 
community. García’s hip is bad and he eats lunch at his daughter’s house. He 
needs a little car to get around town. Paquita, on the 5th floor, is 40 years old and 
still single. Know why? Her mouth is disgusting and she’s never been kissed. She 
needs to get her teeth fixed. It’s all here on this list, corrected year after year. 
Know what I’m talking about? About solidarity, respect. We believe in respecting 
others. You don’t know what that means.  
 
[Nosotros queríamos que fuéramos uno más. Que compartieras la suerte de vivir 
en esta casa. Hasta te hicimos una fiesta de bienvenida. ¿Y cómo nos lo pagas? 
Riéndote de nosotros, y lo que es peor, echando balones fuera que es lo más sucio 
que se puede hacer. Domínguez no hubiera muerto si tú no le hubieras 
traicionado. ¿Qué le dijiste? ¿Mitad y mitad, no . . . ?! Pobre Domínguez no se 
merecía este final! ¿Sabes cuántos años llevo detrás de este proyecto? ¿Sabes el 
esfuerzo que he tenido que hacer para poner de acuerdo a toda esta gente? He 
rechazado trabajos, trabajos muy bien pagados, sólo por no alejarme de esta casa. 
Sabía que si yo no estaba todo esto se vendría abajo. ¿Ves lo que pasa? Sólo por 
darles un capricho a los chicos, las únicas vacaciones  que me he permitido en 20 
años, y de pronto ¡llegas tú y lo jodes todo! ¿Quién te has creído que eres?! Yo te 
lo voy a decir! Eres una puta mentirosa que no tiene donde caerse muerta! Ni 
siquiera eres la dueña de este piso. ¡Pero eso qué más da! La gente como tú me da 
pena. . . . Sois todos iguales. Sólo pensáis en vosotros mismos. Seguro que 
                                                                                                                                                 
police that “they,” the neighbors of the community, want to kill her because she has found 
“something” they have been looking for, for years. But, when asked what is this “something,” 
unable to tell them the truth, she responds that she has found the luxurious apartment and “people 






tampoco tienes familia, que también eso es mentira. ¡Claro! Vosotros no queréis 
responsabilidades, sólo vivir el presente, disfrutar de la vida a lo loco . . . Bueno, 
pues aquí no. Aquí somos una comunidad. García tiene mal la cadera y va todos 
los días a comer a casa de su hija que vive en Atocha. Necesita un coche . . . para 
conducir por la ciudad. Paquita, la del quinto, tiene 40 años y sigue soltera. 
¿Sabes por qué? Porque su boca da asco y nadie la ha besado. Necesita una 
dentadura nueva. Está aquí todo, en esta lista, corregida año tras año. ¿Sabes de 
qué te estoy hablando? De solidaridad, de respeto. Nosotros creemos en el respeto 
a los demás. Pero claro tú no sabes lo que quiere decir esa palabra.] 
 
For Emilio, Julia embodies everything the community is not. Even though the 
community gave her the chance to “share the luck” of living in the building, she has 
chosen instead to pursue her own pleasures and interests. She is an ingrate for having 
rejected everything the community offered. The selfishness, individualism and hedonism 
of which Emilio accuses her clash with the collective values of sacrifice, family, 
responsibility, solidarity, and respect upon which the community is allegedly grounded. 
Her refusal to share the values and the commitment to the common good goes against the 
community’s way of life. This commitment to the common good requires effort and 
sacrifice from each of its members, and Julia has failed to play her part. Emilio accuses 
Julia of mocking these values and everything the community stands for, and blames her 
for double-crossing Domínguez and causing his death. 
In the name of the common good, Emilio has allocated power (the most capable), 
wealth (equal shares to the old man’s money), rights (individual and collective), rules (to 
prevent people from damaging others in the pursuit of their interests), and duties (to 
follow the rules of the community), all of which serves as a yardstick for the 
community’s sense of equality and justice. Furthermore, the prosperity of the community 
can only be achieved if the neighbors abide by the common rules (i.e., to watch the old 





the old man’s wealth. Emilio positions himself as the catalyst and embodiment of such 
commitment: he has worked tirelessly to make the agreement possible and has sacrificed 
better job offers for the sake of the common good. Indeed, the chaos produced during his 
absence—forcing him to interrupt his first vacation in twenty years—reaffirms the fact 
that his leadership and management are the glue that keeps the community together. 
Emilio assures her that all the problems, interests, and needs of each member are heard 
and taken into account. Thus, the list of each member’s demands is amended year by 
year: for instance, García’s hip is bad, and he needs a little car to get around town; 
Paquita needs to get her teeth fixed. The equality of everyone in the community thereby 
seems equal to the sum of its parts and their problems with nothing left over.63 The 
community, according to Emilio, exists in a higher ethical order where its being together 
entails solidarity, respect, sacrifice, and sharing. Emilio presents the values of the 
community as the embodiment of a democratic regime, and criticizes Julia’ selfishness, 
consumerism, and hedonism (people thinking only of themselves, devoid of 
responsibilities, who enjoy living the present life day by day without knowing the value 
of solidarity, family, and respect) as a threat to the community and the common good.64  
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B. Postdemocracy: Exclusion and Powerlessness  
To be sure, Emilio’s idyllic description of the community is closer to what 
Rancière has called “consensus democracy” or “postdemocracy.” Behind Emilio’s 
rhetoric of consensus, solidarity, hospitality, sacrifice, and equality, the film unmasks an 
order of domination based on hierarchy, exclusion, greed, and hatred. This is most 
apparent in the scene of the fake party, which Emilio adduces as evidence of the 
welcoming nature of the community and the good will it harbors towards Julia. The scene 
begins by visually positioning Emilio as an authoritarian figure whom everyone obeys. It 
opens with a close-up of an arm wearing a gold watch with a Spanish flag on it. Then, the 
camera introduces Emilio as the owner of the watch, wearing a shirt with a Spanish flag 
collar. When Oswaldo announces Julia’s arrival, everybody looks at Emilio and waits for 
instructions [Picture 9]. Emilio orders everyone to get ready, and as the music begins, he 
directs the moves of the neighbors like the conductor of an orchestra [Picture 10]. This 
image links the harmonious configuration of the bodies, places, and functions of the 
community to the mechanisms of a clock and a well-directed orchestra. 
   
 Picture 1.9     Picture 1.10 
However, a series of conversations between the neighbors call into question the 
harmony residing in the community and the legitimacy of Emilio’s rule. The first 






conversation takes place between Castro (Sancho Gracia) and Ramona in close-up: 
Ramona complains that she cannot stand Emilio’s ideas any more. Castro agrees with 
Ramona and observes that the problem is that “no one listens” because Emilio has 
“brainwashed them.” Ramona then warns him that no one can do anything without 
Emilio’s finding out. Fear and manipulation, rather than duty to and respect for Emilio’s 
authority, seem to guide the neighbors’ behavior.  
In another conversation between Charlie and his mother, Charlie asks her 
permission to leave the party. His mother replies that he has to stay because Emilio said 
so. Charlie then complains that he did not want to be part of it, and that they forced him 
to sign the agreement (“You made me sign it,” he says). Moreover, his mother says that if 
he leaves, he may end up like the engineer. Under the pretext of agreement, the 
consensual community masquerades the fact that there are individuals who, like Charlie, 
are not willing partners in the consensual system. Charlie’s attempt to leave the party 
signals the violent dynamics of the community. His mother denies him the permission to 
leave (because Emilio says so), and reminds him of what happened to the engineer when 
he refused to follow the rules of the community. This dialogue shows that the community 
functions as a police order which does not allow the possibility of dissent, and that it has 
powerful sanction mechanisms (including the death threat) to assure compliance among 
its members. 
At the same time, Charlie’s own inclusion in the community and role are 
questioned. Throughout the film, Charlie is treated as an inferior being (a “retard,” as 
Castro calls him) whom no one in the community takes seriously. He is portrayed as a 





relegating Charlie to the domestic sphere, the community excludes him from the public 
space of collective negotiation and the process of decision making. As an inferior being, 
Charlie’s words cannot be recognized as speech (logos), that is, he is denied the capacity 
to enunciate what is just or wrong, and regarded as a mere noise (phôn) that need not be 
taken into account. Nevertheless, in order to maintain the appearance of consensus, 
Charlie must still sign the agreement. By his signature, Charlie is included in the 
community without being part of the community—he is “the part of those who have no 
part.” Charlie “consents” to the given distribution of parts and functions without being 
allowed to participate in that distribution. Through Charlie’s “inclusion,” the community 
effaces any trace of the false count or exclusion, that is, it eliminates the internal conflict 
and creates the illusion of a seamless totality. By these mechanisms, the consensus 
community prescribes a given “regime of the perceptible,” a particular way of perceiving 
that establishes at one and the same time what is common to the community and the 
delimitations that define the respective parties, their places, and functions.65  
By keeping everyone in his place, the logic of consensus dismisses any possible 
criticism of the configuration of the common and reduces any space for emancipation. 
There are only two options for those who question the consensus community: either they 
are made to accept its common project, values, and rules and become members, like 
Charlie, but not participants of the community; or, if they refuse to accept them (like the 
engineer) or are perceived to have violated them (like Domínguez), they become a threat 
and are treated like the enemy. In the latter case, the community responds with sheer 
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violence.66 When Julia asks Emilio if he killed the engineer, Emilio justifies the murder 
by asserting that “[h]e was destroying the community.” The engineer did not want to 
follow the common rules and his refusal to cooperate became a threat to the survival of 
the community. To preserve the community’s way of life he had to be eliminated. 
According to Emilio, Julia represents a similar threat, and as such, must experience the 
same “luck” as the engineer.  
By presenting a visible and identifiable enemy, the community ‘‘conveniently 
establishes an inside and an outside.”67 Whereas Charlie is an internal problem towards 
whom the community must “stretch its hand” in order to maintain the illusion of 
consensus, Julia is the external other who does not share the identity of the community 
and therefore needs to be excluded to preserve its common project. The community’s 
perceived risk of dissolution produces the effect of unity through inclusion. Moreover, 
this unity is maintained through exclusion and hatred towards those who are deemed 
selfish and unsupportive. Rather than a “being together” as an act of solidarity and of 
respect for the other, as Emilio claims, this is “a coming together in order to exclude”.68  
 
C. The Foundation of the Consensus Community 
Julia sees through Emilio’s rhetoric and replies to his long “monologue”: “You 
are a fraud and a thief, like me, like everybody.” Emilio defends himself, asserting that he 
is entitled to the money because the old man guessed the scores of the soccer lottery 
thanks to him. Emilio tells Julia: “He asked for advice. He said, ‘Sporting against Real 
                                                 
66 See Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, tr. George Schwab (Chicago & London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
67 Rancière, Disagreement, supra at 116. 





Sociedad,’ and I said, ‘Tie’. I don’t know, it just came out of my mouth. No one else in 
Spain marked ‘Tie’. Just me.” According to Emilio, this gives him the right to a share of 
the profits. He explains that the old man became greedy and decided to keep the winnings 
for himself instead of sharing it with him and with the community. “As if we didn’t 
exist,” he complains. “We were neighbors. A lifetime together, meeting in the elevator, in 
the bar. It meant nothing to him. He could have given us a part, or just gifts.” As Emilio 
tells the story, the neighbors had a prior claim to the money that the old man had denied 
them when refusing to share what was their due.  
Despite Emilio’s myth about the origins of the community, the community he is 
talking about is founded precisely at the moment in which the neighbors conspire to steal 
the money from the old man. The previous “being together” of the community, which the 
old man had supposedly infringed on when refusing to share the winnings of the lottery, 
does not give them the right to a share of the profits. The idea of “coming together” arises 
at the moment the old man wins the lottery. What brings about the consensus community 
is therefore, as Cristina Moreiras-Menor points out, not the sharing of experiences, 
values, or space by all its members, but rather their materialist dreams and desires.69 
Around these dreams and desires, Emilio has fabricated a sense of community which 
serves his own interests. Now that Julia threatens to destroy his plans, as the engineer did 
before her, she must be eliminated. 
Julia understands that Emilio’s rhetoric hides the same selfishness and 
individualism of which he accuses her and the old man, and accuses him of using the 
neighbors: “You needed the neighbors. You couldn’t guard the old man by yourself.” 
                                                 
69 See Cristina Moreiras-Menor, Nuevas fundaciones: Temporalidad e historia en La comunidad 





After realizing Emilio’s hypocrisy, Julia stands up from the floor and confronts Emilio 
face-to-face for the first time. Julia asks: “Now you don’t need them. Will you kill them 
all?” Emilio violently beats her again. Julia responds (ironically, with words that recall 
her earlier fight with her husband): “You’ve had 20 years to think about it. And about 
getting rid of your beloved wife and kids. . . . She must be a good woman to have gone 
without vacations. But with money, you can get something better. . . . Someone who 
doesn’t know, who matches your new house and pool, your new convertible. Have you 
thought about it?” A cutaway from Julia’s apartment shows that Charlie is witnessing 
everything with his binocular [Pictures 11 and 12]. 
 
                      
Picture 1.11     Picture 1.12 
 Emilio tries to kill Julia, but she defends herself and, in a sudden move, Emilio 
slips and hits the bathtub with his head and begins to bleed profusely. Julia tries to clean 
the blood stains from her hands and face, when she receives a call from the real estate 
agency, telling her that new clients are about to arrive to visit the apartment. Julia hides 
Emilio’s body in the bedroom, thinking he is dead, and tries to get rid of the clients. After 
they leave, Julia lies side by side with Emilio. Suddenly, he wakes up and attacks Julia, 
after which she kills him with a lamp. When she thinks she is finally safe, the neighbors 
enter Julia’s apartment, but she is able to hide in the balcony with the suitcase. Like the 





spot as the body of the old man when found. Visually, Julia’s materialistic dreams put her 
in the same exact position as the dead old man, afraid of the neighbors and in danger of 
ending like him [Pictures 13 and 14].  
                          
Picture 1.13      Picture 1.14 
By reading the consumer society in Baudrillardian terms,1 and the consensual 
community of neighbors as an allegory of what Rancière calls postdemocracy, I have 
attempted to unmask how the interplay of the power of the market and the power of the 
State confine individuals to a depoliticized place, the market system through its order of 
differentiation, the consensus community through its police order of distribution.2 Both 
transform society into a homogeneous and objectifiable police-like order, which, in the 
name of inclusion and difference, produces, paradoxically, exclusion and sameness. Both 
confer on individuals the illusion of sovereignty, while imposing codes of conduct that 
determine their behaviors and attitudes and discourage people’s questioning their roles as 
consumers. Democracy is thereby reduced to a form of government that enables 
economic and state powers to rule in the name of the sovereignty of the people, and 
                                                 
1 Rancière, Hatred, supra at 95. This Baudrillardian cinematic account of democracy and the 
alienated consumer contrasts with the contemporary European intellectual tendency to blame 
individuals for the power of consumption. Contrary to this anti-democratic tendency, the 
Baudrillardian reading of the film denounces not an excess of democracy but its absence. 
Baudrillard, supra at 50. 
2 Brett Levinson defines the interplay of these two powers as a “duopoly”: “[a] state/market dyad 
in which relativism and absolutism, contingency and necessity, deregulation and law, circulation 
(a key topos of the market) and production (a fundament of the state form), unfixity and fixity, 
work together to form our social, political, cultural, and intellectual domains.” Market and 
Thought, supra at 15. 
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relegates politics to the consensual administration and management of economic interests 
and allocation of power and resources within the State.  
 
IV. THE POWER OF THE DEMOS 
The central question I am exploring now is whether the film engenders any 
possibility for political emancipation. Rancière defines the politics of emancipation as a 
set of practices guided by the presupposition of equality for anyone and everyone, and by 
the attempt to verify this presupposition through action.3 Through the act of political 
emancipation, the demos—those who have no part in the distribution of the sensible—
dissent from the identity, role, and place the police order has assigned them and, enacting 
their equality, are able to reconfigure the political realm. As he puts it, “politics exists 
because those who have no right to be counted as speaking beings make 
themselves of some account.”4 Politics is not, according to Rancière, a discussion or 
negotiation between parties about their interests, values, or opinions. Neither is it a 
quarrel over the solutions to be applied to a problematic situation. It is a disagreement 
over what the police order has established as the “common” of the community;5 it is a 
dispute over the configuration of the perceptible itself, that is, over the frame within 
which one sees something as given. 6 Politics is, in this sense, an aesthetic act that 
reconfigures the perceptible partitions that define the sum of the parts and their 
                                                 
3 Rancière, “Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization” in The Identity in Question, ed. John 
Rajchman (New York: Routledge, 1995) at 63. 
4 Disagreement, supra at 26-27. 
5 As Gabriel Rockhill notes, the “common” is “what makes or produces a community and not 
simply an attribute shared by all its members.” In The Politics of Aesthetics, supra at 102-103. 
6 Rancière, Introducing Disagreement, supra at 6. Cf. Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical 
Discourses of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, tr. F. Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987).  
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capacities.7 This acting out or demonstration is not the act of a subject who has an 
identity prior to the conflict in which it is named as a party. Rather, the political act 
occurs through a process of subjectification, by which those not previously identifiable 
within the given field of experience are able to appear and inscribe “subject names” on 
it.8 This moment of inscription—which coincides with the political act—reveals the 
existence of a wrong, which is an inequality and miscount of the parts of the community.9 
For Rancière, politics is synonymous with democracy, which “is neither a form of 
government that enables oligarchies to rule in the name of the people, nor it is a form of 
society that governs the power of commodities. It is the action that constantly wrests the 
monopoly of public life from oligarchic governments, and the omnipotence over lives 
from the power of wealth.”10 Democracy is thus “a way for politics to be.”11  
The last part of the film offers an example of such political emancipation. The 
sequence begins with an image of Julia trapped in the old man’s apartment and the 
neighbors trying to get inside by breaking the door. At this point, Charlie unexpectedly 
enters the apartment from a hole in the ceiling. “Where is the suitcase?” he asks. Julia 
tells him to forget the money, but Charlie insists that, in order to escape, the suitcase has 
to go with the two of them. In their way out to the rooftop, Charlie exchanges the suitcase 
                                                 
7 For Rancière, aesthetics is “what allows separate regimes of expression to be pooled.” 
Disagreement, supra at 57. 
8 Id. at 35 and 37. 
9 Rancière defines “wrong” as “the mode of subjectification in which the assertion of equality 
takes its political shape.” He distinguishes wrong from the lawsuit: “objectifiable as the 
relationship between specific parties that can be adjusted through appropriate legal procedures. 
Quite simply, parties do not exist prior to the declaration of wrong. . . . What is more, the wrong it 
exposes cannot be regulated by way of some accord between the parties. It cannot be regulated 
since the subjects a political wrong sets in motion are not entities to whom such and such has 
happened by accident, but subjects whose very existence is the mode of manifestation of the 
wrong.” Disagreement, supra at 39.   
10 Rancière, Hatred, supra at 96. 
11 Rancière, Disagreement, supra at 99. 
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with the money inside it for another behind Julia’s back. Once there, the following 
dialogue takes place: 
Charlie: “This is my plan. You escape. I’ll create a distraction, like in the Death  
  Star.”  
Julia: “What Star?”  
Charlie: “Han Solo distracted the Stormtroopers while Luke and the Princess fled, 
  remember?”   
Julia: “This isn’t ‘Star Wars.’”  
Charlie: (he kisses her in the mouth and says) “The Force is with me.”  
Julia: “They could kill you.”  
Charlie: “Don’t worry, nothing will happen. I’ll play dumb as always. Trust me.”  
  
[Charlie: Este es mi plan. Tú huyes mientras yo los distraigo, como en la Estrella 
 de la Muerte. 
Julia: ¿Pero qué Estrella? 
Charlie: Hans Solo distrae a los soldados imperiales mientras Luke y la Princesa  
  huyen. Pero vamos a ver, ¿cómo no te puedes acordar? 
Julia: Por favor, ¡esto no es la Guerra de las Galaxias! 
Charlie: La Fuerza esta conmigo. 
Julia: ¿Pero no te das cuenta de que te pueden matar? 
Charlie: Tranquila mujer, que no pasa nada. Me haré el tonto como siempre.  
  Confía en mí, ¿vale?] 
  
 Julia finally trusts Charlie and starts running. When the neighbors arrive on the 
rooftop, Charlie, dressed in Darth Vader apparel, confronts them with a fake plastic 
sword and says: “Too late. The princess is gone. The rebellion will triumph. Long live the 
Republic!” [Pictures 15 and 16]. Oswaldo and Castro beat him up, while commenting 
with derision: “Republic! What fucking Republic? Why is this retard here?” Charlie’s 
mother recriminates him: “I told you to stay at home.” Charlie replies that Julia had told 
him that she loved him and she would marry him. His mother reproaches: “Your father 




    
Picture 1.15    Picture 1.16 
 Before analyzing the political character of Charlie’s confrontation with the 
community, it is crucial to remark that Charlie’s action arises from his ethical encounter 
with Julia’s vulnerable face after he witnesses the violent scene between Emilio and Julia 
with his binocular.12 As I will explain in chapter 3, according to Levinas’ ethics, in the 
face-to-face encounter between the self and other, the other appears in the uniqueness of 
her face, and expresses an ethical demand, “Consider me before you act!,” which needs 
to be acted upon immediately.13 In Julia’s vulnerable face, brought closer with the help of 
the binocular, Charlie reads a concrete and personal ethical request—help me!—
addressed to him. Charlie responds to Julia’s call by helping her escape from the old 
man’s apartment, and his unconditional responsibility towards her manifests itself when 
he confronts the community of neighbors in order to create a diversion for her.  
 In the quoted conversation between Charlie and Julia, Charlie uses the fictional 
world of Star Wars (in particular, Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope, 1977) to explain 
his plan of escape to Julia.14 When Julia warns him that he does not live in a fictional 
                                                 
12 Charlie is seen several times spying on Julia with his binocular, but he takes action only this 
time. In a figurative way, Charlie is the joker with binocular that Julia finds at the beginning of 
the film. 
13 This ethical obligation towards the other is not part of moral principles or categories that reduce 
the other to the same. This other is always unfathomable, irreducible to the categorical 
imperatives of the self.  
14 Charlie refers to the scene where Han Solo, a smuggler that joins the Rebel Alliance against the 
authoritarian Galactic Empire, helps Princess Leia and Luke Skywalker (the hero of the saga, and 
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world (“This is not Star Wars”) but in one where he could get killed, Charlie tells her to 
trust him, and assures her that, since he will “play dumb as always,” nothing will happen. 
Charlie uses the marginal role that the police order has assigned him (the role of the 
“retard”) in order to distract the neighbors and facilitate Julia’s escape. By playing 
“dumb,” Charlie manages also to protect himself (had the community realized his true 
plans, he would have been most likely killed). At the same time, Charlie’s confession that 
he will play dumb “as always” reveals this playing dumb as a deliberate and willful 
strategy that makes him smarter than what he looks like, demonstrating that “dumb” is 
not a category to which he belongs. Behind the role the community has assigned him—
and he playfully has adopted—lies an intelligent person capable of deceiving and 
outsmarting the community. For the first time, he stands against the community and 
imposes himself as an actor: he dissents from the identity, role, and place he had been 
assigned and inscribes himself as an equal.   
By making it apparent that his role as a “retard” is undeserved, Charlie also 
dissents from the identity and role imposed by (the community of) viewers. Charlie’s 
action reconfigures the regime of the perceptible for the viewer, who had, up to that 
point, underestimated him—like the rest of neighbors.15 What appears at first as a utopian 
fantasy—the escapist fantasy of a freak dressed in Darth Vader apparel imagining 
rescuing Princess Leia from the Imperial Stormtroopers—becomes the narrative 
framework for what is actually happening. The fantasy materializes and Charlie becomes 
Han Solo, able to defy the Galactic Empire (the community) in order to help Princess 
                                                                                                                                                 
whose father was killed by cyborg Darth Vader, commander of the Empire) to escape from the 
Imperial Stormtroopers. The Death Star is the ultimate Imperial weapon. With the help of the 
Force (a metaphysical power), Luke destroys the Death Star. 
15 Throughout the film, viewers are invited to share the community’s diminishing way of seeing 
Charlie, as a “retard” who cannot be taken seriously. 
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Leia (Julia). Likewise, his words “The Force is with me,” earlier used in the context of  
masturbation, undergo a transformation. They become representative of Charlie’s real 
strength, forcing viewers to recast Charlie as a political actor, not as a freak or pervert. 
 Through this political act of emancipation, Charlie brings the wrong, the 
inequality and injustice on which the consensus community is grounded, into the open, 
and confronts the community with a contradiction. On the one hand, the community 
claims to be founded upon the principle of equality among all its members (the 
“agreement” between the neighbors) with which it supposedly operates (the equal 
distribution of shares, roles, and positions). On the other hand, the community is 
committed to inequality: Charlie is treated as an inferior being, who is beaten, humiliated, 
and treated with contempt by the neighbors. Even his own mother expresses the wish that 
he had better been drowned at birth, denying his fundamental right to exist. Charlie’s act 
performs this contradiction, which shows the community’s failure to act in ways 
consistent with the principles they claim to hold. As Todd May argues, the consensus 
community is in contradiction with itself, that is, there is a tension between “what it says 
and what it does.”16 By acting out the presupposition of equality, Charlie verifies his 
equality, putting himself retroactively on equal footing with the neighbors who would 
deny it.   
 Equality, according to Rancière, “is not a value to which one appeals.”17 Neither 
is it “a given that politics then presses into service . . . a goal politics sets itself the task of 
attaining. It is a mere assumption that needs to be discerned within the practices 
                                                 
16 Todd May, The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière. Creating Equality (University Park: 
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008) at 108-109. Furthermore, the community’s 
violent refusal to hear him contradicts its claim that all members’ needs and demands are equally 
heard and counted. 
17 Rancière, Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization, supra at 65. 
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implementing it.”18 There is therefore no need for an explicit invocation of the term 
equality, or for recognition of the presupposition of equality by the community, in order 
for it to be effective or discerned. It is rather those who interpret the action, “a third 
people” as Rancière calls them, 19 “whether participants or not, that will recognize the 
equality out of which people act.”20 The inability of the community to recognize 
Charlie’s equality (for its only response is sheer violence) is no obstacle to recognizing 
his act as political, nor to marking this political action as a failure. Charlie’s success lies 
in staging for the viewer 1) the act of subjectification that makes him emerge as an equal 
(political) subject21; and 2) the wrong that disrupts the seamless order of the police. 
Charlie’s dissent uncovers the existence of two opposing worlds in a single world: the 
world of the consensus community, which presents itself, through distribution, 
classification, and exclusion, as a homogenous totality; and the world created by 
Charlie’s political act of subjectification, which presents the community, through 
declassification, disidentification, and inclusion as different from itself.22 This 
reconfiguration of the given order of classification and identification demonstrates the 
                                                 
18 Rancière, Disagreement, supra at 33. 
19 Id. at 88. 
20 Todd May, There are no Queers: Jacques Rancière and Post-Identity Politics, Vol. 8 
Borderland 2 (2009), pp. 1-17 at 6. See also The Political Thought, supra at 58-59. 
21 For Rancière, “[a] political subject is not a group that ‘becomes aware’ of itself, finds its voice, 
imposes its weight on society. It is an operator that connects and disconnects different areas, 
regions, identities, functions, and capacities existing in the configuration of a given experience—
that is, in the nexus of distributions of the police order and whatever equality is already inscribed 
there, however fragile and fleeting such inscriptions may be.” Disagreement, supra at 40. 
22 For Rancière, “Any act of subjectification is a disidentification, removal from the naturalness 
of a place.” Id. at 36. Subjectification “is the formation of a one that is not a self but is the relation 
of a self to an other” (Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization, supra at 66).  
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power of the demos—symbolized in Charlie’s figure—the power to undermine the 
prevailing forms of domination that structure society. 23 
 
What kind of community does Charlie create among those alongside whom he acts? 
Rancière objects that the ethical obligation to respond to the call of the other in 
need creates a hierarchical and unequal relation between self and other, between master 
and victim, that goes against equality and the politics of emancipation.24 I have 
demonstrated that the fact that Charlie does not act in the name of equality, but out of his 
ethical obligation to respond to Julia’s demand, does not prevent politics in Rancière’s 
sense occurring.25 Now, I want to suggest that the community between Charlie and Julia 
                                                 
23 Rancière observes that among the necessary qualifications that Plato lists as the sources of 
legitimate authority there is a “seventh title” called the “drawing of lots,” “the law of chance.” 
This title shows that “the condition under which a government is political is that it is founded on 
the absence of any title to govern.” Rancière, Hatred, supra at 44. The power of the demos lies 
precisely in the rupture of all logics that purport to found domination on some entitlement or in 
some specific qualification to dominate: Charlie’s political action breaks the correspondence 
between the capacity for ruling and the capacity for being ruled, and exposes the contingency of 
the consensual logic of domination (the entitlement or qualification to govern). See also Ten 
Theses on Politics, Vol. 5 Theory and Event 3 (2001).  
24 Rancière explicitly rejects Jean-François Lyotard’s interpretation of the rights of the Other. For 
Lyotard, the Levinasian “’infinite respect for the Other’ means obedience to the power of the 
Other, . . . to which the human is a hostage or a slave.” Does Democracy Means Something, supra 
at 98. This way of understanding ethics, according to Rancière, may lead to what he calls “the 
contemporary ethical turn”: “a growing indistinction between fact and law, what is and what 
ought to be,” which “brings about an unprecedented dramaturgy of infinite evil, justice and 
redemption,” as it serves to justify the military campaigns against the axis of Evil (i.e., the War 
on Terror). The Ethical Turn, supra at 2. But it may also lead to what is called the “right to 
humanitarian interference”: if those who suffer inhuman repression are unable to protect 
themselves, somebody else has to protect them (i.e., humanitarian interventions in the 1990s in 
Bosnia). By placing them as victims, it becomes simultaneously a “right that some nations 
assume to the supposed benefit of victimized populations” and the “rights of the absolute victim. 
The absolute victim is the victim of the absolute evil”. Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man, 
103 South Atlantic Quarterly 2/3 (2004), pp. 297-310 at 304, and 308-309.  
25 Rancière, however, rejects giving the Other a gaze and giving to her/his voice the power of an 
“ethical injunction,” because, in his view, it may lead to a substantialization of the Other. In 
particular, he objects that, while deconstructing identity, Derrida is always on the brink of 
reinstating it by overstating the “identity of alterity” or the presence of the absent—what, in 
Specters of Marx, Derrida calls “the ghost.” Instead of speaking of ghosts, Rancière prefers to 
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is not based on a hierarchical and unequal relation. The fact that Julia is in need of 
Charlie does not mean that she is, for that reason, a helpless victim and deprived of all 
agency, nor that Charlie is a god or a master that would come to save Julia. Once Julia 
receives Charlie’s initial impulse, she is able to assert her own difference and confront 
the community, enacting her own emancipation. The beginning of Julia’s liberation 
visually coincides with the moment the two of them reach the rooftop and the frame 
shifts from the claustrophobic and constricted atmosphere of the interior of the building 
to an open view of the same majestic Madrid that is shown at the beginning of the film. 
 The neighbors run after Julia and begin a long chase across the rooftop, during 
which the neighbors start killing each other (Castro kills Oswaldo and Ramona kills 
Castro). Finally, Julia and Ramona confront each other under gigantic equestrian 
sculptures on the roof:26  
Ramona: “You wanted to cut in line. You wanted it all for yourself. You pig! . . . 
 What did you do to Emilio? . . . You  want to keep the suitcase. . . . You 
 hypocrite! You hold that suitcase like your soul was inside! You’re just 
 like us, like everyone!”  
Julia: “No, I won’t be like you!”  
Ramona: “You can’t help it. You were born that way, it’s in your blood! You ran 
 over everyone. Say you’re like me! Say it!”  
Julia: “No, Ramona. You’d never do this!”  
 
[Ramona: ¡Querías saltarte la cola! ¡Querías llevarte todo el ‘pescao’!   
  ¡Desgraciada! ¿Qué le has hecho a Emilio? . . . ¡Qué mentirosa eres! Mira  
  cómo te agarras a la maleta, ¡cómo si llevaras el alma dentro! Tú eres  
  como nosotros, ¡como todos! 
Julia: No, yo no puedo ser como vosotros. 
                                                                                                                                                 
speak of fictions. For him, the “inexistent” is, first of all, “words, texts, fictions, narratives, 
characters—‘a paper life’ instead of a life of ghosts. It is a poetic framing of specific appearances 
rather than a phenomenology of the unapparent.” The Thinking of Dissensus: Politics and 
Aesthetics, Fidelity to the Disagreement: Jacques Rancière and the Political, conference organized 
by the Post-Structuralism and Radical Politics and Marxism Specialist Groups of the Political 
Studies Association of the UK, Goldsmiths College, London, 2003, pp. 1-15 at 12-13.  
26 Not by chance, the building headquarters of a bank (Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, BBVA). 
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Ramona: Eso no se elige, se nace con ello. Tú lo llevas en la sangre. Te has  
  llevado a todos por delante. ¡Di que eres como yo! ¡Dilo! 
Julia: No, Ramona. Tú no harías esto.] 
 
This dialogue replicates Julia’s own words to Emilio but it inverts them (then, it 
was Julia who asserted that all of them were alike: “You are a fraud and a thief, like me, 
like everybody”). Ramona now asks Julia to recognize that she too, like Ramona and the 
rest of the neighbors, is driven by greed and self-interest. This time, however, Julia 
rejects this identification and realizes that she does not want to be like them.27 To assert 
her difference from the community, Julia throws the suitcase with the money at Ramona, 
who, caught by surprise, falls to her death in the middle of the building’s courtyard. By 
renouncing the money, she dissents, like Charlie, from the identity that she has been 
assigned by the community and sets herself free from the constraints and values of the 
economic order that had previously alienated her.28 Her triumph over the power of wealth 
is visually reinforced when a low angle shot shows her looking down at Ramona’s body 
from the rooftop [Picture 17]. Ramona is seen the same way viewers saw Julia moments 
earlier, when she lay on the floor of the old man’s apartment [Picture 18]. This image 
suggests that Julia could be the one lying dead on the ground, if it were not for her 
renouncing the money. 
   
Picture 1.17    Picture 1.18 
                                                 
27 Maroto, supra at 338.   
28 In so doing, Julia demonstrates, against Baudrillard’s claim, that alienation can be overcome. 
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 The moment Ramona lies dead on the ground, the rest of the neighbors arrive and 
start fighting amongst themselves, like vultures over a corpse, for the money inside the 
suitcase. Viewers learn about the community’s fate from a newspaper headline shown in 
close-up in the next scene: “Neighbors kill each other for money that doesn’t exist.” The 
neighbors have killed each other for the fake Monopoly money that Charlie had put in the 
suitcase. Greed, as Domínguez had predicted, has led the community to its own 
destruction and death.  
Several days after the incident with the neighbors, Julia sees a message from 
Charlie addressed to her in the newspaper: “Darth Vader seeks Princess Julia to meet him 
at the bar ‘El Oso y el Madroño’” (The Bear and the Strawberry Tree, symbol of Madrid). 
When Julia meets up with Charlie at the bar, she questions him directly: “Why didn’t you 
tell me you switched suitcases? They almost killed me.” Charlie explains that if he had 
told her, the neighbors would have guessed it and she would not have been able to 
escape. “That’s it?” Julia insists. Charlie admits that he also wanted to see if she was like 
his mom. Charlie invites her to dance and they start dancing together with joy. Charlie 
and Julia’s bond creates a community of equals based on mutual trust:29 on the one hand, 
                                                 
29 In The Politics of Friendship, through a deconstructive reading of canonical texts in political 
theory and friendship (from Plato and Aristotle to Nietzsche, Blanchot, Nancy, Schmitt, etc.), 
Derrida (very roughly) points to and questions a canonical “familial, fraternalist and thus 
androcentric configuration of politics” that excludes friendship between a man and a woman, and 
also between women. The Politics of Friendship, tr. George Collins (London & New York: 
Verso, 1997) at viii (italics in the original) and at 279. He observes that, from the beginning, the 
concept of politics rarely announces itself without some sort of linkage of the State to the family, 
a “schematic of filiation,” and in particular to fraternity or brotherhood; that “any republican 
motto almost always associates fraternity with equality and freedom;” and that democracy has 
seldom represented itself without the possibility of fraternization. Id. at viii. Since all the 
concepts which are fundamental in politics—democracy, sovereignty, power, representation, 
community, the nation-state—share this phallocentric, exclusive, and inegalitarian concept of the 
social bond as friendship, Derrida considers it necessary “[t]o think, interpret and implement 
another politics, another democracy”—that is, “to think and live a politics, a friendship, a justice 
which begin by breaking with their naturalness or their homogeneity, with their alleged place of 
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Julia trusts Charlie, when she follows his escape plan and runs away while he distracts 
the community; on the other hand, Charlie trusts Julia, when he asks her to meet him and 
tells her the truth about the money. Charlie’s response to Julia’s ethical call, which in turn 
becomes Charlie’s political act of emancipation, allows Julia to assert her difference from 
the greedy and self-interested community, which in turn becomes her act of political 
emancipation. Together as equals, Julia and Charlie are able to overcome both the power 
of wealth and of the consensus democracy that had previously excluded them, and to 
create a democratic community based on trust and respect for the singularity of each 
other. The film thus creates a space where the singularity of the other is reconciled with 
the demand for democratic equality. 30  
 
V. THE REEMERGENCE OF SPANISH NATIONALISM  
The scene at the bar “El Oso y el Madroño” presents a castizo group of male 
working-class customers dressed in chulo outfits (traditional Madrilenian clothes with flat 
cap, waistcoat and neckerchief) who join Charlie and Julia in dancing at the sound of the 
organillo (barrel organ) [Picture 21]. While they sing a tuna (traditional song sung by 
University student groups), its lyrics expressing their love for Portugal, Charlie shares 
                                                                                                                                                 
origin.” Id. at 105. The bond between Charlie and Julia, between a man and a woman, offers the 
possibility of “an alterity without hierarchical difference at the root of democracy”; for it frees “a 
certain interpretation of equality by removing it from the phallocentric schema of fraternity.” Id. 
232 (italics in the original). 
30 Cf. Derrida: “There is no democracy without respect for irreducible singularity or alterity, but 
there is no democracy without the ‘community of friends,’ . . . without the calculation of 
majorities, without identifiable, stabilizable, representable subjects, all equal. These two laws are 
irreducible one to the other. Tragically irreconcilable . . .” Politics of Friendship, supra at 22.  
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5,000-pesetas bills with everyone.31 According to Buse, Triana-Toribio, and Willis, the 
castizo version of Madrid presented at the bar is “just as anachronistic and antiquated as 
the murderous elevator which creaks up the centre of the block of flats.” Hence, the scene 
of the dancing chulos “is not really a departure from the temporal isolation of the 
comunidad, but a return to it.”32 Although the joyful and cheerful community at the bar 
[Picture 19] may visually remind one of the community of neighbors at the fake party 
[Picture 20], the scene is best understood not as a return to the former police order, but 
rather as a departure from it (the staging of all the differences separating one from the 
other). By reducing the community at “El Oso y el Madroño” to the Francoist castizo 
community of neighbors, Buse, Triana-Toribio, and Willis neglect the anti-national 
character of the former and, with it, the critical character of the film’s finish.    
Before analyzing the scene, it is important to shed some light on the different 
meanings of the term castizo. As Deborah Parsons explains, the adjective castizo was 
used in mid-nineteenth century costumbrista literature to describe the customs, lifestyle, 
and habits of the lower classes of Madrid, in particular, the social identity of the working-
class inhabitants of the low-lying barrios (neighborhoods) of Lavapiés, La Latina, and 
Embajadores.33 The lively urban street culture, verbenas (street parties), and arrogant 
public attitude of this social group soon came to dominate the cultural identity of the city 
                                                 
31 The Tunas estudiantiles are thought to have their origins in the Medieval Ages (13th century). 
Tunos was the name given to poor students who sang on the streets in order to collect money to 
pay their University costs. During Franco’s dictatorship, the Tunas were considered dangerous to 
the regime and, although allowed, were subject to strict control (Dirección General de Seguridad, 
10 March 1955). 
32 Buse, Triana-Toribio, and Willis, supra at 135. 
33 Deborah L. Parson, A Cultural History of Madrid. Modernism and the Urban Spectacle 
(Oxford, New York: Berg, 2003) at 10. See also: Deborah L. Parsons, “Fiesta Culture in Madrid 
Posters, 1934-1955,” in Constructing Identity in Contemporary Spain. Theoretical Debates and 
Cultural Practice, ed. Jo Labanyi (Oxford: University Press, 2002), pp. 178-205 at 184  
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(referred to as lo castizo). As a particularly localized identity, “lo castizo contrasted with 
both the national and imperial symbolism of the city on the one hand, and its burgeoning 
European modernity on the other.”34 The term castizo, however, was constantly 
appropriated and redefined over the years. At the beginning of the 20th century, writers of 
the “Generation of 1898,” such as Azorín and Unamuno, in reaction against urban 
modernity, used the term to refer to “the representative values” of a fantasized rural 
Castile. Later, Franco appropriated this meaning for his nationalist, Castilian discourse. 
Under his dictatorship, castizo lost its local and marginal connotations, and was 
naturalized into a “genuine” and “authentic” expression of Spanish national cultural 
identity.35 The castizo verbenas as an expression of the Madrilenian local identity and 
tradition were banned for the sake of a more homogenous national community. Franco 
declared Madrid the “symbolic capital of his own vision of a centralized imperial regime, 
its local urban identity submerged under a myth of universal ‘Spanishness.’”36 After 
Franco’s death, with the electoral victory in 1979 of the Socialist Mayor of Madrid 
Enrique Tierno Galván, the local and traditional verbenas were reinstated.  
Buse, Triana-Toribio, and Willis observe that the Francoist nationalist castizo 
character of the community of neighbors is apparent throughout the film: e.g., the casting 
of all the actors that play the neighbors in the community (except for, conspicuously, 
Eduardo Antuña [Charlie]), “whose personas are steeped in ‘Spanishness,’” thanks to 
their longstanding presence in all sorts of Spanish drama: cinematic, televisual and 
theatrical”; and whose presence expresses “a nagging persistence of the past in the 
                                                 
34 Parsons, A Cultural History, supra at 10. 
35 Parsons, Fiesta Culture, supra at 183. 
36 Parsons, A Cultural History, supra 1. 
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present.” 37 The film self-consciously invokes the Spanish tradition of the sainete 
costumbrista of the 1950s and 1960s.38 The old furniture and wallpaper of the interior of 
the building, the neighbors’ old-fashioned clothes and the guateque (party in a house) 
with a record player playing music of the fifties (in particular, “Why Wait” by Pérez 
Prado and his Orchestra)—all of these project the nationalist values of Spanishness 
(rejection of the outsider, homogeneity, and unity) embodied by the community.  
    
Picture 1.19     Picture 1.20 
    
Picture 1.21     Picture 1.22 
  In contrast, Charlie and Julia are visually and narratively located within the post-
Franco democratic Spain. The actors playing Charlie (Eduardo Antuña) and Julia 
(Carmen Maura) are not traditional actors of the sainete costumbrista (Carmen Maura is 
particularly well known for her collaborations with Pedro Almodóvar in the eighties). 
This post-Francoist timeframe is further reinforced through Charlie’s fictional world of 
                                                 
37 Buse, Triana-Toribio, and Willis, supra at 122 and 125. 
38 For example the dark comedies of directors such as Fernando Fernán-Gómez’s La vida por 
delante (1958) and El Extraño viaje (1963), Marco Ferreri’s El Pisito (1958) and El Cochecito 
(1960), and Luís García Berlanga’s El Verdugo (1963). See Buse, Triana-Toribio, supra at 126. 
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Star Wars, which premiered in 1977, the year of the first general elections after Franco’s 
death.39 At the same time, Julia’s modern pink suit contrasts with the old-fashioned 
clothes of the neighbors, visually dissociating her from them. Charlie and Julia are not 
merely representative of the democratic Spain, but act against the Francoist castizo ethos 
that the community of neighbors represents. Moreover, Charlie is not a freak “autistically 
trapped in 1977 with his Darth Vader outfit,”40 but an intelligent person that consciously 
uses his Darth Vader persona to outsmart the community. Charlie’s fictional world 
metaphorically alludes to the triumph of the Republic (“Long Live the Republic”) over 
the forces of the Empire (Franco’s dictatorship).  
Charlie’s political act of emancipation can be read as a collective act for the 
memory of the Republican victims, symbolized in the film by the 88-year-old man’s 
body. The film situates the foundation of the community of neighbors in the year 1981, 
the year that Real Sociedad won the Spanish title for the first time against Real Sporting 
de Gijón,41 and the discovery of the old man’s body around 2000 or 2001 (since almost 
twenty years have passed since the old man won the lottery). As Moreiras-Menor 
remarks, this timeframe allegorically locates the (national) project of the community 
between the year of the failed attempt of the coup d’état against democracy, led by 
Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero, and the year 2000, in which the Asociación para la 
Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica (ARMH) initiated the exhumation of Republican 
                                                 
39 Other contemporary cinematic references in the film are: Hitchcock’s Psychosis (1960), 
Polanski’s The Tenant (1976), Marc Caro’s and Jean-Pierre Jeunet’s Delicatessen (1991), and 
Andy and Lana Wachowski’s The Matrix (1999).  
40 Buse, Triana-Toribio, and Willis, supra at 134. 
41 In 1981, Real Sociedad of San Sebastián (Basque Country) won, for its first time, the Spanish 
football league championship against Real Madrid (itself the team representative of Franco’s 
dictatorship). This could be read as symbolizing the fight of the periphery against the center. 
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mass graves.42 The film, as Moreiras-Menor further argues, opens with the image of the 
dead body inviting us to question Spain’s politics of memory concerning the victims of 
Franco’s dictatorship and, particularly, Aznar’s rejection of the work of the ARMH, 
claiming that this would unnecessarily reopen old wounds in the Spanish society.43 By 
inscribing himself as equal while claiming “Long Live the Republic,” Charlie includes 
himself as a “conflictual actor” carrying a right not yet recognized by Spain (The Law of 
Historical Memory passed by Congress in 2007).44 
After shattering the Francoist community of neighbors and freeing themselves 
from their claustrophobic and repressive interiors, it can hardly be taken as a sign of a 
return to their pasts that Charlie and Julia are at ease amongst a bunch of local working-
class madrileños freely celebrating their local festivities and expressing “their love” for 
Portugal in a public bar. Divorced both of Francoist exclusive nationalism and the 
neoliberal politics of consensus, this joyful and cheerful community in which Charlie and 
Julia participate is 1) more “authentic” (than the fake party); 2) welcoming and open to 
the other (rather than hatred driven); and 3) generous (rather than greedy and self-
interested). By presenting all these distinctive features in the Madrilenian chulo outfit, the 
scene ridicules the castizo Spanishness of the community of neighbors and shows that 
“among those who know how to share with anybody and everybody [their equality], 
[democracy] can conversely inspire courage, and hence joy.”45  
The closing scene of the film suggests, however, that the elimination of the 
consensus and national order of domination does not guarantee a permanent democracy. 
                                                 
42 Moreiras-Menor, supra, at 379. 
43 Id. 
44 Rancière, The Ethical Turn, supra at 6. 
45 Rancière, Hatred, supra at 97. 
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The scene begins with a close-up of the suitcase containing the fake monopoly money in 
the bloodied courtyard with the silhouette of Ramona’s body painted on the floor. The 
camera then shows an image of the monopoly money flying over the Madrilenian skyline 
between the Vitalicio building and the equestrian sculptures, while the music from the bar 
“El Oso y el Madroño” continues to play extra-diegetically [Picture 22]. The opening 
scene of the film brought viewers inside the interiors of the wrecked building of La Calle 
San Jerónimo to expose the bleak reality hidden behind a European façade. The closing 
scene reverses this move and suggests that, although freed from the logic of national 
consensus, the new community remains subordinated to the requirements of European 
economic and banking policies. The community at the bar “El Oso y el Madroño” is left 
with the same old pesetas for which the neighbors have killed each other, which have the 
same value as the fake monopoly money, until they are changed into Euros. The fact that 
Charlie and Julia disrupt the prevailing police order does not mean that other forms of 
domination are not likely to be created or already exist. Rather, this suggests that 
democracy can never be fully consolidated, for it relies on episodic disruptions of the 
established order and the continual renewal of the actors and the forms of their actions. 46 
                                                 
46 May, The Political Thought, supra at 178. In Rancière’s words: “The guarantee of permanent 
democracy is not the filling up of all the dead times and empty spaces by the forms of 
participation or of counterpower; it is the continual renewal of the actors and of the forms of their 
actions, the ever-open possibility of the fresh emergence of this fleeting subject. The test of 
democracy must ever be in democracy’s own image: versatile, sporadic—and founded on trust.” 





 Justice and Historical Memory: Re-Imagining the Spanish Past 
 
The true picture of the past flits by. The past can be seized only as 
an image which flashes up at the instant when it can be recognized 
and is never seen again. . . . To articulate the past historically does 
not mean to recognize ‘the way it really was’ . . . It means to seize 
hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger. 
   
Walter Benjamin—Theses on the Philosophy of History 
 
No justice seems possible or thinkable without the principle of 
some responsibility, beyond all living present, within that which 
disjoins the living present, before the ghosts of those who are not 
yet born or who are already dead, be they victims of war, political 
or other kind of violence.  
 




In his Theses on the Philosophy of History, Walter Benjamin offers a critical vision of 
history through an interpretation of Paul Klee’s painting Angelus Novus.1 In Klee’s 
painting, Benjamin sees an angel looking as though he is about to move away from the 
present to the future while keeping his face turned toward the past. There the angel, 
looking horrified, sees not the uninterrupted historical progress, but rather a single 
catastrophe that keeps piling ruins at his feet. The angel would like to stop, awaken the 
dead, and rebuild the ruins, but he cannot. The power of a storm blowing from Paradise 
                                                 
1 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” tr. Harry Zohn, Illuminations (New 




prevents him from going back. The storm propels him forward, toward the future to 
which his back is turned, while the pile of wreckage grows skyward.2 For Benjamin, 
Paradise represents the historicist conception of history, which always reproduces the 
past in accordance with the official version of the dominant classes. The storm, in turn, is 
the ideology of progress that hides the barbarism upon which Paradise stands. The Angel 
of History, on the other hand, perceives the reality of a past excluded from the historicist 
discourse and is able to “brush history against the grain.”3 This dialectical relationship 
between the present and the past gives a new and hopeful meaning to the present.4 
According to Benjamin, it is necessary to look back and reveal the barbarism of the past 
in order to avoid repeating it in the future.  
 
 
Picture 2.1 Paul Klee’s Angelus Novus. 
 
Drawing on this Benjaminian critical image, this chapter addresses the recovery of 
the historical memory of the victims of Francisco Franco’s dictatorship (1939–1975) by 
                                                 
2 Walter Benjamin (1842–1940) was a German-Jewish Marxist philosopher, who, after Adolf 
Hitler’s election as Chancellor, had to leave Germany. Years later, he was incarcerated by the 
French authorities for three months. During his return to Paris in 1940, Benjamin wrote his 
Theses of the Philosophy of History. However, shortly after the Nazi takeover of France in 1940, 
fearing that he would fall into the hands of the Gestapo, he committed suicide at the Spanish 
border.   
3 Benjamin, supra at 257. 
4 Id., at 261. 
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contrasting Antonio Muñoz Molina’s novel Beltenebros (better known as Prince of 
Shadows, 1989) and the recent Spanish “Law of Historical Memory” (Ley 52/2007).5 In 
juxtaposing the novel and the current law, I aim to trace in each text a series of recurring 
representational practices (words, images, expressions, and figures) that seek justice for 
the victims with unequal success. The novel uses a series of images and recurring 
expressions (i.e., shadows, the repressed, eternal return, ghosts, and blindness) which 
stress the importance of coming to terms with the “ghosts of the past.” The law focuses 
instead on words and images (i.e., foundation, reconciliation, concord, and closure) that 
allude to the idea of historical progress without proper acknowledgment of the injustices 
of the past. In doing so, the law becomes a commemorative site for the Spanish 
Transition, not for the recovery of the memory of the victims. In other words, the law 
becomes another instance of the Benjaminian paradise: a reproduction of the official 
version of history that ignores and hides the ruins of the past.  
This study is not, and does not claim to be, a critical analysis of the Spanish 
Transition or of its “politics of memory.” 6 Rather, I focus on Spain’s current attempts to 
                                                 
5 For discussions about the relationship between history and memory see, among others: 
Halbwachs, Maurice, and Jeanne (Halbwachs) Alexandre. La Mémoire Collective. [1. éd.] (Paris: 
Presses universitaires de France, 1950); Nora, Pierre, Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de 
Memoire 26 Representations (1989), pp. 7-24. Within the Spanish context, see: Juliá, Santos, 
Bajo el imperio de la memoria 302-303 Revista de Occidente (2006), pp. 7-19; Ruiz Vargas, José 
María, ¿De qué hablamos cuando hablamos de ‘memoria histórica’? Reflexiones desde la 
Psicología cognitiva, 7 Entelequia. Revista Interdisciplinar (2008), pp. 53-76; Erice Sebares, 
Francisco, Memoria histórica y deber de memoria: las dimensiones mundanas de un debate 
académico, 7 Entelequia. Revista Interdisciplinar (2008), p. 96.  
6 The Spanish Transition is generally said to have begun in 1975, alter Franco’s death. There is no 
consensus however over its completion: the promulgation of the Spanish Constitution 1978, the 
PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) electoral victory in 1982, or the accession of Spain 
into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986. For a critical study of the politics of 
memory during the Spanish Transition, see, among others, Morán, Gregorio, El Precio de la 
Transición (Madrid: Planeta, 1991); Vilarós, Teresa M., El mono del desencanto. Una crítica 
cultural de la transición española (1975–1993) (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1998); Resina, Joan Ramón, 
Disremembering the Dictatorship: The Politics of Memory in the Spanish Transition to 
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cope with its traumatic past by examining the first legal document explicitly designed to 
deal with it. In my analysis of the law, I am not concerned with its concrete or positive 
legal measures, but with its justificatory and self-legitimating strategies, and for what 
these can reveal (or conceal) about the memory of the victims. These rhetorical strategies 
are best found in the law’s “Preamble” (Exposición de Motivos, in Spanish), the part of 
the law that precedes the concrete body of measures and tries to justify its own existence 
and goals. This is so because the Preamble narrates the law’s own version of the history 
that precedes it and makes it necessary, describes the social reality and context that it 
wants to affect, and depicts the kind of society it imagines and wishes to establish for the 
future. My argument is that a critical reading of these representational practices yields a 
far less satisfactory outcome than what the law is set to accomplish. Contrary to its 
declared objectives (i.e., recovering the memory of the victims), the law actually fails to 
address their memory. In contrast, the novel’s dark and ghostly representations unveil in 
the Angel of History the ghosts that return to claim justice, and which the law’s 
commemorative act renders invisible. As a result, and in a way that the current law is 
unable to accomplish, the language of the novel engenders the principle of responsibility 
without which “no justice seems possible or thinkable.”7  
My analysis is divided into four sections. The first section provides a historical 
overview of the repression during the dictatorship and the politics of memory during the 
ensuing democracy. The second section turns to Muñoz Molina’s Beltenebros to explore 
                                                                                                                                                 
Democracy (Amsterdam: Ediciones Rodopi, 2000); Moreiras Menor, Cristina, Cultura herida: 
Literatura y cine en la España democrática (Madrid: Libertarias, 2002); Gallego Ferrán, El mito 
de la transición. La crisis del Franquismo y los orígenes de la democracia (1973–1977) (Madrid: 
Crítica, 2008).    
7 Derrida, Jacques, Specters of Marx: The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New 




the language with which the novel takes responsibility for these ruins and comes to terms 
with the traumatic past. The third section looks at the ways in which the “Law of 
Historical Memory” fails to achieve responsibility for the memory of the victims. The 
fourth and final section concludes with the proceedings against Judge of the Audiencia 
Nacional Baltasar Garzón, who in 2008 tried to open a criminal investigation into 
Franco’s crimes. My comparative analysis of the law and the novel offers an alternative 
vision of history and justice that can be used as a constructive platform to critique 
contemporary Spain. 
 
I. ANTECEDENTS: PERVERSIONS OF HISTORY 
 On July 18, 1936, Franco’s coup d’état put an end to the democratic and 
constitutional government of the Spanish Second Republic (1931–1936).8 Its aftermath 
was three years of bloody Civil War (1936–1939) and almost forty years of a repressive 
dictatorship. According to the Francoist version of history, the Civil War was necessary 
and justified, as Franco “liberated” Spain from the public chaos of an illegitimate 
Republic led by “evil and degenerate Marxists.” Franco’s hegemonic nationalist 
discourse centered on eradicating the values and institutions of the Second Republic (i.e., 
secularization, democracy, federalism, etc), which were considered as a disease for the 
Spanish nation. To do so, Franco’s regime focused on the restoration of traditional 
catholic values (National-Catholicism), the exaltation of the myth of the Spanish Empire 
in Latin America (Hispanity), the assertion of Spain as one and indivisible territorial 
                                                 
8 See, for instance: Paul Preston, La destrucción de la democracia en España: reforma, reacción 
y revolución en la segunda República (Barcelona, Spain: Grijalbo Mondadori, 2001); Stanley G. 
Payne, Spain’s First Democracy The Second Republic, 1931—1936  (Madison: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1993). 
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integrity, and the rejection of communism (what was called the “New Crusade”).9 Franco 
himself defined his military uprising against the Second Republic as a “national crusade” 
to protect la patria from what he called “the bastardized, Frenchified, Europeanizing” 
doctrines of modern liberalism.10 Franco distanced Spain from modern and democratic 
Europe and promoted a homogenizing and single national identity.11 Thus, any mention 
of democratic pluralism was considered as a dangerous conspiracy of “reds” and 
“masons.” Franco proclaimed himself Generalísimo of the Spanish army, as well as 
Caudillo de España por la Gracia de Dios (Head of State of Spain by the “grace of 
God”). Furthermore, he divided Spanish society into victors (vencedores), who 
represented the heroes and liberators of the true Spain and vanquished (vencidos), who 
represented the enemies and traitors.  
During the years of the dictatorship, the military uprising of July 18 came to be 
commemorated as the “glorious uprising” (glorioso alzamiento), and April 1st, the end of 
the war, as the “Day of Victory” (El Día de la Victoria). Monumental sites such as the 
Valley of the Fallen (El Valle de los Caídos, built by the forced labor of Republican 
prisoners) or the Madrilenian Arch of Triumph (Arco del Triunfo) were built to honor the 
                                                 
9 Closa, Carlos, The Domestic Basis of Spanish European Policy and the 2002 Presidency, Tr. 
Stephen J. Wilkins, 16 Notre Europe, European Studies (2001), https://www.notre-europe.eu, at 
3-4.   
10 Pablo Jáuregui, “National Pride and the Meaning of ‘Europe’: a Comparative Study of Britain 
and Spain,” in Whose Europe? The Turns Towards Democracy, eds. Dennis Smith and Sue 
Wright, (Oxford: Balckwell, 1999), pp. 275-287, at 274. 
11 Franco’s nationalist discourse was defensive, autarkic and anti-European until the end of 
WWII. However, with the failure of the autarkic economic policy, Franco was forced to open 
Spain to Europe (to the influence of the international markets) and therefore, to change the 
previous anti-Europeanist discourse. In 1962, Spain expressed its desire to enter into the 
European Economic Community [ECC], but “[t]here was no question of admission to the EC so 
long as Spain remained a nondemocratic country.” In the 1960s and 1970s, Franco moderated the 
nationalist tone. The regime’s slogan España es diferente (Spain is different) “symbolized efforts 
by Spanish political and cultural elites to justify the Spanish political institutions and resist 
European values.” Díez-Medrano, Juan and Paula Gutiérrez, Nested Identities: National and 
European Identity in Spain Vol. 24 Ethnic and Racial Studies 5 (2001), pp. 753-778, at 762-764. 
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memory of those who “died for God and Spain.” Political propaganda such as the 
newsreel No-Do—News, and Documentaries (Noticiarios y Documentales 
Cinematográficos)—were created to transmit Franco’s ideological discourses and to 
establish absolute control over education and the media, helped to promote the image of 
Franco as a national hero and to legitimize the repression of his ideological opponents. In 
the last decades of the regime, the exaltation of the war became the exaltation of the years 
of peace, which Franco contrasted with the “violent” and “chaotic” period of the Second 
Republic.   
In contrast, the History of the vanquished Republicans was deemed unworthy of 
recounting. Their memories and suffering were severely repressed, and no memorials or 
mourning for their dead were allowed. Fear, humiliation, imprisonment, and threats of 
being punished or killed, became institutionalized mechanisms to censure any vision of 
the past that contradicted the Francoist version of history. A series of laws were enacted 
to persecute those who fought on the Republican side or were suspected of having 
collaborated with it.12 The Law of Political Responsibilities (February 9, 1939) was 
enacted against those who supported the Republican cause and anyone who was 
considered an enemy of the new Regime; the Law for the Repression of Masonry and 
Communism (March 1, 1940) was passed against those who, according to the law, 
represented the evils of Spain—they were the cause, among others, of the loss of the 
remnants of the Spanish Empire, the Civil Wars of the nineteenth century, the fall of the 
Constitutional Monarchy prior to the Republic, and the Civil War. To purify Spain from 
Republican evils, thousands of children were removed from Republican families and sent 
                                                 
12 See Carrillo, Marc, “El marco legal en la represión en la dictadura franquista durante el periodo 




to state institutions, or adopted by families that could “adequately” raise them.13 In 
March, 29, 1941, the Law of the Security of the State was passed to reinforce the Law for 
the Repression of Masonry and Communism. This law allowed the prosecution of those 
suspected of opposing the regime without any procedural guarantee. On the other hand, 
the Law of Public Order (July, 30, 1959) was used to legalize torture and to repress and 
execute any person suspected of opposing the ideology of the regime. Women were not 
an exception. In the name of the Francoist concept of redemption, women were 
imprisoned, raped, and executed because of the behavior of a son or husband.14 As a 
result, at the end of Franco’s regime, hundreds of thousands of people had been illegally 
detained, imprisoned, tortured, executed, and forced into labor, exile, or “disappeared.”15 
During almost forty years of dictatorship, the stories and memories of the vanquished 
were condemned to silence. 
Franco’s death in 1975 might have provided Spain the opportunity to seek justice for 
the victims of the regime and to honor their memory. Instead, the prominent political 
forces of the Transition agreed that securing a successful and peaceful transition to 
democracy required leaving the past behind—what has been referred to as the “pact of 
forgetfulness” (Pacto del Olvido). During the Transition (and to this day), no “truth 
                                                 
13 Brincat Report (Informe Brincat), Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe, Need for 
International Condemnation of the Franco Regime, Doc. 10737, November 4, 2005; Read May 1, 
2009, URL: 
http://www.assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc05/EDOC10737.htm, 
at 72-75. In 2006, Maltese Socialist politician Leo Brincat presented a report to the Council of the 
European Union that demanded Spain to formally condemn the human rights violations 
committed during the dictatorship. 
14 Id., at 56. 
15 Id. These were the objectives of Antonio Vallejo Nágera, Director of the Military Psychiatric 
Services and of the Psychological Investigations Cabinet during the dictatorship. He claimed to 
have demonstrated through psychological experiments the infrahuman, dangerous, and evil 
condition of the Republican enemies. Ruiz Vargas, José María, Trauma y memoria de la Guerra 
Civil y la dictadura franquista, 6 Hispana Nova. Revista de Historia Contemporánea (2006), pp. 
299-336, at 325-328.  
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commission” or trials to investigate and judge those responsible for Francoist crimes 
were (or have been) set up. In the name of national reconciliation, a parliamentary 
majority passed the Amnesty Law of 1977 (Amnesty Law/1977, 15 October, B.O.E. no. 
248).16 The law exonerated “the authorities, officers and agents of public order who, prior 
to December of 1976, committed crimes and misdemeanors against the exercise of 
people’s rights” (article 2). The law excused the newly created democratic State from the 
obligation to investigate, judge, and punish those responsible for the disappearances, 
illegal detentions, tortures, and murders committed under Franco’s regime.17 This 
amnesty “for all” was praised by almost all political groups, including communists who 
fought against Franco and his sympathizers, “because it was an instrument of ‘national 
reconciliation,’ intended to ‘close the past,’ ‘forget,’ and start a new phase.”18  
It is important to mention that few months before approving the Amnesty Law, Spain 
signed in September 28, 1976, the United Nations Treaty of International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (PIDCP), which took effect in July 27, 1977 (B.O.E. 30 April 
                                                 
16 See Appendix 1. 
17 Javier Chinchón Álvarez, Transición española y justicia transicional: qué papel  juega el 
ordenamiento jurídico internacional en un proceso de transición? A propósito de  la coherencia, 
buena fe y otros principios de derecho internacional postergados en la transición política de 
España 7 Entelequia. Revista Interdisciplinar (2008), pp. 247-254, at 247. As Aguilar explains, 
“[i]n exchange, regime reformists accepted the liberation of all political prisoners, the legalization 
of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), and truly free elections in June 1977.” Paloma Aguilar, 
“Justice, Politics, and Memory in the Spanish Transition,” eds. Alexandra Barahona de Brito, 
Carmen González Enríquez, and Paloma Aguilar, in The Politics of Memory. Transitional Justice 
in Democratizing Societies (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 92-118, at 96.  
18 Aguilar, supra at 103. Other than the radical Basque nationalists, the Spanish Socialist and 
Worker Party (PSOE), the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), Center Democratic Union (UCD), 
and the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) voted in favor; the right-wing party, Popular Alliance 
(AP), abstained from voting.   
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1977) and declared the protection of human rights.19 Article 2. 3 states that each State 
Party to the present Covenant undertakes:  
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are 
violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has 
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;  
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto 
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by 
any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to 
develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;  
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when 
granted. 
  
As Chinchón-Alvarez observes, “the obligation to article 2.3 seemed to be completely 
and simply forgotten by Spain, whose legislator, perhaps suffering a severe amnesic 
attack, only five months after consenting to be obligated to the treaty, had no qualms 
about approving the célèbre and celebrated Amnesty Law . . .  which violated the 
Covenant in its letter and spirit.”20 But the PIDCP was not the only treaty Spain was 
obligated, since a number of international treaties and laws in defense of the human rights 
were in force long before, such as the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1949 or the First 
Conference of The Hague in 1899.21 Most importantly, the Spanish Republican 
Constitution of 1931 included the obligation of the State of Spain to respect the 
International Law. The crimes against humanity of the Francoist dictatorship were (and 
are), therefore, part of the European context and the types of offences that are determined 
                                                 
19 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 16, 1966 and took effect in 
1976. 
20 Chinchón-Álvarez, supra at 346-347, my own translation. 
21 Also: The European Convention of Human Rights (1950); American Convention of Human 




by the Nuremberg doctrine.22 The State of Spain had the obligation to apply the Charter 
of Nuremberg and its principles (1945), which recognized and condemned war crimes, 
crimes against peace and against humanity (i.e., murder, torture, deportation, persecution 
based on political, racial or religious grounds) and conferred jurisdiction to the 
International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg to judge and punish those responsible for 
those crimes.23  Despite the obligation of the State of Spain to respect the International 
law, Spain did not ensure or provide remedies to defend and protect the rights of the 
victims of the Francoist repression, neither provided full reparation for the victims nor 
facilitated access to justice. As a result, individual human rights and international law 
were “sacrificed” in the service of national reconciliation. 
In the mind of many Spaniards, there was a direct link between the Republicans’ 
political “excesses” (as they were called by Francoist sympathizers) and the Civil War 
(not least because of persistent Francoist propaganda). This perceived link between the 
Republic and the Civil War made many weary of bringing back the ghosts of the Second 
Republic.24 There was a reluctance to relate the emerging democracy with the 
constitutional Republic, as it was feared that to do so could revive the conflict between 
the “two Spains.” In fact, the democratic regime chose not to restore the Republican 
tricolor flag (red/yellow/purple) and the national anthem (Himno de Riego). Instead, the 
                                                 
22 See International Amnesty report: “España: poner fin al silencio y a la injusticia. La deuda 
pendiente con las víctimas de la Guerra Civil Española y del régimen franquista.” 18 July 2005 
read April 30, 2009 http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/espana/doc/aifranq.html; and also “The 
question of impunity in Spain and crimes under Franco.” Equipo Nizkor 14 April 2004 read April 
30 2009 http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/espana/doc/impuspa.html  
23 The applicability of the “Principles of Nuremberg” in Spain was recognized in August 12 1949 
(BOE 5 September 1952 and 31 July 1979) at the ratification of the Geneva Convention to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War. Nizkor, supra.  
24 Paloma Aguilar, Políticas de la memoria y memorias de la política. El caso español en 
perspectiva comparada (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2008), at 234-235. 
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Constitution of 1978 preserved the traditional red/yellow/red tricolor flag and the Marcha 
Real anthem (both used also under Franco). As Francisco Erice Sebares points out, “[t]he 
hypothetic consensus of pre-transitional memory could be judged, rather than like a 
meeting point, like a triumph of the re-elaboration of the Francoist ideology of memory 
over a possible alternative interpretation of the heirs of the Republican tradition.”25 After 
Franco’s death, Spain became the constitutional democratic monarchy of King Juan 
Carlos I—before his death, Franco designated the young prince as his successor with a 
view to continuing the regime.   
The failed attempted coup d’état of Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero on 
February 23, 1981 (known as the “tejerazo”), although a shocking reminder of Spain’s 
dictatorial past, reinforced the “politics of forgetting” of the Transition. In this regard, the 
arrival of Felipe González’s Spanish Socialist and Workers Party (Partido Socialista 
Obrero Español, PSOE) to the government on October 28, 1982 did not change things in 
this respect. The post-Franco collective desires of becoming European and turning 
against the country’s dictatorial past were capitalized by the Socialist government of 
Felipe González and well captured in its 1982 campaign slogan for “El cambio” 
(“Change”). However, in its attempt to break with the past, the Socialist government 
(1982–1996) did not confront or challenge the official history fabricated by Franco’s 
regime, nor condemn publicly its crimes against human rights. Only some economic 
pensions or symbolic reparations (i.e., monuments to honor the Republican memory, 
pensions to Republican veterans) were granted to the victims. These limited reparations 
did not take into account the nature and gravity of the offenses, and in most cases they 
                                                 
25 Erice, Francisco, Generalizaciones y memoria de la represión franquista: un balance de los 
movimientos por la memoria 6 Hispana Nova. Revista de Historia Contemporánea (2006), pp. 
337-365, at 359, my own translation. 
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came too late or were insufficient.26 The Socialist government’s priority was to reach the 
socioeconomic levels of its European neighbors, where modernization and 
Europeanization were tantamount to democratization. Incorporation into the European 
Common Market in 1986 was considered the culmination of Spain’s political and 
economic process of modernization. Despite its frenetic attempt to break with the 
Francoist past, the Socialist government had not undone but appropriated and adjusted 
much of the institutional machinery of the old regime, such as the justice system, police 
forces, etc. As a result, the victims of the dictatorship were doubly victimized, first by 
Franco, and then by the emerging democracy. 
 
II. FROM TRAUMA TO JUSTICE: THE RETURN OF THE DEAD IN BELTENEBROS  
[I]t was as if the entire building had risen up again from the ruins, 
emerging in the night and reality of the present. . . I was walking towards 
the Universal Cinema as if I were alone on a stage-set from the past . . . 
From the distance, the building seemed intact: a pioneering cinema from 
the thirties, arrogant like a schooner or a light-house, set there on a 
Madrid street corner like a gleaming sculpture of black basalt. But the 
whole lower part of the façade was covered by successive layers of ripped 
posters discolored by sun and rain and a closer look revealed large cracks 
on the smooth surface.27 
         Beltenebros 
           
  
                                                 
26 International Amnesty, España: poner fin al silencio y a la injusticia. Supra. 
27 “[E]ra como si el edificio entero volviera a erguirse desde los escombros, emergiendo a la 
noche y a la realidad del presente igual que un barco levantado de las profundidades del mar por 
poderosas grúas y cables de acero. . . . Estaba acercándome al Universal Cinema como en una 
solitaria escenificación del pasado . . . Desde lejos, el edificio parecía intacto: un cine temerario 
de los años treinta, con una arrogancia de navío o de faro, plantado como una reluciente escultura 
de basalto negro en una esquina de Madrid. Pero toda la parte inferior de la fachada estaba 
cubierta por varias capas sucesivas de carteles desgarrados y descorridos por el sol y la lluvia, y 
más de cerca se veían largas grietas en la superficie lisa” (202-203). 
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Antonio Muñoz Molina’s novel Beltenebros copes with the ghosts and wounds 
that, after almost twenty years of Franco’s dead (the novel was written in 1989), haunt 
and hurt democratic Spain deeply.28 Muñoz-Molina describes the post-Francoist years in 
which the novel was written as the years in which “the rushed socialist catechism of 
modernity added a new nuance to the abolition of the past and its memory.”29 
Disenchanted with the leftist political ideals of change and revolution, Molina argues that 
“the left that does democracy does not do democracy, but instead it plays the game of 
democracy founded by the heirs of the dictatorship. This left, rather than restoring the 
best of its own tradition, it assumes the moral indignity of the dictatorship.”30 In 
Beltenebros, he uses the perceptions of his protagonist to critically bring to light the 
ghosts, the traces of the victims of Francoism, and to offer strategies for undertaking 
responsible historical memory.  
Beltenebros is a political thriller that explores the crimes and injustices of the 
Francoist dictatorship from the traumatic perspective of the victims. Inspired by real 
events, the novel sheds light on two critical events in the history of the communist 
resistance: 31 1) the torture and execution of communist leader Heriberto Quiñones by the 
Francoist police in the 1940s, and 2) the case of Julián Grimau, an exiled anti-Francoist 
communist leader who was ambushed in mysterious circumstances, put on trial by a 
                                                 
28 According to Cathy Caruth, trauma “is understood as a wound inflicted not upon the body but 
upon the mind … [T]he breach in the mind’s experience of time, self, and the world.” Caruth, 
Cathy, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996), at 3. 
29 Antonio Muñoz Molina, “La historia y el olvido,” El País. 1997, my own translation. 
30 Muñoz Molina, in Rich, Lawrence, The Narrative of Antonio Munoz Molina: Self-Conscious 
Realism and 'El Desencanto,' (New York: Peter Lang, 1999), my own translation. 
31 In an edition of Beltenebros edited by Circulo de Lectores in 1990, in the “Epílogo y 
arqueología de un libro,” Muñoz Molina indicates Gregorio Morán’s book “Miseria y Grandeza 
del Partido Comunista de España” as one of the books on which he drew on his main inspiration.  
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military court, sentenced to death, and consequently executed in the 1960s.32 Beltenebros 
presents three different but interconnected historical periods: 1945, the European and 
Spanish postwar years, 1965, the last era of Franco’s dictatorship (1939-1975), and 1989, 
the democratic Spain, in which the novel is written. It tells the story of Darman, an ex-
Republican survivor of the Spanish Civil War, who, at the time of the dramatic action, 
works as an exiled professional killer for the clandestine Communist Party. Told in 
flashback by its non-omniscient protagonist, the narrative does not follow a chronological 
order. The narrator pieces together what he experienced and partially witnessed as he 
imagines the events at which he was not actually present. This chaotic and subjective 
narrative of thoughts and past events is allegorical of traumatic memory—i.e., its 
disconnected fragments from the stream of consciousness that cannot be integrated into a 
totalizing history or account of the protagonist’s traumatic experience.33 Since, as Caruth 
notes, “trauma is always the story of a wound that cries out . . . in the attempt to tell us of 
a reality or truth that is not otherwise available,”34 the novel does provide language with 
which to overcome the traumatic experience by way of acknowledging the principle of 
responsibility, which makes “justice thinkable.” Psychologist proponents of the Narrative 
Exposure Therapy claim that victims of torture, terror, or war can only overcome the 
                                                 
32 In 2004, the Military Division of Spain’s Supreme Court refused to revise 72 death sentences 
issued by Francoist courts, among them Julián Grimau’s, because they “were legal.” See: “El 
Supremo rechaza revisar 72 ejecuciones del franquismo al estimar que no fueron ilegales,” 19 
June 2004, El País.  
33 Ruiz Vargas, Trauma y memoria, supra at 331. Lawrence Rich reads Beltenebros as a “novel of 
memory” that challenges the foundations of Francoist historiography: “Muñoz Molina questions 
what is generally accepted as historical “fact” by foregrounding the very process of history-
making as his characters attempt to recover the past.” Rich, Lawrence, The Narrative of Antonio 
Muñoz Molina: Self-Conscious Realism and 'El Desencanto' (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), at 
39. I would add that it is a novel of “traumatic memory” that reflects the contemporary Spanish 
difficulty of dealing with its violent past.   
34 Caruth, supra at 4. 
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traumas if they have the chance to narrate what happened to them. By transforming the 
trauma into words, they recuperate their dignity, and discover the truth.35 In his 
retrospective account, Darman engages in a political critique of the power structures that 
have shaped his reality and consciousness, and through this, he becomes not only the 
narrator but also the critic of Spain’s political past and present. 
Paradoxically, the words “Franco,” “Francoism,” and “dictatorship” are never 
mentioned in the novel. Their ontological absence grants them a spectral presence in the 
text and reveals a “past/present” time haunted by ghosts. Both the title itself 
(Bel)tenebro[u]s and the name of its protagonist, Dar[k]man,36  allude to something 
shadowy, gloomy, and sinister, and anticipate the novel’s dark physical world and the 
specters that haunt the text.37 Beltenebros presents two different types of specters: the 
“malignant” specters of totalitarian power structures, and the “benign” specters of the 
victims within these structures. Beltenebros’ “hauntology” stresses that “[w]e inherit not 
‘what really happened’ to the dead but what lives on from that happening, what is 
conjured from it, how past generations and events occupy the force fields of the present, 
how they claim us, and how they haunt, plague, and inspirit our imaginations and visions 
for the future.”38 The question to be asked here is not what happened, but rather how the 
                                                 
35 Ruiz Vargas, Trauma y memoria, supra at 332. See also: Phelps, Teresa Godwin, Shattered 
Voices. Language, Violence, and the Work of Truth Commissions (Pennsylvania: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 
36 The name of Beltenebros pays tribute to El Quijote where in chapter 25 of the first volume 
there is a character called Beltenebros. 
37 With the terms specter and ghost, Derrida refers to the paradoxical condition of the “the non-
present present,” that is, the “being-there of an absent or departed.” Derrida, Specters of Marx, 
supra at 5. In turn, “[t]o be haunted is at once to experience the profundity or significance of 
something from the past and not to know what that something was. . . . So haunting takes place 
between history and memory; it is simultaneously an achievement of memory and a failure of 
memory with regard to some significant historical effect.” Wendy Brown, Politics Out of History 
(New York: Princeton University Press, 2001), at 152. 
38 Brown, supra at 150. 
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past in the form of ghosts interrupts, constrains, and shapes the present and the future. 
The novel accomplishes this by focusing on its recurring representational practices—
shadows, the repressed, eternal return, ghosts, and blindness. While denouncing the 
violation of human rights during Franco’s regime, the novel’s dark and ghostly 
representations of the past take responsibility for the ghosts that return to claim justice. 
Shadows. At the novel’s opening, Darman lives in exile in Brighton (England), 
where he has moved shortly after the end of the Spanish Civil War. There, he manages a 
shop of antiquarian books that has the virtue of granting him “a feeling of immersion in 
the remoteness of other worlds and in a time not entirely of the living” (5).39 Darman’s 
aspirations are disrupted when in 1965, Bernal, the leader of the clandestine organization, 
sends him back to Madrid to seek out and kill a traitor called Andrade— allegedly, an 
informer of Inspector Ugarte, who is in charge of the Dirección General de Seguridad 
(Bureau of National Security) in Madrid. Ugarte, aka the Prince of Shadows, is not a 
torturer like the rest, Bernal tells Darman, but a hunter with no past and no face and who 
has the ability to see in the dark.40 Andrade, on the other hand, has the cunning of an 
invisible man who hides like a shadow. This mission reminds Darman of another one he 
                                                 
39 “la virtud de otorgar[le] una serenidad más bien sonámbula, un sentimiento de inmersión en la 
lejanía de otros mundos y de un tiempo que no era del todo el de los vivos” (15). 
40 “un catálogo de desconocidos cuyas fotografías había ido quemando o perdiendo como se 
deshace un asesino de su pasado culpable, como un traidor abjura de su lealtad y su memoria” 
(33). Derrida ascribes to the police the power to exercise a phantom-like violence. They “are 
present or represented everywhere that there is force of law. They are present, sometimes 
invisible but always effective  . . . they are . . . the faceless figure, a violence without a form . . . 
The police become hallucinatory and spectral because they haunt everything.” Derrida, “Force of 
Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority,’” trans. Mary Quaintance, eds., Drucilla Cornell, 
Michael Rosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson, in Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice 
(New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 3-67, at 44–45. During the dictatorship, the Dirección General 
de Seguridad was synonymous with repression and torture. 
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undertook in 1945, when he had to kill a traitor named Walter, and which he has spent 
the rest of his life trying to forget.  
Despite the parallels of the two missions, Darman is not the same man that killed 
Walter. Now he is “someone else, a catalogue of strangers whose photographs [he]’d 
been burning or losing like a murderer getting rid of his guilty past, like a traitor who 
forswears his loyalty and memory” (6).41 This is nowhere more evident than when Luque, 
a young member of the organization, expresses his admiration for him. Rather than being 
flattered, Darman expresses his disgust for once having been similar to him. When Bernal 
shows him the photograph of Andrade, his next target, Darman does not see a traitor, but 
a person like himself, a man who is prematurely dead, and still does not know he is a 
shadow.42 Darman accepts the new mission because he feels a strong desire to know not 
the reasons behind Andrade’s treachery but the reasons behind his sadness. He is drawn 
into the crying wound of the man in the photograph, “not as the story in relation to the 
events of his own past, but as the story of the way in which one’s own trauma is tied up 
with the trauma of another, the way in which trauma may lead, therefore, to the encounter 
with another.”43 Andrade’s photograph is to Darman the first manifestation of 
consciousness of his own condition as living dead; to know Andrade’s story may mean 
knowing his own. The novel’s struggle against oblivion is illustrated in Darman’s journey 
                                                 
41 “la virtud de otorgar[le] una serenidad más bien sonámbula, un sentimiento de inmersión en la 
lejanía de otros mundos y de un tiempo que no era del todo el de los vivos” (15). 
42 The photograph, using Eduardo Cadava’s words, announces Andrade’s death. “Photographs 
bring death to the photographed. The conjunction of death and the photograph is in fact the very 
principle of photographic certitude: the photograph is a cemetery. . .  [It] is a grave for the living 
dead. It tells their history—a history of ghosts and shadows—and it does so because it is this 
history.” Cadava, Words of Light. Theses on the Photography of History (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997), at 8–10. 
43 Caruth, supra at 8. 
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back to Madrid—to the “interior” as he calls it. His return to Madrid becomes both a 
process of a recovery of memory (individual and collective) and of a search for justice.  
The Repressed. As soon as Darman arrives in Madrid, a hostile and intrusive 
waiving flag in the streets of the capital reminds him that the reality of Francoist Spain is 
not his reality anymore. He is a member of the defeated group and his country is now at 
hand of the enemy. Darman is even worried that the rottenness of the enemy may end up 
contaminating him. At the train station, he hurries to leave it, smelling his own clothing, 
looking at himself in the shop-windows to ensure he has not been polluted. Darman does 
not want to fight for something that he no longer feels as his own. But moved by inertia, 
he continues playing the role he has been assigned: “[E]ver since I’d agreed to go to 
Madrid, I’d been a hesitant specter pretending I was going to kill a man . . . I was being 
swept along by a current more powerful than my will” (42).44  
In Madrid, he encounters people and places, recognizes names from the past that 
take him back in time, making him relive the repressed details of “Walter’s case.” He 
remembers that, in 1945, Walter ran a theater called Universal Cinema, where he lived 
with his lover, Rebeca Osorio, a writer of romance novels who introduced codes and 
messages through her writings, and Valdivia, another member of the organization. He 
also remembers that he shot Walter knowing that doing so would shatter Rebeca’s life 
(she was in love with Walter). After the assessination, Darman escaped to England, 
Valdivia was supposedly killed by the police, Rebeca disappeared, and the Universal 
Cinema was closed. Twenty years later, Darman faces an almost identical situation: He 
encounters a second Rebeca Osorio, who not only looks exactly like the first one, but is 
                                                 
44 “desde que acepté viajar a Madrid yo era un lento fantasma que fingía que iba a matar a un 
hombre y se internaba en la mentira como una selva de espejismo” (59). 
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also the lover of his target, Andrade. (Later, Darman will also discover that she is the 
daughter of Walter and the first Rebeca Osorio).45 This new encounter makes him realize 
that he never regretted killing Walter, “but it cost [him] years of sleepless nights not to 
keep seeing Rebeca Osorio’s eyes everywhere” (113).46 Darman’s return to Madrid is 
“like shedding the skin of indifference and oblivion time had added to memory, and 
everything hurt[s] as if it had happened yesterday” (45).47  
Caruth’s conception of trauma may shed light on Darman’s situation here. In her 
view, trauma is an “unclaimed experience” that is “not locatable in the simple violent or 
original event in an individual’s past, but rather in the way that its very unassimilated 
nature—the way it was precisely not known in the first instance—returns to haunt the 
survivor later on.”48 The traumatic event is never contained in a single moment; it must 
be first internalized and afterwards revivified in a second scene that echoes the original 
traumatic one.49 Darman’s twenty years of exile in England are the “latency period” of a 
trauma, the period during which the effects of the experience are not apparent, because 
the traumatic effects have been repressed and forgotten.50 In Madrid, the juxtaposition of 
                                                 
45 Rebeca Osorio works as a singer in a clandestine club called Boîte Tabú and she signs for 
inspector Ugarte, who always hides behind the curtains while looking at her performance.  
46 “pero [le] costó años de insomnio no seguir viendo en todas partes los ojos de Rebeca Osorio” 
(147). 
47 “como si perdiese la piel de indiferencia y olvido que el tiempo había agregado a la memoria, y 
todas las cosas me herían como recién sucedidas” (62). 
48 Caruth, supra at 4. 
49 As Jean Laplanche puts it: [O]n the one hand, the repressed scene, an unpleasant memory, on 
the other, an apparently subordinate, concomitant memory, a circumstance contingent to the 
traumatic event, which unlike that event, has remained in memory as a symptom or ‘symbol’ of 
the first scene, which itself cannot be brought to consciousness. The connection between the two 
cannot be consciously maintained. . . . Every new perception which irritates the unconscious 
memory of the traumatizing event, and every new trauma which may echo it, results in the 
emergence into consciousness not of the scene itself but of the symbol of the scene, and of the 
symbol alone.” Life and Death in Psychoanalysis (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1976), at 35. 
50 Caruth, supra at 17. 
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past (1945) and present (1965) triggers the memories of the original traumatic scene that 
Darman had forgotten. The relationship between the second Rebeca Osorio and Andrade, 
his new victim (second scene) surfaces as the “symbol” of Darman’s repressed love for 
the first Rebeca Osorio and his old victim Walter (the primary scene). Darman goes from 
shadows (his condition of living dead) to consciousness (life), from forgetfulness to 
memory, as he comes to terms with his traumatic past.  
The recovery of the traumatic memory enables Darman to realize that Andrade’s 
sadness is part of the reality of his (Darman’s) present:   
I know who you are, . . . I know what you’ve seen and what you’ve lost, your life 
and country, your own history sacrificed in the name of a sterile heroism that no 
one will ever thank you for, . . . because what you paid is much more valuable 
than everything you imagined you would receive and that no one will give you 
(143).  
 
[Sé quién eres, . . . sé lo que has visto y lo que has perdido, tu vida y tu país, tu 
biografía inmolada en nombre de una estéril heroicidad que nadie te agradecerá 
nunca, . . . porque lo que pagaste es mucho más valioso que todo lo que 
imaginaste que recibirías y nadie te dará (186)]. 
 
Darman is, like Andrade, part of the Republican vanquished, whom it is impossible to tell 
their story, mourn for their dead, and recover their dignity, making them feel like the 
living dead, like shadows. His understanding of both his own trauma and that of the rest 
of the victims transforms Darman from executioner to victim’s savior: now, he wants to 
save Andrade, both from Inspector Ugarte and from the organization.51 
Eternal return. However, Andrade’s fate seems predestined. As if following a 
script written by someone else that leaves no room for agency, Andrade is ultimately 
killed by Luque, Darman’s unconditional admirer and follower: Andrade’s death is the 
repetition of Walter’s; Luque is the duplication of Darman; the love between Andrade 
                                                 
51 Cf. Navajas, Gonzalo, Más allá de la posmodernidad. Estética de la nueva novela y cine 
españoles  (Barcelona: Ediciones Universitarias de Barcelona, 1996). 
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and the new Rebeca replays the love between Walter and the old Rebeca Osorio; and so 
on, endlessly. Such a stance echoes Nietzsche’s idea of the “eternal recurrence:” 
everything has already happened in the past, and will continue to happen repeatedly in 
the future. It is precisely the distressing thought that everything is destined to be and thus 
is predestined—for if everything recurs, his actions could have been determined in 
advance— which makes Darman realize he might have been deceived into killing an 
innocent man. Darman thus faces a new challenge: Is it possible to break the eternal cycle 
of violence? 
  As Gustavo Martínez remarks, the duplication technique reveals the deadlock of 
abstract categories of ideology. It is the result of an uncritical application of the same 
ideological structures to different ideological situations.52 In Beltenebros, this is 
exemplified with Bernal, the dogmatic and fanatic ideologue for whom “everything is 
defined, explained and judged beforehand.”53 Bernal is depicted as judging and 
condemning the accused of treason without knowing anything about them, without 
questioning who they really are, and without hesitating about his own conclusions. For 
him, the truth is established with an unemotional and mathematical precision: “Shut up in 
a room with a bunch of papers . . . Bernal had found this all as solitarily as a 
mathematician solves a hitherto unformulated puzzle” (38).54 As Darman says, “he 
conceded only a secondary importance to reality” (38).55 It is not surprising then that the 
                                                 
52 Martínez, Gustavo, Duplicidad, duplicación y desdoblamiento en Beltenebros. Espéculo. 
Revista de estudios literarios. Universidad Complutense de Madrid (2005) URL: 
http://www.ucm.es/info/especulo/numero29/duplicid.html, at 11. 
53 Id., at 2. 
54 “Encerrado en una habitación frente a un puñado de papeles . . . Bernal lo había averiguado 
todo tan solitariamente como resuelve un matemático un enigma no formulado hasta entonces” 
(53). 
55 “es posible que sólo concediera a las realidad una importancia secundaria” (53). 
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organization he represents keeps making the same mistakes repeatedly; that is, the 
condemnation of innocent people and correlative praise of the real traitors. Operating 
from the exile, Bernal remains indifferent to the passing of time, namely, to the 
transformations that men suffer because of their personal history. For him, nobody and 
nothing change, as he replies when Darman claims that he is not the same person he used 
to be: “Nobody changes. Neither they nor we have changed” (35). Unable to see the 
Spanish shifting reality from his distant office in Florence, he is trapped within his 
obsolete convictions.  
Ghosts. After Andrade’s death, all the dead and phantoms from past and present, 
the two Rebecas and Valdivia, follow in Darman’s wake. Yet when “the dead return, . . . 
return more stubbornly than the living, . . . the dead return and mask their shadows in the 
features of the living and walk slowly through the places from the past” (143).56 These 
are, in Derrida’s language, the revenants, the specters, the victims of violence who 
always return to claim their debt from the living, and one cannot control their comings 
and goings because they “begin” by coming back.57 The coming of the ghosts pushes 
Darman to take responsibility not only for the dead, but also for the living; for those who 
yet have a life to live. This responsibility, which began with Darman’s acceptance of the 
new mission, takes shape during his expedition through the tunnel that connects the Boîte 
Tabú (the present), where Ugarte keeps the new Rebeca, with the old Universal Cinema 
(the past), where he fell in love with the old Rebeca. Twenty years earlier, Walter used 
the same tunnel to escape from Darman but from back to front. Now, Darmam goes the 
                                                 
56 “los muertos vuelven, vuelven con más tenacidad que los vivos, obstinados y leales como 
aquellas ánimas del purgatorio a las que les rezaban oraciones al atardecer, los muertos vuelven y 
enmascaran sus sombras con las facciones de los vivos y caminan despacio por los lugares del 
pasado” (185). 
57 Derrida, Specters of Marx, supra at 11. 
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other way round out of loyalty to the dead and to the living. He rebels against the game of 
duplicity to which he has been subjected and rushes to confront the author of this 
duplicity: “I felt an intolerable need to look at that man face to face with the lights on . . .  
Inspector Ugarte, Beltenebros, prince of shadows, living and watching in the dark, his 
only light the cigarettes which glowed like eyes” (153).58 Darman wants to respond to the 
ghosts’ claim for justice, that is to say, to their memory.   
Blindness. Darman advances into the darkness of the Universal Cinema, into the 
“kingdom of dead, to the dark subsoil where infamy thrived, because [he] realized each 
step was moving [him] close to the source of guilt and corruption” (172).59 In the cinema, 
he can hear two sounds from his past—the wheels of the projector (whirring slowly and 
mechanically)—and Rebeca Osorio’s typing. Hidden in an upper room of the Universal 
Cinema, Darman finds the original Rebeca Osorio alive, devoid of reason, and furiously 
typing, paperless, at her old Remington typewriter. Hoping she will remember him, 
Darman struggles to wake her from her trance; he knows that her hatred of him remains 
in her consciousness. When Rebeca finally recognizes his face, she angrily throws her 
typewriter at him, breaking it into pieces. The creative artifact that helped her to write 
novels and introduce secret codes is destroyed, and, with it, the sound from Darman’s 
                                                 
58 [S]entí una intolerable necesidad de mirar cara a cara a ese hombre, a plena luz, . . . el 
comisario Ugarte, Beltenebros, el príncipe de la tinieblas, el que habita y mira en la oscuridad, sin 
más luz que la de los cigarrillos que resplandecen como ojos” (199). 
59 “al oscuro subsuelo donde alentaba la infamia, porque me daba cuenta de que paso a paso 
estaba acercándome a la raíz de la culpa y de la corrupción” (222). The darkness of the narrative 
can be read as an allegory of trauma, because trauma is “something normally hidden from sight, 
something whose obscure depth (or whose end) cannot be fathomed and whose bottom (or whose 
starting point) cannot be seen.” Felman, Shoshana, The Juridical Unconscious: Trials and 
Traumas in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), at 89. Darman’s 
expedition to the Universal Cinema may be read as an immersion into darkness, that is, into the 
unconscious. Pérès, Christine, Le nouveau roman espagnol et la quête d’identité: Antonio Muñoz 
Molina (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2000), at 249.   
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guilty conscience is symbolically removed. After comprehending that she has been kept 
locked there by the faceless Ugarte/Beltenebros all these years, Darman rushes back to 
the darkness of the theater in order to find and kill him.  
In the uppermost seats of the cinema, Darman finds the new Rebeca still alive, 
blindfolded, and terrified. He also sees a red pupil in the dark that dulls and brightens like 
a reptilian eye. Ugarte goes on smoking “on the other side of the abyss, the one 
separating . . .  his power of sight and [Darman’s] blindness” (188).60 But when a torch 
suddenly illuminates Ugarte’s face, like a flash of lightning, it reveals him as Valdivia, 
the member of the organization who twenty years earlier had been allegedly killed by the 
police. Meanwhile, Rebeca had “torn the bandage from her eyes, and slid down the rows 
without him seeing her till she was sure that when she switched on the torch it would be 
right in his face” (194-195).61 The torch steadily advances until Ugarte can neither see 
nor retreat further. He ultimately falls into the dark void, looking up at Darman for the 
last time.  
At the end of the novel, blindness and sight are reversed. Once the Prince of 
Shadows is blinded, Darman recovers his sight and, just then, he realizes that Valdivia, 
Ugarte, and Beltenebros are all the same person. Valdivia/Ugarte/Beltenebros is the 
malignant specter that observes everyone without being seen and strategically sets its 
enemies one against the other.62 Under its spectral machination, Walter and Andrade are 
                                                 
60 “al otro lado de un abismo, el que separaba . . . su potestad de ver y [su] ceguera” (242). 
61 “arrancado en silencio el esparadrapo de los ojos, se había deslizado por las gradas sin que él la 
viera hasta que estuvo segura de que cuando encendiera la linterna le acertaría en la cara” (251–
252). 
62 As Michel Foucault explains, “[a] central point would be both the source of light illuminating 
everything, and a locus of convergence for everything that must be known: a perfect eye that 
nothing would escape.” Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan 
Sheridan, French original, 1975 (New York: Vintage, 1997), at 173). In Beltenebros, the “ability 
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falsely accused of treason, tortured, and executed; Darman is forced into exile, 
transformed into the living dead, and contrived to repeat the same mistakes of the past, 
and the two Rebecas are deprived of identity.63 The space of the Universal Cinema 
functions as the ideological apparatus through which Ugarte weaves the web of 
predestination and the repetition of violence.  
In this way, if the adjective “universal” suggests the overarching ideals that 
encouraged all members to believe and fight for the organization’s cause, “Cinema,” on 
the other hand, implies the space of fiction where reality is replaced by the simulacra of 
images and where its power-mechanisms are concealed.64 Such a vision is reminiscent of 
Jean-Louis Baudry’s conception of cinema: as “an apparatus destined to obtain a precise 
ideological effect, necessary to the dominant ideology: creating a phantasmatization of 
the subject, it collaborates with a marked efficacy in the maintenance of idealism.”65 Put 
                                                                                                                                                 
or inability to see defines the various characters, and determines their subject position as seers or 
objects of contemplation.” Olga Lopez-Valero Colbert, The Gaze on the Past. Popular Culture 
and History in Antonio Muñoz Molina’s Novels (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2007), at 
89. 
63 The long confinement of political activist Rebeca Osorio in the prisonlike space of the 
Universal Cinema and the humiliating abuse at which Beltenebros subjects her double (her 
daughter) expose “the silencing and/or disciplining mechanisms practiced against women, both 
within and beyond prison walls.” Vosburg, Nancy, Prisons With/out Walls: Women’s Prison 
Writings In Franco’s Spain,” 11 Monographic Review (1995), pp. 121–133, at 121. During 
Franco’s dictatorship laws such as the marital permission (“permiso marital”) were passed, with 
the support of the Catholic Church, to maintain a conservative and patriarchal society. Women 
were not allowed to sign contracts, pursue a career, apply for a job or take a trip without the 
permission of their fathers or husbands. Women’s only role was to be model housewives and 
mothers. Radcliff, P. B., 2001, “Imagining female citizenship in the ‘New Spain’: Gendering the 
democratic transition, 1975–1978,” Gender and History, 13(3): 498–523, at 505. The fact that it 
is Rebeca’s torchlight instead of Darman himself what eventually kills Beltenebros can be read as 
the symbolic elimination of a patriarchal system. See Silvia Bermúdez, Negro que te Quiero 
Rosa: la Femenización de la Novela de Espías en Beltenebros, 7 España Contemporánea 2 
(1994), pp. 7-25. 
64 Martínez, supra at 20.  
65 Baudry, Jean-Louis., “Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus,” eds. 
Gerald Mast, Marshall Cohen, Leo Braudy, in Film Theory and Criticism, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), pp. 355-365, at 364. 
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differently, the darkened and closed ideological space of the Universal Cinema functions, 
like the Platonic cave, as a mirror-screen that “reflects images but not ‘reality.’”66 In this 
sense, the Universal Cinema may be regarded as the origin of the total simulacrum, where 
those remaining within find themselves caught by an illusory reality that manipulates, 
controls, and shapes their thinking and actions. The cinematic space thus appears as the 
totalizing ideological apparatus that erases memory and projects idealized images of the 
present (the official version of history), perpetuating the barbarism and injustice of the 
past. 67 
The Madrilenian spatial interiors of the warehouse and the Boîte Tabú, where the 
action takes place, may be read as a reproduction of the Universal Cinema. As soon as 
Darman arrives in Madrid, he ends up at the warehouse where Luque instructed him to 
find Andrade. Instead, he encounters a man whose face he cannot see, but whose 
“uncanny” familiarity frightens him.68 In the darkness of the warehouse, shadows move 
from one place to another and only the red light of the man’s cigarette (Ugarte’s), as the 
light of the projector, illuminates and guides their movements.69 In the Boîte Tabú, the 
nightclub where the new Rebeca sings for Ugarte, everything replicates the movie 
theater. The tickets Darman uses to enter look like movie stubs. The double of Rebeca, 
whose name itself is a Hollywood name (Hitchcock’s Rebecca, 1940), imitates, in turn, 
                                                 
66 Baudry, supra at 362. 
67 For an interesting analysis of the cinematic techniques and influences of the novel, see 
Richardson, Nathan E., A Kingdom of Shadows: Muñoz Molina’s Beltenebros, film theory, and 
Spain, 1944–1989, 29 Anales de la Literatura Española Contemporánea (2004). For a film-
adaptation of the novel see Pilar Miró’s Beltenebros (1991). 
68 I use the term “uncanny” in Freud’s sense, that is, as “nothing new or strange, but something 
that was familiar to the psyche and was estranged from it only through being repressed.” Freud, 
Sigmund, “The Uncanny”: 123-162, trans. David McLintock, in The Uncanny (New York: 
Penguin Books, 2003), at 148. 
69 Richardson, supra. 
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the femme fatale Rita Hayworth, moving her hips to the rhythm of a bongo on the stage, 
as a reenactment of Charles Vidor’s famous “Gilda” (1946). All of this seems projected 
from behind the curtains, through the light of the cigarette of the same mysterious man 
Darman saw in the warehouse. Rebeca is in this way another image coming from the 
projector—the light of the Prince of Shadow’s cigarette—of the Universal Cinema. This 
explains Darman’s first vision of her on the Boîte Tabú: “her face was pallid like the 
images in the cinema” (69).70 Even Darman himself becomes a cinematic image inside 
the darkness of the nightclub: “my identity was becoming blurred like the faces in the 
welcoming shadows, pale and unknown above the blue lamps” (72).71  
The only way to resist and break through the repressive effects of the mirror-
screen is to travel to the other side of the mirror and make its deceptive mechanisms 
visible. In the novel, this is materialized when Darman appears behind the screen of the 
Universal Cinema:  
I’d reached the Universal Cinema, was behind the screen, and was getting a close-
up of the enormous characters in a film without sound. . . .  I was bewildered by 
the sudden bursts of darkness and light that broke up the space as if nothing was a 
really solid mass, not even myself, that dark silhouette mixed up with the others, 
lost among them, sliding over a dirty brick wall, over the great white canvas 
where the film was being projected. . . . As I went down into the cinema I felt I 
was pulling myself away from the unreality of the film, that once again I was 
recovering the shape of my body and the sovereignty of my consciousness, 
aroused by the recognition of things that had survived (174). 
 
[Había llegado al Universal Cinema, estaba detrás de la pantalla, mirando desde 
muy cerca las desmedidas figuras de una película despojada de sonido. . . . Me 
aturdían los sobresaltos de claridad y de sombra que disgregaban el espacio como 
si nada tuviera un volumen firme de verdad, ni yo mismo, una silueta oscura y 
confundida con las otras y perdida entre ellas, deslizándose sobre una sucia pared 
de ladrillo, sobre el gran lienzo blanco donde se proyectaba la película. . . . Al 
                                                 
70 “su cara tenía la misma palidez que las imágenes de cine, la misma consistencia tenue de 
breves claridades y fugaces penumbras” (91). 
71 “mi identidad se me desdibujaba como uno cualquiera de aquellos rostros acogidos a la sombra, 
desconocidos y pálidos sobre las lámpara azules” (95). 
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bajar a la sala sentí que me desprendía de la irrealidad de la película, que 
recobraba otra vez la forma de mi cuerpo, y la soberanía de mi conciencia, 
incitada por el reconocimiento de todas las cosas perduradas (224).] 
 
By figuratively traveling to the other side of the mirror, Darman confronts the 
unknown past and reveals the present reality as an illusion created by the spectral forces 
of the ideological apparatus. In the darkness of the Universal Cinema, he finally has 
access, with the help of Rebeca’s flashlight, to the invisible, to the uncanny, that is, to 
trauma. He goes from shadows (his condition of living dead) to consciousness (life), from 
forgetfulness to memory, coming to terms with the traumatic past. Rebeca’s flashlight 
finally allows Darman to access the hidden “truth”—the violence, manipulation, and 
injustice that Ugarte, as representative of Francoist repression, has inflicted on everyone. 
Benjamin links this moment of revelation to a political action in the fight for the 
oppressed past and the transformation of the present.72 Darman and Rebeca embody this 
possibility. They are able, in the end, to uncover the impenetrable logic of repetition and 
deception and to destroy its point of origin. Having regained their sight, a new future 
opens to them, one in which they can reclaim their agency and eventually their (lost) 
dignity. Only by confronting the cycle of violence and deception created by Beltenebros, 
and by acknowledging the ruins left in its wake, can Darman and Rebeca do justice to the 
memory of the victims—one that necessarily implies an ethical responsibility for the 




                                                 
72 Benjamin, supra at 263. 
 
 96
III. REMEMBERING TO FORGET: THE “LAW OF HISTORICAL MEMORY”  
While fictional worlds like Beltenebros attempt to recover the historical memory of 
the victims of Franco’s regime, many years would pass until the Spanish State would 
give a legal answer to the victims’ claim for justice. At the end of the nineties, grass roots 
organizations such as the Asociación para la Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica 
(Association for the Recovery of Historical Memory ARMH) mobilized themselves to 
demand the debt the Spanish State owed Franco’s victims, and to assert their right to 
know the truth, and to regain appropriate reparations and historical recognition (or 
“historical memory”). 73 Their claims finally broke the almost 70 years of silence, 
challenging in so doing the so-called Pact of Forgetfulness. They sought justice without 
revenge. They wanted to recover the (around 30.000) bodies of those buried in unmarked 
common graves, honor their memory, and repair their dignity. They also demanded the 
formal declaration of Franco’s uprising and regime as illegal. To them its laws, trials, and 
legal proceedings should be declared null and void. In the absence of national policies 
that addressed the memory of the victims, the ARMH based their demands in the existing 
Human Rights and International Law. 
The conservative government of Partido Popular (Popular party, PP), led by Prime 
Minister Jose María Aznar (1996–2004), opposed any debate regarding the recovery of 
historical memory in order to avoid opening old scars. This is not at all surprising 
considering that many of Partido Popular’s leading members come from Francoist 
                                                 
73 The response in the international community to Truth Commissions, such as in South Africa 
and Latin America, and the charging of Pinochet for crimes against humanity in Spain in 1998, 
influenced the creation of different civic associations. Among others: Forum for Memory; 
Association for the Creation of Archives of the Civil War; International Brigades; the Children of 
War; the Spanish Resistance and Exile (AGE); and Association of Families and Friends of 
Republicans oppressed during Francoism (AFARIIR). 
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families (Aznar’s grandfather, for instance, was Franco’s collaborator) or, like Manuel 
Fraga Iribarne, were ministers under the dictatorship.74 Aznar’s government, however, 
finance the cost of the exhumation and repatriation from Russia of the corpses of Spanish 
members of Franco’s División Azul (the Blue Division) that fought during World War II 
alongside Adolf Hitler.75 In addition, Aznar’s government awarded the Francisco Franco 
Foundation, whose president is Franco’s daughter, one of the highest annual state 
subsidies to non-profit-making private Spanish organizations.76 The Foundation intends 
“to increase awareness of the figure of Francisco Franco in its human dimensions, 
political and military, as well as the achievements and projects carried out by his 
regime.”77 In a public declaration, Aznar put Pío Moa’s book Los Mitos de la Guerra 
Civil Española (2006) as his bedside book, a way of showing his public support to Moa’s 
version of history, according to which, Franco saved Spain from the chaos of the Second 
Republic and established the foundations for the current Spanish democracy. 
With the coming to power of the Socialist government of Jose Luis Rodríguez 
Zapatero in 2004 the demands of the ARMH and other associations were officially 
addressed for the first time. This same year the socialist government created the 
Interministerial Commission for the Study of the Situation of the Victims of the Civil 
War and Francoism (Comisión Interministerial para el Estudio de las Víctimas de la 
Guerra Civil y del Franquismo) chaired by the Vice-President of the Government María 
Teresa Fernández de la Vega. Only in 2006, partly in response to the ARHM’s demands, 
                                                 
74 Sebastian Balfour, “The Reinvention of Spanish Conservatism. The Popular Party Since 1989,” 
ed. Sebastian Balfour, in The Politics of Contemporary Spain (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 
146-168. 
75 Omar G. Encarnación, Spanish Politics. Democracy After Dictatorship (Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press, 2008), at 143. 
76 Balfour, supra at 151. 
77 See Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco, http://www.fnff.es/datos.htm 
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did Zapatero newly elected government present a bill to recognize and extend these rights 
in favor of those who suffered persecution or violence during the Civil War and the 
dictatorship.78 The bill was approved by Congress on October 31, 2007. Its full and 
verbose name is “Ley 52/2007, de 26 de diciembre, por la que se reconocen y amplían 
derechos y se establecen medidas en favor de quienes padecieron persecución o violencia 
durante la guerra civil y la dictadura,” but is popularly known as the “Law of Historical 
Memory.”79  
The 52/2007 law also addressed a non-binding majority resolution by the 
Constitutional Commission of Congress of November 20, 2002 (the 27th anniversary of 
Franco’s death), stating that: “No one is entitled to use violence, as it has occurred in our 
past, for the purpose of imposing political ideology or totalitarian regimes that are 
contrary to our liberty and our dignity, and that deserve the condemnation and rejection 
of the democratic society.”80 The “Law of Historical Memory” reproduces this 
condemnation verbatim, and also incorporates the Resolution of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe of March 17, 2006, which condemns the “severe 
violations of human rights” that occurred in Spain from 1939 to 1975.  
This law establishes some economic, legal, and symbolic measures: the declaration of 
the illegitimacy of Franco’s courts and legal sentences (article 3); economic 
compensation for different categories of victims (articles 5–10); assistance to private 
citizens for locating and identifying the bodies that remain in unidentified graves (articles 
                                                 
78 José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero’s grandfather was shot while on Franco’s side in 1936. For an 
analysis of the use of the Law of Historical Memory as a political strategy to win the elections of 
2004, see Blakeley, Georgina, La política de siempre? Los desafíos y cavilaciones de la Ley de la 
Memoria Histórica en España, 7 Entelequia. Revista Interdisciplinar (2008), pp. 315-330. 
79 See Appendix 2. 
80 All translations of the law are my own. 
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11–14); banning of symbols, monuments, and the glorification of Franco and his regime 
from buildings and public spaces (articles 15–16); the creation of the Center of 
Documentation of Historical Memory in Salamanca; and maintaining and developing the 
General Archives of the Civil War and the private right to access them (articles 20–22). 
 Despite these undeniably positive contributions, I want to focus on the rhetorical 
strategies found in the law’s Preamble. I inquire how and in what ways the law 
“remembers,” or “forgets,” that is, what kind of narratives of the past it validates, and 
which ones it doesn’t consider or excludes. I explore, in other words, how the law “stands 
in relation to the past, the present, and the future.”81 Through these acts of remembering 
(and forgetting), the law becomes an active participant in the process through which 
history and collective memory are being constructed.  
The Preamble of the Law of Historical Memory states that “the spirit of 
reconciliation and concord and of respect to pluralism and peaceful defense of all ideas” 
that guided the Transition resulted in the Constitution of 1978, “the best constitutional 
model of coexistence in Spain’s history” (Law 52/2007). Appealing to this “foundational 
spirit of concord,” the law says it is time for Spain’s democracy and for the living 
generations to honor and to recover the memory, once and for all, of all the people who 
directly suffered injustices and offenses for political, ideological, or religious reasons. 
The law cautions us that “it is not the task of the legislator to impose a specific collective 
memory.” Rather, it reaffirms the “obligation to protect each citizen’s right to his or her 
personal and family memory as an expression of democratic citizenship.” Likewise, it 
establishes the commitment “to promote the constitutional values” and “the knowledge 
                                                 
81 Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns, History, Memory, and the Law eds. Sarat, Austin and 




and reflection of [the] past to avoid the repetition of situations of intolerance and 
violation of human rights.” Thus, the law lays the grounds for public policies aimed at 
“the knowledge of Spain’s history and the promotion of the democratic memory.” The 
final goal of the law is to contribute to “healing the wounds [that are] still open.” To do 
so, it appeals to the Transition’s “spirit of reconciliation and concord.” Despite the law’s 
attempt to recover the “historical memory”—first by protecting the citizens’ rights to 
personal and family memory, and then by establishing public policies aimed at the 
promotion of “democratic memory”—an analysis of the law’s own representational 
practices may yield a more debatable result than what was intended.  
Foundation. The law begins by situating the Transition, and the Constitution of 1978 
as the points of origin of contemporary Spanish democracy. In choosing the Transition as 
the foundational moment of democracy (and by marking this period as the origin and 
cause of the law as well), the law neglects the antecedent democratic government of the 
Second Republic, to which Franco’s uprising put an end in 1936.82 The Second republic 
represents precisely the democratic values for which Republicans fought against Franco 
and the reason for which they were killed, tortured, or disappeared under his regime. The 
exclusion of this memory from the law contradicts its expressed goal of recuperating the 
memory of the Republican victims of Francoism. 
By omitting any reference to the democratic and constitutional heritage of the 
Republic, the law “forgets” that the fundamental rights were not born with the 
Constitution of 1978—the Constitution of 1931 recognized, among others, the rights of 
religious and political pluralism, freedom of speech, the right to a fair trial, the separation 
                                                 
82 Moreno Díaz, José Antonio, Perspectivas sobre la Ley de Memoria Histórica 7 Entelequia. 




of Church and State, the right to divorce, and women’s right to vote, and included the 
obligation of the State to respect International Law. Reclaiming the “democratic 
memory” of the Second Republic would have meant emphasizing the fact that Francoism 
was a post-constitutional illegal regime established by military force against an elected 
government.83 In this sense, the law’s declaration of Francoist legal framework and 
legislation as “illegitimate” instead of “illegal, null, and void” (as the Associations of 
victims had demanded) seems to validate retroactively the legality of Franco’s regime, 
even when it seeks to denounce its immorality.84  
If words such as “Franco,” “Francoism,” and “dictatorship” were absent from the 
novel, the word “Republic” is never mentioned in the legal text. Its ontological absence 
grants the Republic a spectral presence in the law and reveals a present time haunted by 
the same ghosts that haunted the Transition. Like the Transition, the law is reluctant to 
link the contemporary democracy with the democracy of the Republic: to revive its 
memory may break the spirit of reconciliation and concord of the Transition in which the 
law is founded. By casting out the ghosts of the Second Republic, the law leaves 
unquestioned the Francoist version of Republican evils and the direct link between their 
actions and the Civil War.  
 In contrast to the law, Beltenebros begins by reclaiming the legality of the 
Republican constitutional order: “Now, as then, we were united by the need to defeat 
treachery and it didn’t matter that we no longer wore uniforms or that the law we swore 
                                                 
83 Moreno Díaz, supra at 250. 
84 According to Equipo Nizkor, which represents more than twenty civic associations, the law 
“implies the legality of the Franco regime and evidences an intention to defend this ‘legality’ by 
placing on equal footing victims and criminals (those responsible for the crimes under 
international law).” An Aberrant Law. 30 Oct 2007, Read May 22, 2009, URL:  
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/espana/doc/hmlpress.html   
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to obey had been abolished by our conquerors: the law survived within us, as intact as our 
pride, re-established by our determination to abide by it” (97).85 To recover the 
democratic memory of the Second Republic would mean to restore the memory and 
dignity of the victims of Francoism. 
Reconciliation and Concord. The law praises the spirit of reconciliation and concord 
that guided the Transition as being the same spirit that now guides the current law. This 
identification between the spirit of the Transition and the spirit of the current law is 
problematic because, as it has been explained, the reconciliation and concord brought by 
the Spanish Transition was achieved precisely at the cost of forgetting, rather than by 
making peace with the past. Thirty years later, the law’s commemorative act reproduces 
the same ideological “forgetfulness” that characterized the former period: in the name of 
a new sense of national reconciliation, once again the law suppresses an open and honest 
debate about the Transition’s lack of accountability regarding those responsible for past 
crimes. And it does so, paradoxically, contrary to the principle of memory that the law 
wishes to vindicate. This apparent contradiction between what the law claims to do for 
the victims and what it does through its rhetorical choices of self-legitimation casts 
doubts on its ability to provide any sense of reparation and justice to the victims. The law, 
unlike the novel, looks at the past from the point of view of the State and uses an 
idealized version of history to justify itself.  
Furthermore, despite its claim to the kind of consensus that made possible the 
Constitution of 1978 and the transition to democracy, the law conceals the fact that it 
                                                 
85 “Ahora, como entonces, nos aliaba la tarea de desbaratar una traición, y no importaba que ya no 
vistiéramos uniformes ni que la ley que juramos obedecer hubiera sido abolida por quienes nos 
vencieron: la ley sobrevivía en nosotros, intacta como nuestro orgullo, restablecida por nuestra 




passed amidst fierce controversy and a lengthy legislative process. For instance, 
mainstream political forces and the outgoing government of the right-wing Popular Party 
(PP, 1996–2004) disagreed with the law, claiming that it would split the country, revive 
the conflict between the two Spains, and endanger the spirit of the Transition. PP voted 
only in favor of some aspects of the law, such as providing financial support to the 
victims and the banning of commemorative services in the Valley of the Fallen by 
Franco’s supporters.86 Leftist parties such as United Left-Initiative for Catalonia Greens 
(IU–ICV), and regionalist parties such as the Catalan Convergence and Union (CIU) 
presented alternative texts which demanded, among other things, that the Franco regime’s 
legal sentences ought to be declared null and void, and voted in favor of the law only 
after having added several amendments to the final bill.87 Republican Left of Catalonia 
(ERC) voted against the law, claiming that it was insufficient and did not do justice to the 
victims. The law’s re-appropriation of “the spirit of the Transition” hides the difficult 
political context of its own existence, ignoring that acknowledgement of dissent and 
conflict becomes both necessary and possible as a part of the functioning of democratic 
politics.88 According to John R. Gillis, “[c]ommemorative activity is by definition social 
and political, for it involves the coordination of individual and group memories, whose 
results may appear consensual when they are in fact the product of processes of intense 
                                                 
86 Laura Robertson, Breaking the Silence, Rewriting History 14 The Journal (Sunday 23, 
November 2008)  http://www.journal-online.co.uk/article/5098-breaking-the-silence-rewriting-
history. See also: “Rajoy acusa al PSOE de romper el espíritu de la transición al retirar la estatua 
de Franco” El País 19 March 2005. 
87 The final draft of the bill, however, declares Francoist sentences “illegitimate” and “unjust.” 
Blakeley, supra at 321-322. 
88 Id., at 317. 
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contest, struggle, and in some instances, annihilation.”89 This is why the law does not 
embody true reconciliation, but the commemoration of reconciliation. The law’s re-
appropriation of the spirit of the Transition may function rhetorically as a charm to guard 
against reproducing the conditions that led to the Civil War, and reveals Spain’s deep 
fears of confronting the ghosts of the past. 
Closure. Even though the law includes the Resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe of March 17, 2006, that condemns Francoism, it does not follow 
the Council’s main recommendation “to set up a national commission to inquire into 
violations of human rights committed under the Franco dictatorship” with a mandate to 
establish “the truth regarding repression under Franco.”90 The Law of Historical Memory 
obligates the Spanish administration only to “provide assistance” to individuals and 
families for the identification of corpses in unidentified graves. However, the law leaves 
the State’s task of location and exhumation of bodies in the hands of private citizens and 
their families, making it particularly hard to recover the remains and therefore to reveal 
the truth surrounding individual deaths. 91  
Indeed, the right to know cannot be merely a private matter but rather a “collective 
right” that the State must guarantee: 
The right to know is not simply the right of any individual victim or closely related 
person to know what happened—a right to the truth. The right to know is also a 
                                                 
89 John R. Gillis, “Memory and Identity: The History of a Relationship,” ed. John R. Gillis, in 
Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1994), pp. 3-24, at 5. 
90 Giulia Tamayo, Los derechos de las víctimas de la Guerra Civil española y el franquismo en el 
contexto de la experiencia mundial y las obligaciones internacionales sobre la verdad, justicia y 
reparación 7 Entelequia. Revista Interdisciplinar (2008), pp. 255-271, at 271. See: Draft 
Recommendation unanimously adopted by the Committee on 04.10.05 par 94-95 doc 10078 ref 
2926, March 2, 2004; Read May 1, 2009, URL: www.coe.int. 
91 See “El Estado no asumirá las exhumaciones de las fosas franquistas,” D. Barcala and L. 
Calvo, March 11, 2009, Publico.es   
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collective right, drawing upon history to prevent violations from recurring in the 
future. Its corollary is a “duty to remember,” which the State must assume, in order to 
guard against the perversions of history that go under the names of revisionism or 
negationism; the knowledge of the oppression it has lived through is part of a 
people’s national heritage and as such must be preserved. 92  
    
The law cautiously states that it does not want to impose a concrete “collective 
memory,” but in its goal scrupulously to avoid it. This, the law relegates the democratic 
regime of the Second Republic and the memory of those victimized by Franco to a 
threshold beyond public recognition. In doing so, it constructs another version of the 
Benjaminian Paradise, in which words such as foundation, reconciliation, concord, and 
closure, serve to hide the barbarism upon which it stands. The law’s inability to assume 
the ruins of the past may ultimately prevent it from healing the wounds as intended; and it 
may keep them barely covered in ways that will continue to cause pain in the future.  
  
IV. AFTER THE LAW OF HISTORICAL MEMORY 
In October of 2008, in response to an official request of more than fifteen associations 
for the recovery of historical memory, the Judge of the Audiencia Nacional Baltasar 
Garzón opened a criminal investigation against Franco and more than 30 generals and 
other officials who served under the dictatorial regime and committed “crimes against 
                                                 
92 The collective right to know was expressed in a United Nations’ report by M. Joinet, Question 
of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (Civil and Political), E/CN. 4/Sub. 
2/1997/20/Rev.1, October 2, 1997; Read April 30, 2009, URL:  
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/impu/joinet2.html In 2005, Diane Orentlicher updated the set of 
principles elaborated by Joinet in Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of 
Principles to Combat Impunity, Diane Orentlicher E/CN.4/2005/102/Add. 1, February 8, 2005; 
Read April 30, 2009, URL: http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/impu/principles.html   
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humanity.”93 In the indictment, he described Francoism as a “preconceived and 
systematic plan of extermination of political opponents through mass killings, torture, 
exile, and forced disappearances.”94 He argued that the Spanish Amnesty Law of 1977 
did not extinguish the State’s obligation to investigate these kind of crimes and 
eventually punished those responsible for them.95 The State’s duty to investigate and 
prosecute those responsible for gross violations of human rights has been reaffirmed by 
the United Nations Commission for Human Rights, in the “Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law.” These principles “do not entail new international or domestic legal obligations but 
identify mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the implementation of 
existing legal obligations under international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law which are complementary though different as to their norms.”96 For 
instance, Principle 4 states that: 
In cases of gross violations of international human rights law and serious 
violations of international humanitarian law constituting crimes under 
international law, States have the duty to investigate and, if there is sufficient 
evidence, the duty to submit to prosecution the person allegedly responsible for 
the violations and, if found guilty, the duty to punish her or him.  
 
According to this principle (that Garzón evoked), the State has not only the duty to 
investigate, but also to prosecute and punish those responsible for the violation of human 
rights, and these include the crimes that occurred during the Franco dictatorship. 
                                                 
93 Auto del juez Garzón DILIGENCIAS PREVIAS 399 /2006 V sobre los desapariciones 
forzadas por el franquismo. 
94 Garzón, supra at 3, my own translation. 
95 Id. at 47. 
96 These principles were adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 60/147 of 16 
December 2005, Read April 28, 2009, URL: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/remedy.htm  
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Accordingly, impunity is a violation of both the International Law of Human Rights and 
the victims’ rights to truth, reparation, and justice.97 Furthermore, for Garzón, the recent 
Law of Historical Memory “does not exhaust the requirement of accountability and is 
fully compatible . . . with the exercise of rights and access to ordinary and extraordinary 
proceedings established in the laws and international treaties and agreements ratified by 
Spain.”98 On these grounds, Garzón declared his court competent to investigate the 
circumstances surrounding the forced disappearance of more than a hundred thousand 
people during the Civil War and the early years of the dictatorship. He also proposed to 
create a map of the mass graves, and the exhumation and the identification of victims still 
buried in nineteen unmarked mass graves, including the one believed to hold the remains 
of the famous poet and playwright Federico García Lorca.99 
 Garzón’s initiative to open a criminal investigation into Franco’s crimes caused 
fierce critical reactions. A week later, Javier Zaragoza, Spain’s chief prosecutor, filed a 
motion to dismiss Garzón’s proceedings. According to Zaragoza, Garzón’s initiative 
“breaks the most elementary rules of criminal procedure and leads to a general inquisition 
prohibited by the Constitution,” which is “hardly compatible with the scope, limits, and 
                                                 
97 Garzón, supra at 56.  
98 Id., at 57. 
99 Garzón’s order of exhuming Federico García Lorca’s remains was hardly free of controversy. 
Lorca’s own relatives —a group of nephews and nieces—opposed the exhumation of the poet’s 
remains because they wanted them to “rest forever where they are.” Jon Lee Anderson, Letter 
from Andalusia. Lorca’s Bones. Can Spain Finally Confront its Civil-War Past? (The New 
Yorker, June 22, 2009), pp. 44-48, at 45. Families’ victims whose corpses are thought to be 
buried with Lorca requested their exhumation and identification. At first instance, the judge 
assigned to the case refused to order the exhumation. Later, despite the objections of Lorca’s 
relatives, and under the request of the ARMH, the gravesite was declared by the Socialist 
government of Andalucía a matter of “archeological interest” and the excavations began. After 
two months of work, the poet’s remain were not found.  
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purposes of the criminal proceedings in a ‘Estado de Derecho.’”100 Zaragoza argued that 
under the Spanish criminal code in force before the Civil War (passed in 1932), those 
offences were not punishable as crimes against humanity but as ordinary crimes, which 
are ordinarily prescribed after a 20 years period. Or, in its default, they were covered by 
the 1977 Amnesty Law.101 Moreover Zaragoza argued that the recovery of the memory 
and dignity of the victims could be satisfied through the mechanisms established by the 
Law of Historical Memory, and would not depend “solely on whether the courts can 
continue with the criminal investigation.” 102 In any case, he argued that the investigation 
“did not fall under the jurisdiction of the Audiencia Nacional but under the various 
territorial courts where the crimes were committed.”103  
On November 18th, Garzón withdrew his investigation and recused himself in 
favor of Spain’s provincial courts, hoping that the investigation would continue. Instead, 
Garzón soon found himself in the midst of a criminal investigation in the opposite 
direction. On April 7th 2010, the Spanish Supreme Court Judge Luciano Varela admitted 
a complaint filed by three extreme right wing organizations (Manos Limpias, Libertad y 
Identidad, and Falange Española y de las JONS) accusing Garzón of deliberately 
overstepping his jurisdiction (and hence committing the crime of prevaricación or “abuse 
of power.” Varela argued that even though he was “aware of his lack of jurisdiction and 
that the crimes reported lacked penal relevance when the proceedings began, [Garzón] 
built a contrived argument to justify his control of the proceedings he had initiated.”104 If 
                                                 
100 Javier-Alberto Zaragoza Aguado, “Recurso de apelación ante la Sala de lo Penal de la 
Audiencia Nacional” October 20, 2008, at 12, 8. 
101 Zaragoza, supra at 32. 
102 Id., at 7. 
103 Id., at 35. 
104 Luciano Varela Castro, Auto, n: 20048/2009, Tribunal Supremo. Sala de lo Penal. 
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found guilty, Garzón faces disbarment for 10 to 20 years, which would mean the end of 
his career as a judge, and incidentally, the triumph of the heirs of Francoism against the 
only judge who officially tried to open a criminal investigation against its crimes.  
 For Garzón’s supporters (he enjoys the support, among others, of the associations 
for the recovery of memory, The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), and human 
rights activists), he has become “the last victim of Francoism.”105 Garzón’s supporters 
also believe that his prosecution is politically motivated, since it coincides with an 
investigation of a case of political corruption (the so-called Gürtel case, in which several 
Partido Popular (PP) politicians were accused of bribery and receiving expensive gifts). 
The PP has fiercely demonstrated its stand against Garzón. María Dolores Cospedal, the 
Secretary General of the PP, described the demonstrations in support of Garzón in Spain 
organized by left wing parties as “an attack against democracy.”106 Cospedal told Prime 
Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero that “instead of keeping silent and encouraging 
such actions, [the prime minister] should act in defense of democracy, separation of 
powers, equality of all Spanish people and in defense of Spanish institutions.”107 She also 
urged Zapatero to worry “for the real problems of the Spanish people, which are 
unemployment [and] lack of economic options” and the wounds that should not be 
reopened.  
 Regardless of what María Dolores Cospedal says, the comparative analysis 
between the novel and the Law of Historical Memory shows that these wounds still 
                                                 
105 See International lawyers support the Garzon’s cause against Franco’s regime, September 19, 
2009, http://zikipediq.wordpress.com/2009/09/10/international-lawyers-support-the-
garzon%e2%80%99s-cause-against-franco%e2%80%99s-regime/ 






remain open, and that only by taking responsibility for the perversions of history can the 
cycle of violence and injustice be broken and give the victims and their families the 
recognition and dignity they have been denied until now. 
APPENDIX 1 
Ley 46/1977, de 15 de octubre, de Amnistía.  
Jefatura de Estado (BOE n. 248 de 17/10/1977) 
De conformidad con la Ley aprobada por las Cortes, vengo en sancionar:  
ARTÍCULO PRIMERO.  
I. Quedan amnistiados:  
A) Todos los actos de intencionalidad política, cualquiera que fuese su resultado, 
tipificados como delitos y faltas realizados con anterioridad al día quince de diciembre de 
mil novecientos setenta y seis.  
B) Todos los actos de la misma naturaleza realizados entre el quince de diciembre de mil 
novecientos setenta y seis y el quince de junio de mil novecientos setenta y siete, cuando 
en la intencionalidad política se aprecie además un móvil de restablecimiento de las 
libertades públicas o de reivindicación de autonomías de los pueblos de España.  
C) Todos los actos de idéntica naturaleza e intencionalidad a los contemplados en el 
párrafo anterior realizados hasta el seis de octubre de mil novecientos setenta y siete, 
siempre que no hayan supuesto violencia grave contra la vida o la integridad de las 
personas.  
II. A los meros efectos de subsunción en cada uno de los párrafos del apartado anterior, 
se entenderá por momento de realización del acto aquél en que se inició la actividad 
criminal.  
La amnistía también comprenderá los delitos y faltas conexos con los del apartado 
anterior.  
ARTÍCULO SEGUNDO.  
En todo caso están comprendidos en la amnistía:  
A) Los delitos de rebelión y sedición, así como los delitos y faltas cometidos con ocasión 
o motivo de ello, tipificados en el Código de Justicia Militar.  
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B) La objeción de conciencia a la prestación del servicio militar, por motivos éticos o 
religiosos.  
C) Los delitos de denegación de auxilio a la justicia por la negativa a revelar hechos de 
naturaleza política, conocidos en el ejercicio profesional.  
D) Los actos de expresión de opinión, realizados a través de prensa, imprenta o cualquier 
otro medio de comunicación.  
E) Los delitos y faltas que pudieran haber cometido las autoridades, funcionarios y 
agentes del orden público, con motivo u ocasión de la investigación y persecución de los 
actos incluidos en esta ley.  
F) Los delitos cometidos por los funcionarios y agentes del orden público contra el 
ejercicio de los derechos de las personas.  
ARTÍCULO TERCERO.  
Los beneficios de esta ley se extienden a los quebrantamientos de condenas impuestas 
por delitos amnistiados, a los de extrañamiento acordados por conmutación de otras 
penas y al incumplimiento de condiciones establecidas en indultos particulares.  
ARTÍCULO CUARTO.  
Quedan también amnistiadas las faltas disciplinarias judiciales e infracciones 
administrativas o gubernativas realizadas con intencionalidad política, con la sola 
exclusión de la tributarias.  
ARTÍCULO QUINTO.  
Están comprendidas en esta ley las infracciones de naturaleza laboral y sindical 
consistentes en actos que supongan el ejercicio de derechos reconocidos a los 
trabajadores en normas y convenios internacionales vigentes en la actualidad.  
ARTÍCULO SEXTO.  
La amnistía determinará en general la extinción de la responsabilidad criminal derivada 
de las penas impuestas o que se pudieran imponer con carácter principal o accesorio.  
Respecto del personal militar al que se le hubiere impuesto, o puediera imponérsele como 
consecuencia de causas pendientes, la pena accesoria de separación del servicio o pérdida 
de empleo, la amnistía determinará la extinción de las penas principales y el 
reconocimiento, en las condiciones más beneficiosas, de los derechos pasivos que les 
correspondan en su situación.  
ARTÍCULO SÉPTIMO.  
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Los efectos y beneficios de la amnistía a que se refieren los cuatro primeros artículos 
serán en cada caso los siguientes:  
A) La reintegración en la plenitud de sus derechos activos y pasivos de los funcionarios 
civiles sancionados, así como la reincorporación de los mismos a sus respectivos cuerpos, 
si hubiesen sido separados. Los funcionarios repuestos no tendrán derecho al percibo de 
haberes por el tiempo en que no hubieren prestado servicios efectivos, pero se les 
reconocer la antigüedad que les corresponda como si no hubiera habido interrupción en la 
prestación de los servicios.  
B) El reconocimiento a los herederos de las fallecidos del derecho a percibir las 
prestaciones debidas.  
C) La eliminación de los antecedentes penales y notas desfavorables en expedientes 
personales, aun cuando el sancionado hubiese fallecido.  
D) La percepción de haber pasivo que corresponda, en el caso de los militares 
profesionales, con arreglo al empleo que tuvieren en la fecha del acto amnistiado.  
E) La percepción del haber pasivo que corresponda a los miembros de las fuerzas de 
orden público, incluso los que hubiesen pertenecido a cuerpos extinguidos.  
ARTÍCULO OCTAVO.  
La amnistía deja sin efecto las resoluciones judiciales y actos administrativos o 
gubernativos que hayan producido despidos, sanciones, limitaciones o suspensiones de 
los derechos activos o pasivos de los trabajadores por cuenta ajena, derivados de los 
hechos contemplados en los artículos primero y quinto de la presente ley, restituyendo a 
los afectados todos los derechos que tendrían en el momento de aplicación de la misma 
de no haberse producido aquellas medidas, incluidas las cotizaciones de la seguridad 
social y mutualismo laboral que, como situación de asimiladas al alta, serán de cargo del 
Estado.  
ARTÍCULO NOVENO.  
La aplicación de la amnistía, en cada caso, corresponderá con exclusividad a los jueces, 
tribunales y autoridades judiciales correspondientes, quienes adoptarán, de acuerdo con 
las leyes procesales en vigor y con carácter de urgencia, las decisiones pertinentes en 
cumplimiento de esta ley, cualquiera que sea el estado de tramitación del proceso y la 
jurisdicción de que se trate.  
La decisión se adoptará en el plazo máximo de tres meses, sin perjuicio de los ulteriores 
recursos, que no tendrán efectos suspensivos.  
La amnistía se aplicará de oficio o a instancia de parte con audiencia, en todo caso, del 
Ministerio Fiscal. La acción para solicitarla será pública.  
 
 113
ARTÍCULO DIEZ.  
La autoridad judicial competente ordenará la inmediata libertad de los beneficiados por la 
amnistía que se hallaren en prisión y dejará sin efecto las órdenes de busca y captura de 
los que estuviesen declarados en rebeldía.  
ARTÍCULO ONCE.  
No obstante lo dispuesto en el artículo noveno, la administración aplicará la amnistía de 
oficio en los procedimientos administrativos en tramitación y a instancia de parte, en 
cualquier caso.  
ARTÍCULO DOCE.  
La presente ley entrará en vigor el mismo día de su publicación en el "Boletín Oficial del 
Estado".  
Dada en Madrid a quince de octubre de mil novecientos setenta y siete.-Juan Carlos.-el 
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22296 LEY 52/2007, de 26 de diciembre, por la que se reconocen y amplían derechos y 
se establecen medidas en favor de quienes padecieron persecución o violencia durante la 
guerra civil y la dictadura. 
 
JUAN CARLOS I REY DE ESPAÑA 
 
A todos los que la presente vieren y entendieren. Sabed: Que las Cortes Generales han 
aprobado y Yo vengo en sancionar la siguiente ley. 
 
EXPOSICIÓN DE MOTIVOS 
 
El espíritu de reconciliación y concordia, y de respeto al pluralismo y a la defensa 
pacífica de todas las ideas, que guió la Transición, nos permitió dotarnos de una 
Constitución, la de 1978, que tradujo jurídicamente esa voluntad de reencuentro de los 
españoles, articulando un Estado social y democrático de derecho con clara vocación 
integradora. El espíritu de la Transición da sentido al modelo constitucional de 
convivencia más fecundo que hayamos disfrutado nunca y explica las diversas medidas y 
derechos que se han ido reconociendo, desde el origen mismo de todo el período 
democrático, en favor de las personas que, durante los decenios anteriores a la 
Constitución, sufrieron las consecuencias de la guerra civil y del régimen dictatorial que 
la sucedió. 
Pese a ese esfuerzo legislativo, quedan aún iniciativas por adoptar para dar 
cumplida y definitiva respuesta a las demandas de esos ciudadanos, planteadas tanto en el 
ámbito parlamentario como por distintas asociaciones cívicas. Se trata de peticiones 
legítimas y justas, que nuestra democracia, apelando de nuevo a su espíritu fundacional 
de concordia, y en el marco de la Constitución, no puede dejar de atender. 
Por ello mismo, esta Ley atiende a lo manifestado por la Comisión Constitucional 
del Congreso de los Diputados que el 20 de noviembre de 2002 aprobó por unanimidad 
una Proposición no de Ley en la que el órgano de representación de la ciudadanía 
reiteraba que «nadie puede sentirse legitimado, como ocurrió en el pasado, para utilizar la 
violencia con la finalidad de imponer sus convicciones políticas y establecer regímenes 
totalitarios contrarios a la libertad y dignidad de todos los ciudadanos, lo que merece la 
condena y repulsa de nuestra sociedad democrática». La presente Ley asume esta 
Declaración así como la condena del franquismo contenida en el Informe de la Asamblea 
Parlamentaria del Consejo de Europa firmado en París el 17 de marzo de 2006 en el que 
se denunciaron las graves violaciones de Derechos Humanos cometidas en España entre 
los años 1939 y 1975. 
Es la hora, así, de que la democracia española y las generaciones vivas que hoy 
disfrutan de ella honren y recuperen para siempre a todos los que directamente 
padecieron las injusticias y agravios producidos, por unos u otros motivos políticos o 
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ideológicos o de creencias religiosas, en aquellos dolorosos períodos de nuestra historia. 
Desde luego, a quienes perdieron la vida. Con ellos, a sus familias. También a quienes 
perdieron su libertad, al padecer prisión, deportación, confiscación de sus bienes, trabajos 
forzosos o internamientos en campos de concentración dentro o fuera de nuestras 
fronteras. También, en fin, a quienes perdieron la patria al ser empujados a un largo, 
desgarrador y, en tantos casos, irreversible exilio. Y, por último, a quienes en distintos 
momentos lucharon por la defensa de los valores democráticos, como los integrantes del 
Cuerpo de Carabineros, los brigadistas internacionales, los combatientes guerrilleros, 
cuya rehabilitación fue unánimemente solicitada por el Pleno del Congreso de los 
Diputados de 16 de mayo de 2001, o los miembros de la Unión Militar Democrática, que 
se autodisolvió con la celebración de las primeras elecciones democráticas. 
En este sentido, la Ley sienta las bases para que los poderes públicos lleven a 
cabo políticas públicas dirigidas al conocimiento de nuestra historia y al fomento de la 
memoria democrática. 
La presente Ley parte de la consideración de que los diversos aspectos 
relacionados con la memoria personal y familiar, especialmente cuando se han visto 
afectados por conflictos de carácter público, forman parte del estatuto jurídico de la 
ciudadanía democrática, y como tales son abordados en el texto. Se reconoce, en este 
sentido, un derecho individual a la memoria personal y familiar de cada ciudadano, que 
encuentra su primera manifestación en la Ley en el reconocimiento general que en la 
misma se proclama en su artículo 2. 
En efecto, en dicho precepto se hace una proclamación general del carácter 
injusto de todas las condenas, sanciones y expresiones de violencia personal producidas, 
por motivos inequívocamente políticos o ideológicos, durante la Guerra Civil, así como 
las que, por las mismas razones, tuvieron lugar en la Dictadura posterior. 
Esta declaración general, contenida en el artículo 2, se complementa con la 
previsión de un procedimiento específico para obtener una Declaración personal, de 
contenido rehabilitador y reparador, que se abre como un derecho a todos los 
perjudicados, y que podrán ejercer ellos mismos o sus familiares. 
En el artículo 3 de la Ley se declara la ilegitimidad de los tribunales, jurados u 
órganos de cualquier naturaleza administrativa creados con vulneración de las más 
elementales garantías del derecho a un proceso justo, así como la ilegitimidad de las 
sanciones y condenas de carácter personal impuestas por motivos políticos, ideológicos o 
de creencias religiosas. Se subraya, así, de forma inequívoca, la carencia actual de 
vigencia jurídica de aquellas disposiciones y resoluciones contrarias a los derechos 
humanos y se contribuye a la rehabilitación moral de quienes sufrieron tan injustas 
sanciones y condenas. 
En este sentido, la Ley incluye una disposición derogatoria que, de forma expresa, 
priva de vigencia jurídica a aquellas normas dictadas bajo la Dictadura manifiestamente 
represoras y contrarias a los derechos fundamentales con el doble objetivo de proclamar 
su formal expulsión del ordenamiento jurídico e impedir su invocación por cualquier 
autoridad administrativa y judicial. 
En los artículos 5 a 9 se establece el reconocimiento de diversas mejoras de 
derechos económicos ya recogidos en nuestro Ordenamiento. En esta misma dirección, se 
prevé el derecho a una indemnización en favor de todas aquellas personas que perdieron 
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la vida en defensa de la democracia, de la democracia que hoy todos disfrutamos, y que 
no habían recibido hasta ahora la compensación debida (art. 10). 
Se recogen diversos preceptos (arts. 11 a 14) que, atendiendo también en este 
ámbito una muy legítima demanda de no pocos ciudadanos, que ignoran el paradero de 
sus familiares, algunos aún en fosas comunes, prevén medidas e instrumentos para que 
las Administraciones públicas faciliten, a los interesados que lo soliciten, las tareas de 
localización, y, en su caso, identificación de los desaparecidos, como una última prueba 
de respeto hacia ellos. 
Se establecen, asimismo, una serie de medidas (arts. 15 y 16) en relación con los 
símbolos y monumentos conmemorativos de la Guerra Civil o de la Dictadura, 
sustentadas en el principio de evitar toda exaltación de la sublevación militar, de la 
Guerra Civil y de la represión de la Dictadura, en el convencimiento de que los 
ciudadanos tienen derecho a que así sea, a que los símbolos públicos sean ocasión de 
encuentro y no de enfrentamiento, ofensa o agravio. 
El legislador considera de justicia hacer un doble reconocimiento singularizado. 
En primer lugar, a los voluntarios integrantes de las Brigadas internacionales, a los que se 
les permitirá acceder a la nacionalidad española sin necesidad de que renuncien a la que 
ostenten hasta este momento (art. 18); y, también, a las asociaciones ciudadanas que se 
hayan significado en la defensa de la dignidad de las víctimas de la violencia política a 
que se refiere esta Ley (art. 19). 
Con el fin de facilitar la recopilación y el derecho de acceso a la información 
histórica sobre la Guerra Civil, la Ley refuerza el papel del actual Archivo General de la 
Guerra Civil Española, con sede en Salamanca, integrándolo en el Centro Documental de 
la Memoria Histórica también con sede en la ciudad de Salamanca, y estableciendo que 
se le dé traslado de toda la documentación existente en otros centros estatales (arts. 20 a 
22). 
 La presente ley amplía la posibilidad de adquisición de la nacionalidad española a 
los descendientes hasta el primer grado de quienes hubiesen sido originariamente 
españoles. Con ello se satisface una legítima pretensión de la emigración española, que 
incluye singularmente a los descendientes de quienes perdieron la nacionalidad española 
por el exilio a consecuencia de la Guerra Civil o la Dictadura. 
En definitiva, la presente Ley quiere contribuir a cerrar heridas todavía abiertas en 
los españoles y a dar satisfacción a los ciudadanos que sufrieron, directamente o en la 
persona de sus familiares, las consecuencias de la tragedia de la Guerra Civil o de la 
represión de la Dictadura. 
Quiere contribuir a ello desde el pleno convencimiento de que, profundizando de 
este modo en el espíritu del reencuentro y de la concordia de la Transición, no son sólo 
esos ciudadanos los que resultan reconocidos y honrados sino también la Democracia 
española en su conjunto. No es tarea del legislador implantar una determinada memoria 
colectiva. Pero sí es deber del legislador, y cometido de la ley, reparar a las víctimas, 
consagrar y proteger, con el máximo vigor normativo, el derecho a la memoria personal y 
familiar como expresión de plena ciudadanía democrática, fomentar los valores 
constitucionales y promover el conocimiento y la reflexión sobre nuestro pasado, para 
evitar que se repitan situaciones de intolerancia y violación de derechos humanos como 
las entonces vividas. 





Artículo 1. Objeto de la Ley. 
 
1. La presente Ley tiene por objeto reconocer y ampliar derechos a favor de 
quienes padecieron persecución o violencia, por razones políticas, ideológicas, o de 
creencia religiosa, durante la Guerra Civil y la Dictadura, promover su reparación moral 
y la recuperación de su memoria personal y familiar, y adoptar medidas complementarias 
destinadas a suprimir elementos de división entre los ciudadanos, todo ello con el fin de 
fomentar la cohesión y solidaridad entre las diversas generaciones de españoles en torno 
a los principios, valores y libertades constitucionales. 
2. Mediante la presente Ley, como política pública, se pretende el fomento de los 
valores y principios democráticos, facilitando el conocimiento de los hechos y 
circunstancias acaecidos durante la Guerra civil y la Dictadura, y asegurando la 
preservación de los documentos relacionados con ese período histórico y depositados en 
archivos públicos. 
 
Artículo 2. Reconocimiento general. 
 
1. Como expresión del derecho de todos los ciudadanos a la reparación moral y a 
la recuperación de su memoria personal y familiar, se reconoce y declara el carácter 
radicalmente injusto de todas las condenas, sanciones y cualesquiera formas de violencia 
personal producidas por razones políticas, ideológicas o de creencia religiosa, durante la 
Guerra Civil, así como las sufridas por las mismas causas durante la Dictadura. 
2. Las razones a que se refiere el apartado anterior incluyen la pertenencia, 
colaboración o relación con partidos políticos, sindicatos, organizaciones religiosas o 
militares, minorías étnicas, sociedades secretas, logias masónicas y grupos de resistencia, 
así como el ejercicio de conductas vinculadas con opciones culturales, lingüísticas o de 
orientación sexual. 
3. Asimismo, se reconoce y declara la injusticia que supuso el exilio de muchos 
españoles durante la Guerra Civil y la Dictadura. 
 
Artículo 3. Declaración de ilegitimidad. 
 
1. Se declara la ilegitimidad de los tribunales, jurados y cualesquiera otros 
órganos penales o administrativos que, durante la Guerra Civil, se hubieran constituido 
para imponer, por motivos políticos, ideológicos o de creencia religiosa, condenas o 
sanciones de carácter personal, así como la de sus resoluciones. 
2. Por ser contrarios a Derecho y vulnerar las más elementales exigencias del 
derecho a un juicio justo, se declara en todo caso la ilegitimidad del Tribunal de 
Represión de la Masonería y el Comunismo, el Tribunal de Orden Público, así como los 
Tribunales de Responsabilidades Políticas y Consejos de Guerra constituidos por motivos 
políticos, ideológicos o de creencia religiosa de acuerdo con lo dispuesto en el artículo 2 
de la presente Ley. 
3. Igualmente, se declaran ilegítimas, por vicios de forma y fondo, las condenas y 
sanciones dictadas por motivos políticos, ideológicos o de creencia por cualesquiera 
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tribunales u órganos penales o administrativos durante la Dictadura contra quienes 
defendieron la legalidad institucional anterior, pretendieron el restablecimiento de un 
régimen democrático en España o intentaron vivir conforme a opciones amparadas por 
derechos y libertades hoy reconocidos por la Constitución. 
 
Artículo 4. Declaración de reparación y reconocimiento personal. 
 
1. Se reconoce el derecho a obtener una Declaración de reparación y 
reconocimiento personal a quienes durante la Guerra Civil y la Dictadura padecieron los 
efectos de las resoluciones a que se refieren los artículos anteriores. Este derecho es 
plenamente compatible con los demás derechos y medidas reparadoras reconocidas en 
normas anteriores, así como con el ejercicio de las acciones a que hubiere lugar ante los 
tribunales de justicia. 
2. Tendrá derecho a solicitar la Declaración las personas afectadas y, en caso de 
que las mismas hubieran fallecido, el cónyuge o persona ligada por análoga relación de 
afectividad, sus ascendientes, sus descendientes y sus colaterales hasta el segundo grado. 
3. Asimismo, podrán solicitar la Declaración las instituciones públicas, previo 
acuerdo de su órgano colegiado de gobierno, respecto de quienes, careciendo de cónyuge 
o de los familiares mencionados en el apartado anterior, hubiesen desempeñado cargo o 
actividad relevante en las mismas. 
4. Las personas o instituciones previstas en los apartados anteriores podrán 
interesar del Ministerio de Justicia la expedición de la Declaración. A tal fin, podrán 
aportar toda la documentación que sobre los hechos o el procedimiento obre en su poder, 
así como todos aquellos antecedentes que se consideren oportunos. 
5. La Declaración a que se refiere esta Ley será compatible con cualquier otra 
fórmula de reparación prevista en el ordenamiento jurídico y no constituirá título para el 
reconocimiento de responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado ni de cualquier Administración 
Pública, ni dará lugar a efecto, reparación o indemnización de índole económica o 
profesional. El Ministerio de Justicia denegará la expedición de la Declaración cuando no 
se ajuste a lo dispuesto en esta Ley. 
 
Artículo 5. Mejora de las prestaciones reconocidas por la Ley 5/1979, de 18 de 
septiembre, de reconocimiento de pensiones, asistencia médico-farmacéutica y asistencia 
social a favor de las viudas, hijos y demás familiares de los españoles fallecidos como 
consecuencia o con ocasión de la pasada Guerra Civil. 
 
1. Con el fin de completar la acción protectora establecida por la Ley 5/1979, de 
18 de septiembre, de reconocimiento de pensiones, asistencia médico-farmacéutica y 
asistencia social a favor de las viudas, hijos y demás familiares de los españoles 
fallecidos como consecuencia o con ocasión de la pasada Guerra Civil, se modifican las 
letras a) y c) del número 2 de su artículo primero, que quedan redactadas como sigue: «a) 
Por heridas, enfermedad o lesión accidental originadas como consecuencia de la guerra. 
c) Como consecuencia de actuaciones u opiniones políticas y sindicales, cuando pueda 
establecerse asimismo una relación de causalidad personal y directa entre la Guerra Civil 
y el fallecimiento.» 
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2. Las pensiones que se reconozcan al amparo de lo dispuesto en el apartado 
anterior tendrán efectos económicos desde el primer día del mes siguiente a la fecha de 
entrada en vigor de la presente Ley, siendo de aplicación, en su caso, las normas que 
regulan la caducidad de efectos en el Régimen de Clases Pasivas del Estado. 
 
Artículo 6. Importe de determinadas pensiones de orfandad. 
 
1. La cuantía de las pensiones de orfandad a favor de huérfanos no incapacitados 
mayores de veintiún años causadas por personal no funcionario al amparo de las 
Leyes 5/1979, de 18 de septiembre, y 35/1980, de 26 de junio, se establece en 132,86 
euros mensuales. 
2. A las pensiones de orfandad a que se refiere el presente artículo les será de 
aplicación el sistema de complementos económicos vigentes y experimentarán las 
revalorizaciones que establezcan las Leyes de Presupuestos Generales del Estado para 
cada año. 
3. Lo dispuesto en los dos apartados anteriores tendrá efectividad económica 
desde el primer día del mes siguiente a la fecha de entrada en vigor de la presente Ley, 
sin perjuicio de las normas que sobre caducidad de efectos rigen en el Régimen de Clases 
Pasivas del Estado. 
 
Artículo 7. Modificación del ámbito de aplicación de las indemnizaciones a favor de 
quienes sufrieron prisión como consecuencia de los supuestos contemplados en la Ley 
46/1977, de 15 de octubre, de Amnistía. 
 
1. Con el fin de incorporar supuestos en su día excluidos de la concesión de 
indemnizaciones por tiempos de estancia en prisión durante la Dictadura, se modifican 
los apartados uno y dos de la disposición adicional decimoctava de la Ley 4/1990, de 29 
de junio, de Presupuestos Generales del Estado para el año 1990, que quedan redactados 
como sigue:  
«Uno. Quienes acrediten haber sufrido privación de libertad en establecimientos 
penitenciarios o en Batallones Disciplinarios, en cualquiera de sus modalidades, durante 
tres o más años, como consecuencia de los supuestos contemplados en la Ley 46/1977, de 
15 de octubre, y tuvieran cumplida la edad de sesenta años en 31 de diciembre de 1990, 
tendrán derecho a percibir por una sola vez una indemnización de acuerdo con la 
siguiente escala: Tres o más años de prisión: 6.010,12 €. Por cada tres años completos 
adicionales: 1.202,02 €. 
Dos. Si el causante del derecho a esta indemnización hubiese fallecido, y en 31 de 
diciembre de 1990 hubiera podido tener cumplidos sesenta años de edad tendrá derecho a 
la misma el cónyuge supérstite, que sea pensionista de viudedad por tal causa o que, aun 
no teniendo esta condición, acredite ser cónyuge viudo del causante.» 
2. Se añaden un apartado dos bis y un apartado siete a la Disposición adicional 
decimoctava de la Ley 4/1990, de 29 de junio de Presupuestos del Estado con la siguiente 
redacción: «Dos bis. Una indemnización de 9.616,18 € se reconocerá al cónyuge 
supérstite de quien, habiendo sufrido privación de libertad por tiempo inferior a tres años 
como consecuencia de los supuestos contemplados en la Ley 46/1977, de 15 de octubre, 
hubiese sido condenado por ellos a pena de muerte efectivamente ejecutada y no haya 
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visto reconocida en su favor, por esta circunstancia, pensión o indemnización con cargo a 
alguno de los sistemas públicos de protección social.» «Siete. Quienes se consideren con 
derecho a los beneficios establecidos en los apartados uno y dos anteriores, ya sean los 
propios causantes o sus cónyuges supérstites o pensionistas de viudedad por tal causa, 
deberán solicitarlos expresamente ante la citada Dirección General de Costes de Personal 
y Pensiones Públicas.» 
 
Artículo 8. Tributación en el Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas de las 
indemnizaciones a favor de quienes sufrieron privación de libertad como consecuencia 
de los supuestos contemplados en la Ley 46/1977, de 15 de octubre, de Amnistía. 
 
Con efectos desde el 1 de enero de 2005, se añade una nueva letra u) al artículo 7 
del texto refundido de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas, 
aprobado por el Real Decreto Legislativo 3/2004, de 5 de marzo, que quedará redactada 
de la siguiente manera: «u) Las indemnizaciones previstas en la legislación del Estado y 
de las Comunidades Autónomas para compensar la privación de libertad en 
establecimientos penitenciarios como consecuencia de los supuestos contemplados en la 
Ley 46/1977, de 15 de octubre, de Amnistía.» 
 
Artículo 9. Ayudas para compensar la carga tributaria de las indemnizaciones 
percibidas desde el 1 de enero de 1999 por privación de libertad como consecuencia de 
los supuestos contemplados en la Ley 46/1977, de 15 de octubre, de Amnistía. 
 
1. Las personas que hubieran percibido desde el 1 de enero de 1999 hasta la fecha 
de entrada en vigor de la presente Ley las indemnizaciones previstas en la legislación del 
Estado y de las Comunidades Autónomas para compensar la privación de libertad en 
establecimientos penitenciarios como consecuencia de los supuestos contemplados en la 
Ley 46/1977, de 15 de octubre, de Amnistía, podrán solicitar, en la forma y plazos que se 
determinen, el abono de una ayuda cuantificada en el 15 por ciento de las cantidades que, 
por tal concepto, hubieran consignado en la declaración del Impuesto sobre la Renta de 
las Personas Físicas de cada uno de dichos períodos impositivos. 
2. Si las personas a que se refiere el apartado 1 anterior hubieran fallecido, el 
derecho a la ayuda corresponderá a sus herederos, quienes podrán solicitarla. 
3. Las ayudas percibidas en virtud de lo dispuesto en el presente artículo estarán 
exentas del Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas. 
4. Por Orden del Ministro de Economía y Hacienda se determinará el 
procedimiento, las condiciones para su obtención y el órgano competente para el 
reconocimiento y abono de esta ayuda. 
 
Artículo 10. Reconocimiento en favor de personas fallecidas en defensa de la democracia 
durante el período comprendido entre 1 de enero de 1968 y 6 de octubre de 1977. 
 
1. En atención a las circunstancias excepcionales que concurrieron en su muerte, 
se reconoce el derecho a una indemnización, por una cuantía de 135.000 €, a los 
beneficiarios de quienes fallecieron durante el período comprendido entre el 1 de enero 
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de 1968 y el 6 de octubre de 1977, en defensa y reivindicación de las libertades y 
derechos democráticos. 
2. Serán beneficiarios de la indemnización a que se refiere el apartado primero de 
este artículo los hijos y el cónyuge de la persona fallecida, si no estuviere separado 
legalmente ni en proceso de separación o nulidad matrimonial, o la persona que hubiere 
venido conviviendo con ella de forma permanente con análoga relación de afectividad a 
la del cónyuge durante, al menos, los dos años inmediatamente anteriores al momento del 
fallecimiento, salvo que hubieren tenido descendencia en común, en cuyo caso bastará la 
mera convivencia. 
 Subsidiariamente, si no existieran los anteriores, serán beneficiarios, por orden 
sucesivo y excluyente, los padres, nietos, los hermanos de la persona fallecida y los hijos 
de la persona conviviente, cuando dependieren económicamente del fallecido. Cuando se 
produzca la concurrencia de diversas personas que pertenezcan a un grupo de los que 
tienen derecho a la indemnización, la cuantía total máxima se repartirá por partes iguales 
entre todos los que tengan derecho por la misma condición, excepto cuando concurran el 
cónyuge o persona con análoga relación afectiva y los hijos del fallecido, en cuyo caso la 
ayuda se distribuirá al 50 por ciento entre el cónyuge o la persona con análoga relación de 
afectividad y el conjunto de los hijos. 
3. Procederá el abono de la indemnización siempre que por los mismos hechos no 
se haya recibido indemnización o compensación económica alguna o, habiéndose 
recibido, sea de cuantía inferior a la determinada en este artículo. 
4. El Gobierno, mediante Real Decreto, determinará las condiciones y el 
procedimiento para la concesión de la indemnización prevista en este artículo. 
5. Los beneficiarios de la indemnización establecida en este artículo dispondrán 
del plazo de un año, a contar desde la entrada en vigor del Real Decreto a que se refiere el 
apartado anterior, para presentar su solicitud ante la Comisión en él mencionada. 
 
Artículo 11. Colaboración de las Administraciones públicas con los particulares para la 
localización e identificación de víctimas. 
 
1. Las Administraciones públicas, en el marco de sus competencias, facilitarán a 
los descendientes directos de las víctimas que así lo soliciten las actividades de 
indagación, localización e identificación de las personas desaparecidas violentamente 
durante la Guerra Civil o la represión política posterior y cuyo paradero se ignore. Lo 
previsto en el párrafo anterior podrá aplicarse respecto de las entidades que, constituidas 
antes de 1 de junio de 2004, incluyan el desarrollo de tales actividades entre sus fines. 
2. La Administración General del Estado elaborará planes de trabajo y establecerá 
subvenciones para sufragar gastos derivados de las actividades contempladas en este 
artículo. 
 
Artículo 12. Medidas para la identificación y localización de víctimas. 
 
1. El Gobierno, en colaboración con todas las Administraciones públicas, 
elaborará un protocolo de actuación científica y multidisciplinar que asegure la 
colaboración institucional y una adecuada intervención en las exhumaciones. Asimismo, 
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celebrará los oportunos convenios de colaboración para subvencionar a las entidades 
sociales que participen en los trabajos. 
2. Las Administraciones públicas elaborarán y pondrán a disposición de todos los 
interesados, dentro de su respectivo ámbito territorial, mapas en los que consten los 
terrenos en que se localicen los restos de las personas a que se refiere el artículo anterior, 
incluyendo toda la información complementaria disponible sobre los mismos. El 
Gobierno determinará el procedimiento y confeccionará un mapa integrado que 
comprenda todo el territorio español, que será accesible para todos los ciudadanos 
interesados y al que se incorporarán los datos que deberán ser remitidos por las distintas 
Administraciones públicas competentes. 
Las áreas incluidas en los mapas serán objeto de especial preservación por sus titulares, 
en los términos que reglamentariamente se establezcan. Asimismo, los poderes públicos 
competentes adoptarán medidas orientadas a su adecuada preservación. 
  
Artículo 13. Autorizaciones administrativas para actividades de localización e 
identificación. 
 
1. Las Administraciones públicas competentes autorizarán las tareas de 
prospección encaminadas a la localización de restos de las víctimas referidas en el 
apartado 1 del artículo 11, de acuerdo con la normativa sobre patrimonio histórico y el 
protocolo de actuación que se apruebe por el Gobierno. Los hallazgos se pondrán 
inmediatamente en conocimiento de las autoridades administrativas y judiciales 
competentes. 
2. Las Administraciones públicas, en el ejercicio de sus competencias, 
establecerán el procedimiento y las condiciones en que los descendientes directos de las 
víctimas referidas en el apartado 1 del artículo 11, o las entidades que actúen en su 
nombre, puedan recuperar los restos enterrados en las fosas correspondientes, para su 
identificación y eventual traslado a otro lugar. 
3. En cualquier caso, la exhumación se someterá a autorización administrativa por 
parte de la autoridad competente, en la que deberá ponderarse la existencia de oposición 
por cualquiera de los descendientes directos de las personas cuyos restos deban ser 
trasladados. A tales efectos, y con carácter previo a la correspondiente resolución, la 
administración competente deberá dar adecuada publicidad a las solicitudes presentadas, 
comunicando en todo caso su existencia a la Administración General del Estado para su 
inclusión en el mapa referido en el apartado primero del artículo anterior. 
4. Los restos que hayan sido objeto de traslado y no fuesen reclamados serán 
inhumados en el cementerio correspondiente al término municipal en que se encontraran. 
 
Artículo 14. Acceso a los terrenos afectados por trabajos de localización e identificación. 
 
1. La realización de las actividades de localización y eventual identificación o 
traslado de los restos de las personas referidas en el apartado 1 del artículo 13 se 
constituye en fin de utilidad pública e interés social, a los efectos de permitir, en su caso 
y de acuerdo con los artículos 108 a 119 de la Ley de Expropiación Forzosa, la ocupación 
temporal de los terrenos donde deban realizarse. 
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2. Para las actividades determinadas en el apartado anterior, las autoridades 
competentes autorizarán, salvo causa justificada de interés público, la ocupación temporal 
de los terrenos de titularidad pública. 
3. En el caso de terrenos de titularidad privada, los descendientes, o las 
organizaciones legitimadas de acuerdo con el apartado anterior, deberán solicitar el 
consentimiento de los titulares de derechos afectados sobre los terrenos en que se hallen 
los restos. Si no se obtuviere dicho consentimiento, las Administraciones públicas podrán 
autorizar la ocupación temporal, siempre tras audiencia de los titulares de derechos 
afectados, con consideración de sus alegaciones, y fijando la correspondiente 
indemnización a cargo de los ocupantes. 
 
Artículo 15. Símbolos y monumentos públicos. 
 
1. Las Administraciones públicas, en el ejercicio de sus competencias, tomarán las 
medidas oportunas para la retirada de escudos, insignias, placas y otros objetos o 
menciones conmemorativas de exaltación, personal o colectiva, de la sublevación militar, 
de la Guerra Civil y de la represión de la Dictadura. Entre estas medidas podrá incluirse 
la retirada de subvenciones o ayudas públicas. 
2. Lo previsto en el apartado anterior no será de aplicación cuando las menciones 
sean de estricto recuerdo privado, sin exaltación de los enfrentados, o cuando concurran 
razones artísticas, arquitectónicas o artístico-religiosas protegidas por la ley. 
3. El Gobierno colaborará con las Comunidades Autónomas y las Entidades 
Locales en la elaboración de un catálogo de vestigios relativos a la Guerra Civil y la 
Dictadura a los efectos previstos en el apartado anterior. 
4. Las Administraciones públicas podrán retirar subvenciones o ayudas a los 
propietarios privados que no actúen del modo previsto en el apartado 1 de este artículo. 
 
Artículo 16. Valle de los Caídos. 
 
1. El Valle de los Caídos se regirá estrictamente por las normas aplicables con 
carácter general a los lugares de culto y a los cementerios públicos. 
2. En ningún lugar del recinto podrán llevarse a cabo actos de naturaleza política 
ni exaltadores de la Guerra Civil, de sus protagonistas, o del franquismo. 
 
Artículo 17. Edificaciones y obras realizadas mediante trabajos forzosos. 
 
El Gobierno, en colaboración con las demás Administraciones públicas 
confeccionará un censo de edificaciones y obras realizadas por miembros de los 
Batallones Disciplinarios de Soldados Trabajadores, así como por prisioneros en campos 
de concentración, Batallones de Trabajadores y prisioneros en Colonias Penitenciarias 
Militarizadas. 
 





1. Con el fin de hacer efectivo el derecho que reconoció el Real Decreto 39/1996, 
de 19 de enero, a los voluntarios integrantes de las Brigadas Internacionales que 
participaron en la Guerra Civil de 1936 a 1939, no les será de aplicación la exigencia de 
renuncia a su anterior nacionalidad requerida en el artículo 23, letra b, del Código Civil, 
en lo que se refiere a la adquisición por carta de naturaleza de la nacionalidad española. 
2. Mediante Real Decreto aprobado por el Consejo de Ministros, se determinarán 
los requisitos y el procedimiento a seguir para la adquisición de la nacionalidad española 
por parte de las personas mencionadas en el apartado anterior. 
 
Artículo 19. Reconocimiento a las asociaciones de víctimas. 
 
Se reconoce la labor de las asociaciones, fundaciones y organizaciones que hayan 
destacado en la defensa de la dignidad de todas las víctimas de la violencia política a la 
que se refiere esta Ley. El Gobierno podrá conceder, mediante Real Decreto, las 
distinciones que considere oportunas a las referidas entidades. 
 
Artículo 20. Creación del Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica y Archivo 
General de la Guerra Civil. 
 
1. De conformidad con lo previsto en la Ley 21/2005, de 17 de noviembre, se 
constituye el Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica, con sede en la ciudad de 
Salamanca. 
2. Son funciones del Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica:  
a) Mantener y desarrollar el Archivo General de la Guerra Civil Española creado por Real 
Decreto 426/1999, de 12 de marzo. A tal fin, y mediante el procedimiento que 
reglamentariamente se determine, se integrarán en este Archivo todos los documentos 
originales o copias fidedignas de los mismos referidos a la Guerra Civil de 1936-1939 y 
la represión política subsiguiente sitos en museos, bibliotecas o archivos de titularidad 
estatal, en los cuales, quedará una copia digitalizada de los mencionados documentos. 
Asimismo, la Administración General del Estado procederá a la recopilación de los 
testimonios orales relevantes vinculados al indicado período histórico para su remisión e 
integración en el Archivo General. 
b) Recuperar, reunir, organizar y poner a disposición de los interesados los fondos 
documentales y las fuentes secundarias que puedan resultar de interés para el estudio de 
la Guerra Civil, la Dictadura franquista, la resistencia guerrillera contra ella, el exilio, el 
internamiento de españoles en campos de concentración durante la Segunda Guerra 
Mundial y la transición. 
c) Fomentar la investigación histórica sobre la Guerra Civil, el franquismo, el exilio y la 
Transición, y contribuir a la difusión de sus resultados. 
d) Impulsar la difusión de los fondos del Centro, y facilitar la participación activa de los 
usuarios y de sus organizaciones representativas. 
e) Otorgar ayudas a los investigadores, mediante premios y becas, para que continúen 
desarrollando su labor académica y de investigación sobre la Guerra Civil y la Dictadura. 
f) Reunir y poner a disposición de los interesados información y documentación sobre 
procesos similares habidos en otros países. 
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3. La estructura y funcionamiento del Centro Documental de la Memoria 
Histórica se establecerá mediante Real Decreto acordado en Consejo de Ministros. 
  
Artículo 21. Adquisición y protección de documentos sobre la Guerra Civil y la 
Dictadura. 
 
1. La Administración General del Estado aprobará, con carácter anual y con la 
dotación que en cada caso se establezca en los Presupuestos Generales del Estado, un 
programa de convenios para la adquisición de documentos referidos a la Guerra Civil o a 
la represión política subsiguiente que obren en archivos públicos o privados, nacionales o 
extranjeros, ya sean en versión original o a través de cualquier instrumento que permita 
archivar, conocer o reproducir palabras, datos o cifras con fidelidad al original. Los 
mencionados fondos documentales se incorporarán al Archivo General de la Guerra Civil 
Española. 
2. De conformidad con lo dispuesto en la Ley 16/1985, de 25 de junio, de 
Patrimonio Histórico Español, los documentos obrantes en archivos privados y públicos 
relativos a la Guerra Civil y la Dictadura se declaran constitutivos del Patrimonio 
Documental y Bibliográfico, sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en el artículo 22. 
 
Artículo 22. Derecho de acceso a los fondos de los archivos públicos y privados. 
 
1. A los efectos de lo previsto en esta Ley, se garantiza el derecho de acceso a los 
fondos documentales depositados en los archivos públicos y la obtención de las copias 
que se soliciten. 
2. Lo previsto en el apartado anterior será de aplicación, en sus propios términos, 
a los archivos privados sostenidos, total o parcialmente, con fondos públicos. 
3. Los poderes públicos adoptarán las medidas necesarias para la protección, la 
integridad y catalogación de estos documentos, en particular en los casos de mayor 
deterioro o riesgo de degradación 
  
Disposición adicional primera. Adecuación del Archivo General de la Guerra Civil 
Española. 
 
Se autoriza al Gobierno a que lleve a cabo las acciones necesarias en orden a 
organizar y reestructurar el Archivo General de la Guerra Civil Española. 
 
Disposición adicional segunda. 
 
Las previsiones contenidas en la presente Ley son compatibles con el ejercicio de 
las acciones y el acceso a los procedimientos judiciales ordinarios y extraordinarios 
establecidos en las leyes o en los tratados y convenios internacionales suscritos por 
España. 
 




En el plazo de un año a partir de la entrada en vigor de esta Ley, el Gobierno 
establecerá el marco institucional que impulse las políticas públicas relativas a la 
conservación y fomento de la memoria democrática. 
 
Disposición adicional cuarta. Habilitación al Gobierno para el reconocimiento de 
indemnizaciones extraordinarias. 
 
1. Se autoriza al Gobierno a que, en el plazo de 6 meses, mediante Real Decreto, 
determine el alcance, condiciones y procedimiento para la concesión de indemnizaciones 
extraordinarias en favor de quienes hubiesen sufrido lesiones incapacitantes por hechos y 
en las circunstancias y con las condiciones a que se refiere el apartado uno del artículo 10 
de la presente Ley. 
2. Procederá el reconocimiento de las indemnizaciones previstas en esta 
disposición siempre que por los mismos hechos no se haya recibido indemnización o 
compensación económica con cargo a alguno de los sistemas públicos de protección 
social. 
3. Las indemnizaciones establecidas en esta disposición se abonarán directamente 
a los propios incapacitados y serán intransferibles. 
  
 
Disposición adicional quinta. 
 
A los efectos de la aplicación de la Ley 37/1984, de 22 de octubre, el personal de 
la Marina Mercante que fue incorporado al Ejército Republicano desde el 18 de julio de 
1936 se considerará incluido en el Decreto de 13 de marzo de 1937 que establecía la 
incorporación a la reserva naval, el Decreto de 12 de junio de 1937 que aplicaba el 
anterior fijando el ingreso y escalafonamiento en la citada reserva y la orden circular de 
10 de octubre de 1937 que aprueba el reglamento del citado escalafonamiento en 
desarrollo de los anteriores. Procederá el abono de la pensión correspondiente siempre 
que, por el mismo supuesto, no se haya recibido compensación económica alguna, o, 
habiéndose recibido, sea de cuantía inferior a lo determinado en las mencionadas 
disposiciones. 
  
Disposición adicional sexta. 
 
La fundación gestora del Valle de los Caídos incluirá entre sus objetivos honrar y 
rehabilitar la memoria de todas las personas fallecidas a consecuencia de la Guerra 
Civil de 1936-1939 y de la represión política que la siguió con objeto de profundizar en el 
conocimiento de este período histórico y de los valores constitucionales. Asimismo, 
fomentará las aspiraciones de reconciliación y convivencia que hay en nuestra sociedad. 
Todo ello con plena sujeción a lo dispuesto en el artículo 16. 
  




1. Las personas cuyo padre o madre hubiese sido originariamente español podrán 
optar a la nacionalidad española de origen si formalizan su declaración en el plazo de dos 
años desde la entrada en vigor de la presente 
 
Disposición adicional. Dicho plazo podrá ser prorrogado por acuerdo de Consejo de 
Ministros hasta el límite de un año. 
2. Este derecho también se reconocerá a los nietos de quienes perdieron o tuvieron que 
renunciar a la nacionalidad española como consecuencia del exilio. 
 
Disposición adicional octava. Acceso a la consulta de los libros de actas de defunciones 
de los Registros Civiles. 
 
El Gobierno, a través del Ministerio de Justicia, en cuanto sea preciso para dar 
cumplimiento a las previsiones de esta Ley, dictará las disposiciones necesarias para 
facilitar el acceso a la consulta de los libros de las actas de defunciones de los Registros 
Civiles dependientes de la Dirección General de los Registros y del Notariado. 
Disposición derogatoria. 
 En congruencia con lo establecido en el punto 3 de la Disposición Derogatoria de 
la Constitución, se declaran expresamente derogados el Bando de Guerra de 28 de julio 
de 1936, de la Junta de Defensa Nacional aprobado por Decreto número 79, el Bando de 
31 de agosto de 1936 y, especialmente, el Decreto del general Franco, número 55, de 1 de 
noviembre de 1936: las Leyes de Seguridad del Estado, de 12 de julio de 1940 y 29 de 
marzo de 1941, de reforma del Código penal de los delitos contra la seguridad del Estado; 
la Ley de 2 de marzo de 1943 de modificación del delito de Rebelión Militar; el Decreto-
Ley de 18 de abril de 1947, sobre Rebelión militar y bandidaje y terrorismo y las Leyes 
42/1971 y 44/1971 de reforma del Código de Justicia Militar; las Leyes de 9 de febrero 
de 1939 y la de 19 de febrero de 1942 sobre responsabilidades políticas y la Ley de 1 de 
marzo de 1940 sobre represión de la masonería y el comunismo, la Ley de 30 de julio de 
1959, de Orden Público y la Ley 15/1963, creadora del Tribunal de Orden Público. 
 
Disposición final primera. Habilitación para el desarrollo. 
 
Se habilita al Gobierno y a sus miembros, en el ámbito de sus respectivas 
competencias, para dictar cuantas disposiciones sean necesarias para el desarrollo y 
aplicación de lo establecido en esta Ley. 
 
Disposición final segunda. Entrada en vigor. 
 
La presente Ley entrará en vigor al día siguiente de su publicación en el Boletín 
Oficial del Estado, con excepción de la Disposición Adicional Séptima que lo hará al año 
de su publicación. Por tanto, Mando a todos los españoles, particulares y autoridades, que 
guarden y hagan guardar esta ley. 
  
Madrid, 26 de diciembre de 2007. 
 




El Presidente del Gobierno, 
 










CHAPTER 3  
 
Judging Law, Performing Justice: Pedro Almodóvar’s High Heels  
 
[I]t is always starting out from the Face, from the responsibility 
for the other that justice appears, which calls for judgment and 
comparison, a comparison of what is in principle incomparable, 
for every being is unique; every other is unique. 
     




Pedro Almodóvar’s High Heels (the original Spanish title Tacones Lejanos, literally 
means “Distant Heels,” 1991) is a postmodern film that celebrates performance, fluidity, 
and fragmentation, as ways of being in and understanding the world.1 In a generic 
combination of melodrama, comedy, musical, and film noir, High Heels tells the story of 
a turbulent mother/daughter relationship. Following the murder of the daughter’s husband 
(who happens to be the mother’s former lover), there is an ensuing criminal investigation 
by a judge, who, in turn, impersonates the mother in a drag-show. In recent years, 
Almodóvar’s film has received the attention of law-and-film feminist scholar Orit Kamir, 
who opens up a refreshing line of inquiry. Kamir uses the film as a powerful means to 
                                                 
1 It is beyond the scope of this paper to outline the abundant debates on the concepts of 
postmodernity and postmodernism, which have been extensively discussed elsewhere. Yet, if 
only to clarify my use of such terms, I rely on Linda Hutcheon’s distinction between 
postmodernity and postmodernism. In her view, postmodernity means “the designation of a social 
and philosophical period or ‘condition’” [Politics of Postmodernism (New Accents, New York: 
Routledge, 1989), at 23]. Postmodernism (-ist), in contrast, is the cultural production of this 
period: “architecture, literature, photography, film, painting, video, dance, music.” Id. at 1.  
 
 130
explore alternative feminist images of law, judgment, and justice.2 In this chapter, I 
provide new insights into Kamir’s feminist jurisprudential reading of the film by placing 
it within the framework of postmodern jurisprudence, performativity, and queer 
aesthetics. My aim is to re-conceptualize law through an ethics of alterity, and to go 
further in the theoretical developments of postmodern accounts of judgment, ethics, and 
justice. My main argument is that the film’s embodiment of law (in the multiple 
performances of the on-screen Judge) proposes an understanding of “law as a queer 
performance” that responds effectively to the ethical demands of those marginal subjects 
who have been traditionally excluded from the law. 
 In order to explore the legal questions posed by Almodóvar’s High Heels, I 
propose five sections for my analysis. I begin with a historical contextualization of the 
repression of homosexuality under Franco’s dictatorship and the radical shift towards 
sexual liberation in the ensuing democracy. Secondly, after a short summary of the plot 
of the film, I focus on Kamir’s image of caring or motherly law and the reason for its 
failure to bring justice to the singularity of the Other. I explore the ethical implications of 
thinking about law as performance rather than as caring mother. In section three, I turn to 
the cinematic image and explore how it calls upon the viewer for an ethics of response to 
alterity. In section four, I analyze the camp aesthetics in the film, how they affect the 
viewers, and the kind of law and judgment produced by this relation. Finally, I close with 
a brief reference to the recent legal changes in favor of the recognition of same-sex 
marriage in Spain. 
 
 
                                                 




I. LGBT AND LAW UNDER FRANCO AND DEMOCRACY  
As shown in the preceding chapter, hundred of thousands of Republicans were 
illegally detained, imprisoned, tortured, forced into labor, exiled, or “disappeared” during 
the years of Franco’s dictatorship. Another group of victims of Franco’s repression is that 
of the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transsexuals (LGBT) whose suffering and memory 
have been silenced until recently. Franco promoted his regime as strong and virile, 
proclaiming (heterosexual) masculinity, represented in the macho ibérico as the figure of 
Spanish national identity.3 Homosexuality was considered an embarrassment to the 
nation and a danger to the values of the regime: fatherland, family, and God.4 Franco 
used the traditional values of the Catholic Church, medical pseudo-science, and the media 
to promote and justify his homophobic ideology and morality.5  Whereas the Catholic 
Church condemned homosexuality as a sin against nature, psychiatrist, Antonio Vallejo 
Nágera, appointed by Franco as Director of the Military Psychiatric Services and of the 
Psychological Research Cabinet, claimed that homosexuality was a sexual perversion that 
should be punished by law.6 Culture and media (journals, No-Do, books, films, etc) 
                                                 
3 Tsinonis, Nikolaos, “Memoria y Homosexualidad: Sufrimiento, Olvido y Dignidad” ed. Felipe 
Gómez Isa, in El derecho a la memoria (Bilbao: Alberdania, 2006), pp. 461-496, at 479. 
4 Gutiérrez-Dorado, Antonio, “La Voz de la Memoria” in Una Discriminación Universal. La 
Homosexualidad bajo el Franquismo y la Transición, ed. Ugarte-Pérez, Javier (Barcelona-
Madrid: Editorial Egales, 2008), pp. 247-256, at 248. 
5 Arnalte, Arturo, “Gays en la Picota. Su Representación el los Medios de Comunicación” in Una 
Discriminación Universal. La Homosexualidad bajo el Franquismo y la Transición, ed. Ugarte-
Pérez, Javier (Barcelona-Madrid: Editorial Egales, 2008), pp. 139-170, at 141. 
6 Adam Donat, Antoni, and Alvar Martínez Vidal, “‘Infanticidas, Violadores, Homosexuales y 
Pervertidos de todas las Categorías.’ La Homosexualidad en la Psiquiatría del Franquismo” in 
Una Discriminación Universal. La Homosexualidad bajo el Franquismo y la Transición, ed. 
Ugarte-Pérez, Javier (Barcelona-Madrid: Editorial Egales, 2008), pp. 109-138. 
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dehumanized and ridiculed homosexuals, helping to generate an accepted environment of 
homophobic social attitudes.7  
Accordingly, a series of discriminatory laws were enacted to prohibit and repress 
homosexuality.8 For instance, Article 431 of the Penal Code of 1944 criminalized acts 
causing “public scandal,” which was often used by the police to arrest homosexuals. In 
1954, Franco reformed the Ley de Vagos y Maleantes (Vagrancy Act) of 1933 in order to 
include homosexuals and declare homosexuality illegal. The law’s stated goal was to 
protect and correct, rather than to punish, “those subjects who had fallen to the lowest 
levels of morality.”9 Once arrested by the police, homosexuals could be sent to prison or 
correction camps up to three years. In 1970, the Ley de Peligrosidad y Rehabilitación 
Social (Dangerousness and Social Rehabilitation Law) replaced the Vagrancy Act to 
declare homosexuals socially dangerous subjects. The word “rehabilitation” was included 
to emphasize that the law’s goal was to integrate them within the society. To this end, 
special prisons called galerias de invertidos (galleries of deviants) were established, 
where homosexuals were given psychiatric treatment (usually electric shock therapy) to 
cure their “deviant” sexual desires. 10 Francoist police used the law to arrest those who 
appeared to be homosexual. Many homosexuals who were sent to prison were often raped 
by other inmates and tortured by officials in order to get more information about other 
homosexuals or just to humiliate them.11 The Church, medicine, media, and law, helped 
to promote the Francoist vision of homosexuals as sinful, deviant, and criminal subjects, 
                                                 
7 Arnalte, supra 140. 
8 See Terrasa Mateu, Jordi, “La Legislación Represiva” in Una Discriminación Universal. La 
Homosexualidad bajo el Franquismo y la Transición, ed. Ugarte-Pérez, Javier (Barcelona-
Madrid: Editorial Egales, 2008), pp. 79-107. 
9 Ley de Vagos y Maleantes, BOE n 198, July 17, 1954. 
10 Terrasa-Mateu, supra at 100. 
11 Tsinonis, supra at 483-484. 
 
 133
and therefore to justify their discrimination, ill-treatment, punishment, and even death. At 
the end of Franco’s dictatorship, thousands of homosexuals had been tortured, 
imprisoned, locked up in “rehabilitation” centers and mental institutions, or forced into 
exile.12  
 It is important to note that under the Francoist patriarchal social structure, sexual 
pleasure was only associated with men; women were relegated to their role of mothers 
and wives (expected to satisfy their husbands).13 The Penal code condemned adultery, 
abortion, and the use of contraceptives. Educational texts, elaborated by La Sección 
Femenina de Falange Española y de las JONS (the Feminine Section), the only women’s 
organization allowed by the regime, were used to teach children this equation: sexuality = 
heterosexuality = maternity. Protected by the false idea that women did not enjoy sex, but 
preferred love and affection, lesbians did not suffer the same repression as gays. The fact 
that two women kissed or hugged in public or lived together was not considered a public 
scandal or a sexual perversion as it would be if they were two men, rather it was seen as a 
way of expressing friendship between women. This made lesbians almost socially 
“invisible.”14  
 Although clandestine LGBT organizations such as Movimiento Español de 
Liberación Homosexual (Spanish Gay Liberation Movement) were created at the 
beginning of the 70s as a reaction to the repressive policies, they only began to acquire 
                                                 
12 See Brincat Report (Informe Brincat), Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe, Need for 
International Condemnation of the Franco Regime, Doc. 10737, November 4, 2005; Read May 1, 
2009, URL: 
http://www.assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc05/EDOC10737.htm, 
13 Petit, Jordi, and Empar Pineda, “El Movimiento de Liberación de Gays y Lesbianas durante la 
Transición (1975-1981)” in Una Discriminación Universal. La Homosexualidad bajo el 
Franquismo y la Transición, ed. Ugarte-Pérez, Javier (Barcelona-Madrid: Editorial Egales, 2008), 
pp. 171-197, at 172. 
14 Id. at 174. 
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social relevance after Franco’s death in 1975. On June 26th, 1977, Spain witnessed the 
first LGBT pride parade on the streets of Barcelona led by transvestites (which ended 
with a strong police repression) and the emergence of the first openly LGBT 
organizations (i.e., Front d’Alliberament Gai de Catalunya, Frente Homosexual de 
Acción Revolucionaria, or Col.lectiu de Lesbianes de Barcelona). Democratic political 
parties, however, were reluctant to include the recognition of rights for homosexuals in 
their political programs, afraid that society would not take them seriously.15 The 
persecution of homosexuals and transsexuals lasted far beyond 1978. The reformation of 
the Dangerousness and Social Rehabilitation Law of 1970 in 1978 (Ley 77/1978, 
December 26) was insufficient, for it left intact the discriminatory measures of the law 
until 1995, when the law of 1970 and its later reformations were finally repealed (the Ley 
Orgánica 10/1995, November, 23). Furthermore, the late reformation of the 
Dangerousness and Social Rehabilitation Law prevented the LGBT prisoners from 
benefiting from the 1977 Amnesty Law. Their court files and police records remained 
active in the Dirección General de la Seguridad until 2000.16  
 With the 80s came the years of sexual liberation, embodied in the emblematic 
scene of La Movida—a socio-cultural urban movement led by a group of eccentric and 
extravagant young artists (among others, Pedro Almodóvar, Alaska, Kaka de Lux, Ouka 
Lele, etc) who challenged all values inherited from the earlier Francoist Spain. At the 
beginning of the nineties, LGBT activists began to mobilize demanding the legal 
recognition of same-sex marriage and partnership. These demands, however, were not 
answered until 2005 as I will discuss later in the chapter. 
                                                 
15 Arnalte, supra at 166. 
16 Gutiérrez-Dorado, supra at 256. 
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 Among the most well-known and openly gay directors, Pedro Almodóvar’s films 
construct a positive image of the LGBT Spanish community.17 His films are known, 
among other things, for deconstructing the macho ibérico, exploring and challenging 
Spanish heterosexual sexuality. In addition, Almodóvar makes a parodican often 
stylized—recycling of Francoist folklore (i.e., Flamenco dancers or toreadors) in order to 
unearth and deconstruct its ideological function of cultural homogenization, to break with 
patriarchal and traditional family structures, or to revise and subvert Francoist institutions 
of the Church and the police.18 Although High Heels meets most of these subversive 
characteristics, I focus on the film’s reconceptualization of law as a queer performance. 
   
Plot Summary 
High Heels narrates the love-hate relationship between Rebecca (Victoria Abril) 
and her mother, the artist known as Becky del Páramo (Marisa Paredes), who abandoned 
her as a child to pursue her acting and singing career in Mexico. The film opens with a 
scene at Barajas airport where Rebecca awaits the return of her mother, whom she has not 
seen for fifteen years. While waiting, Rebecca remembers a family vacation incident in 
the Caribbean in 1972. Then her mother buys her a pair of earrings and accidentally loses 
one, Rebecca gets lost looking for it. When her stepfather Alberto (Pedro Díez del Corral) 
                                                 
17 Among others, Pepi Luci Bom y Otras Chicas del Montón (1980), Laberinto de Pasiones 
(1982), Entre Tinieblas (1983), and La Ley del Deseo (1986). 
18 See among others: Acevedo-Muñoz, Ernesto, Pedro Almodóvar (London: British Film 
Institute, 2007). Yarza, Alejandro, Un canibal en Madrid: la sensibilidad camp y el reciclaje de 
la historia en el cine de Pedro Almodóvar (Madrid: Libertarias, 1999); D’Lugo, Marvin, Pedro 
Almodóvar (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006); Kinder, Marsha, Blood Cinema. The 
Reconstruction of National Identity in Spain (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 






and her mother finally find her, Alberto pretends to sell her to the islanders and her 
mother laughs at his joke. Then, she recalls another incident that occurred two years later 
in Madrid. When Becky reveals her intention to leave for Mexico to pursue her acting 
career, Alberto opposes her plans. Rebecca then switches Alberto’s stimulants with 
sleeping pills, apparently causing his death in a car accident. With Alberto dead, she 
expects her mother would freely travel to Mexico and take her with her. Rebecca’s 
expectations, however, do not pan out when Becky announces that she will travel alone 
and that Rebecca will stay with her father. On Becky’s return to Madrid, her ex-lover, 
Manuel (Feodor Atkine), who did not know about their family ties, has become 
Rebecca’s husband. That same night, Becky, Rebecca, and Manuel go to see Femme 
Letal (Miguel Bosé), a female impersonator of Becky, whom Rebecca has been coming 
to see whenever she misses her mother. After the performance, Rebecca follows Letal to 
his dressing room, and while helping him remove his costume, a sexual encounter takes 
place. 
 One month later, Manuel is found shot in his country house. The film then 
centers on Judge Domínguez’s investigation of this crime. Three different women, Isabel 
(Miriam Díaz Aroca), Becky, and Rebecca, saw Manuel alive the night of his murder, but 
they deny having killed him when interrogated. After learning that Manuel was not only 
involved with Isabel but also with her mother, Rebecca unexpectedly confesses to the 
crime during a live television broadcast. Judge Domínguez orders her immediate arrest 
and sends her to prison. There, Rebecca befriends Paula (Cristina Marcos), a heartbroken 
social worker who has been abandoned by her boyfriend Hugo (Miguel Bosé). When 
Paula shows Rebecca a nude picture of Hugo, Rebecca realizes that Letal and Hugo are 
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the same person. Immediately after finding out that she is pregnant, Rebecca is suddenly 
released from prison on the basis of insufficient evidence.  
Towards the end of the film, Judge Domínguez reveals his “secret” to Rebecca 
(Letal, Hugo, and the judge are the same man) and proposes marriage to her as Eduardo, 
his real name. They find out on the news that Becky suffers a terminal illness and has 
been hospitalized. Rebecca rushes to the hospital where she confesses that she did, in 
fact, murder Manuel. Becky forgives Rebecca, and takes the blame for the murder in 
order to save her. When Becky is brought home to die, Rebecca gives her the gun she 
used to kill Manuel and Becky leaves her fingerprints on it. Judge Domínguez accepts the 
incriminating evidence that establishes Becky as the murderer.  
 
II. POSTMODERN  RE-IMAGININGS  
In “High Heels: Almodóvar’s Postmodern Transgression,” Kamir concurs with 
Robin West’s suggestion that care and compassion have been rooted out from the 
constitutive elements of what James Boyd White calls the “legal imagination.”19 This is 
worrisome, they say, because the “pursuit of justice, if neglectful of the ethic of care, will 
fail not just as a matter of overall virtue, but more specifically, it will fail as a matter of 
justice.”20 In order to re-conceptualize law and justice as well as to reconstitute the legal 
                                                 
19 James Boyd White, The Legal Imagination: Studies in the Nature of Legal Thought and 
Expression (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973); From Expectation to Experience: 
Essays on Law and Legal Education (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999).     
20 West, cited by Kamir, at 267. In Caring for Justice, West argues that “while ‘justice’ is 
typically associated with universal rules, consistency, reason, rights, the public sphere, and 
masculine virtues, ‘care’ is typically associated with particularity, context, affect, relationship, the 
private sphere, and femininity.” Furthermore, while the work of judges often shows evidence of 
their respect for the constraints of the ethic of justice, it hardly exhibits any sign of constraint by 
an ethics of care (Robin West, Caring for Justice [New York: New York University Press, 1997] 
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imagination in terms of not merely an ethic of justice, but of care, West and Kamir call 
for new cultural images. These are as powerful and memorable as traditional ones: “the 
plumb line, the cupped hands, the blindfolded judge and the scales of justice, as well as 
the values of consistency, integrity, and impartiality that they represent.”21 Kamir thinks 
that High Heels “offers a radical and feminist alternative to the patriarchal image of 
Solomonic justice, which dominates our Judeo-Christian heritage, and the notion of good 
judging in particular. The traditional imagery is replaced by imagery that links ethics of 
justice with ethics of care.”22 
Through an in-depth observation of High Heels, Kamir attempts to overcome the 
well-known feminist skepticism towards postmodernism.23 On the one hand, she claims 
that feminists should embrace and celebrate the postmodern skepticism “toward 
particular claims of objective truth, a particular account of the self, and any particular 
account of gender, sexuality, biology, or what is or is not natural.”24 But on the other 
hand, she is taken aback by the postmodern “unwillingness to entertain descriptions of 
subjective and intersubjective authenticity . . . [and] promises of a nurturant or caring 
morality.”25 According to Kamir, High Heels provides a brilliant example of how to 
combine the best tenets of postmodernism with feminism. 26 In her view, Almodóvar’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
at 23-24). However, “‘justice,’ as it is generally understood, and ‘care,’ as it is widely practiced 
are “each necessary conditions of the other. The pursuit of justice, when successful, must also be 
caring, and the activity of caring, when successful, must be mindful of the demands of justice.” 
Id. at 24. 
21 West, supra at 30. 
22 Kamir, supra at 268. 
23 See, among others, Catharine MacKinnon, Points Against Postmodernism, 75 Chicago-Kent 
Law Review 687 (2000).   
24 West, cited by Kamir, supra at 266. 
25 Id.  
26 Kamir, supra at 267. This reading is by no means uncontroversial: while some critics have 
praised the way it portrays strong and independent women (Barry Jordan & Morgan-Tamosunas, 
Contemporary Spanish Cinema, (New York: Manchester University Press, 1998)) and expresses 
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postmodern imagery transcends the apparent dichotomy between two versions of 
feminism: one that focuses on the traits of care and compassion, and another that 
denounces patriarchal oppression and dominance. By combining these two perspectives, 
Kamir suggests that the film not only undermines an oppressive, patriarchal social reality, 
but promotes a conception of law and justice closely related to the virtues of compassion 
and care.27   
The justice of care is most apparent in the symbolic representative figure of the 
law in the film, the on-screen investigating Judge Domínguez, who guides the 
investigation of the murder of Manuel, Rebecca’s husband.28 Contrary to ingrained habits 
and perception of how judges ought to conduct their affairs, in his criminal investigation, 
Judge Domínguez is deeply and emotionally involved in the lives of the characters, 
particularly in that of Rebecca—the prime suspect for the murder. Kamir argues that the 
judge’s caring, compassionate, and loving attributes ensure that the just outcome is 
reached in this case, i.e., not to prosecute Rebecca for the murder.29 Furthermore, by 
enacting a parallel cinematic off-screen process, High Heels engages the viewer as a 
                                                                                                                                                 
feminist attitudes (Marsha Kinder, supra); Deborah Shaw, Men in High Heels: The Feminine 
Man and Performances of Femininity in Tacones lejanos by Pedro Almodóvar, vol. 6, no. 1 
Tesserae: Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies, (2000)), others have attacked the way it 
conveys misogynistic (Caryn James, Almodovar, Adrift in Sexism, New York Times, 12 January 
1992) and antifeminist messages (Paul Julian Smith, “Tacones Lejanos (High Heels, 1991): 
Imitations of Life” in Desire Unlimited: The Cinema of Pedro Almodóvar (London: Verso, 1994); 
Lucy Fischer, “Modernity and Postmaternity: High Heels and Imitation of Life” in Play it Again, 
Sam: Retakes on Remakes, eds. Andrew Horton and Stuart Y. McDougal (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998)). 
27 Id. 
28 Faithful to its Continental roots, as Kamir notes, High Heels depicts an inquisitorial legal 
system with focus on the judiciary, rather than on lawyers as the Anglo-American adversarial 
system (Id. at 268). While in the latter lawyers are responsible for gathering the evidence, in the 
former the judge is in charge of the search for truth and justice. Accordingly, Judge Domínguez is 
directly and actively involved in the criminal investigation, looking for evidence, determining the 
facts, and questioning witnesses and defendants.   
29 Id., at 279. 
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compassionate judge who adopts a nonjudgmental point of view of Rebecca’s criminal 
act, and reaches the same just legal outcome.30 Kamir concludes that the film, by 
constructing a caring, compassionate, and nonjudgmental cinematic judgment, invites the 
viewer to enact its alternative vision of justice of care, while symbolically punishing the 
patriarchal order represented by Manuel in the film.31  
In an attempt to contribute to the task of expanding the legal imagination and re-
conceptualization of law and justice, my study offers an alternative to Kamir’s imagery of 
caring law and justice of care. Drawing on Costas Douzinas’ and Ronnie Warrington’s 
postmodern jurisprudence, I suggest that High Heels re-imagines law, judgment, and 
justice through an ethics of otherness rather than through an ethics of care.32 As explained 
                                                 
30 Id. 
31 Kamir grounds her approach to the intersection of law and film in three different premises: 
“film as paralleling law,” “film as judgment,” and “film as jurisprudence.” According to the first 
premise, film and law are two related discourses that reflect and refract the multiple fundamental 
values, images, identities, and lifestyles of their societies and cultures, and two dominant players 
in the construction of concepts such as community, identity, memory, gender roles, justice, and 
truth. The second premise is that some films perform “legal indoctrination,” training audiences in 
the act of judging. The third and last premise is that films can offer jurisprudential commentary in 
topics such as perceptions of gender roles, familial structures, human relations, and truth; Id. at 1-
4. 
32 See: Costas Douzinas and Ronnie Warrington, Justice Miscarried: Ethics, Aesthetics and the 
Law (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1995). Postmodern jurisprudence turns to 
Nietzsche, Foucault, Lacan, Lyotard, Levinas, Derrida, and Rorty. Even though to call some of 
these thinkers postmodern is not accurate, legal scholars have included their work within the 
framework of postmodern jurisprudence. For an overview on postmodern legal movements see: 
Gary Minda, Postmodern Legal Movements: Law and Jurisprudence at Century's End (New 
York: New York University Press, 1995). For a critique to postmodern jurisprudence in general 
see: Douglas E. Litowitz, Postmodern Philosophy and Law (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 1997). For a philosophy of otherness see: Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, or 
Beyond Essence, tr. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998); Jacques 
Derrida, “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’” tr. Mary Quaintance, in 
Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, eds. Drucilla Cornell, Michael Rosenfeld, and 
David Gray Carlson (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 3-67 (hereinafter, “The Force of Law”). 
See also: Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1988); Drucilla Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit (New York, Routledge, 
1995). In relation to the ethics of postmodernism see: Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics 
(Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993); Robert Eagleston, “Postmodernism and Ethics Against the 
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by Douzinas and Warrington, this other who “is neither the self’s alter ego, nor its 
reflection or extension,” but an unfathomable other, always calls upon us to consider him 
or her before the ethical or legal decisions are taken.33 Therefore, the ethics of otherness 
“always starts with the other and challenges the various ways in which the other has been 
reduced to the same.”34 Most importantly, while the other can never be comprehended, “a 
failure to strive towards the recognition of otherness is the greatest injustice and the most 
violent oppression of the law. Justice miscarries when it denies the other.”35  
 By using such an approach, I contend that Kamir’s feminist jurisprudential 
interpretation of High Heels risks a return to a moral philosophy reductive of difference 
into sameness, endangering the advances of postmodern critiques to the totalizing 
tendencies of modernity. To better respect the singularity of the other, I replace Kamir’s 
image of a caring law with an image of “law as performance,” in which ethics starts with 
the demand of the other in need. 36 In this work, I use the term performance in three ways: 
                                                                                                                                                 
Metaphysics of Comprehension” in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodernism, edited by 
Steven Connor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
33 Douzinas and Warrington, supra at 19 (emphasis in the original). 
34 Id., at 163. Taking as a starting point Jacques Derrida’s political ethical work, together with 
Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophy of otherness, Douzinas and Warrington seek to articulate a theory 
of ethical action upon which a practice of justice can be built without reproducing the totalizing 
tendencies of Enlightenment. Such postmodern jurisprudence stands in contrast both to 
positivism—which grounds the legitimacy of law on the formal legality deprived of ethics—and 
hermeneutical jurisprudence, which emphasizes the interpretative and ethical character of the law 
but neglects its violent side. For positivism, see H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1961) and H. Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: 
University of California Press, 1967). For hermeneutical jurisprudence, see, for instance, Ronald 
Dworkin, Law as interpretation 60 Texas Law Revue 527 (1982); Law’s Empire (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1986). 
35 Id., at 309. 
36 As Philip Auslander indicates, whereas critical discussions of specific performance practices 
usually draw on ideas of postmodernism (which has been referred to as skeptical, apolitical, 
relativist, and nihilistic), a variety of humanistic and social scientific scholars have appropriated 
the idea of performance and begun to view their disciplines and objects of study accordingly. 
“Postmodernism and Performance” in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodernism, ed. Steven 
Connor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 99. Historians, sociologists, 
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1) as an action that is performed; 2) as an action that has constitutive and transformative 
effects on the world; 37 and 3) as an action that is enacted in front of an audience. In the 
film, the image of law as performance is represented by Judge Domínguez and his 
multiple metamorphoses (as lover, judge, drag performer, and father-to-be). This 
interpretation is not incompatible with the overall feminist task of ending patriarchy, but 
it relocates it in the context of queer.38 By doing so, my goal is to examine and question 
those cultural and normative assumptions that oppress not only women, but also all 
people: gays, lesbians, transvestites, transsexuals, straights, and so on. 
 
The significance of performance for the viewer  
High Heels’ opening credits appear over two drawings depicting high heels and 
guns. They are followed by a collage of fragmented and duplicated drawings of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
anthropologists and many other scholars from different fields “have come to see their respective 
discourses as contingent rather than absolute; as engaged with specific audiences rather than 
autonomous; as existing primarily in a specific, time-bounded context; and as characterized by 
particular processes rather than by the products they generate (Id.) This “postmodern turn” has 
taken place in the context of legal studies as well. See: J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, Law, 
Music, and Other Performing Arts 139 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1991), pp. 
1597–1658. See also: Bernard Hibbitts, Coming to Our Senses: Communication and Legal 
Expression in Performance Cultures 41 Emory Law Journal (fall 1992), pp. 875–6, and Making 
Motions: The Embodiment of Law in Gesture 6 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues (1995), pp. 
51–81; Lara D. Nielsen, Institutionalizing Ensembles: Thinking Theatre, Performance, and ‘the 
Law’ 4 Law, Culture and the Humanities 156 (2008). For an overview on the different 
discussions on legal performance see: Julie Stone Peters, Legal Performance Good and Bad Law, 
Culture and the Humanities (2008). 
37 See J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965). For 
discussions on performativity and performance see, for instance: Andrew Parker and Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick, Performativity and Performance, ed. Parker and Sedgwick (New York: 
Routledge, 1995); W.B. Worthen, Drama, Performativity, and Performance 113 PMLA 5 
(October 1998), pp. 1093–107; Marvin Carlson, Performance: A Critical Introduction (New 
York: Routledge, 1996). 
38 I use the term “queer” in Fabio Cleto’s inclusive sense. For Cleto, queer “claims to inscribe all 
subordinations (of class, gender and ethnicity) into a common design while apparently respecting 
each subordination  . . . in its historical and cultural specificity.” “Introduction: Queering the 
Camp” in Camp. Queer Aesthetics and the Performing Subject—A Reader, ed. Fabio Cleto (The 
University of Michigan Press, 1999). at 15. 
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characters that anticipate their roles in the film.39 All characters in the film are 
interrelated in their roles as performers: Manuel is the director of a TV network where 
Rebecca works as the news anchor; Isabel, Manuel’s lover and Rebecca’s co-worker, 
signs her newscast; and Becky del Páramo, Rebecca’s mother, is a singer and actress. 
Performance defines their everyday life. Furthermore, two drawings of Almodóvar 
filming with his camera encircle the drawings of his characters. The introduction of this 
cinematic device makes us realize that everything we are about to see is a part of a 
performance. This artifice is further emphasized by the film’s constant references to 
television, theater, magazines, photography, radio, and musical shows. Media often takes 
precedence over personal communication, particularly when Almodóvar seeks highly 
dramatic effect: Rebecca learns about her mother’s terminal sickness on TV, as does 
Becky about her daughter’s involvement in Manuel’s murder. Also, Judge Domínguez 
learns about Becky and Manuel’s previous affair from his mother’s magazine clippings 
and uses them as evidence. 
However, High Heels’ overwhelming display of media apparatuses does not 
degenerate into Jean Baudrillard’s world of simulation.40 These various performances 
have performative, i.e., constitutive effects on various audiences, which underscore the 
ethical responsibility towards them. These performative aspects of the film produce an 
                                                 
39 Auslander identifies certain postmodern trends in performance: plurality, diversity, and 
interculturality, as well as characters with fragmented, flowing, and uncertain identities. Supra, at 
102-103.  
40 For Hutcheon, postmodernism “cannot but be political, at least in the sense that its 
representations—its images and stories—are anything but neutral, however ‘aestheticized’ they 
may appear to be in their parodic self-reflexivity.” Supra, at 3. For an opposite view see: Jean 
Baudrillard, “The Evil Demon of Images and the Precession of Simulacra,” in Thomas Docherty, 
ed., Postmodernism: A Reader (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1993). Along this line of 
thought see also: Guy Debord, The Society of Spectacle (Detroit: Black & Red, 1983); Fredric 
Jameson, “Postmodernism and Consumer Society,” in The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on 
the Postmodern, 1983-1998 (New York: Verso, 1998), pp. 1-20. 
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ethical relation between the cinematic performance and the viewer. Furthermore, High 
Heels does not invite the viewer to become a compassionate judge, with respect to the 
characters in terms established by Kamir, but a viewer/judge who responds to an ethics of 
alterity, i.e., to the call of the other. I use the term viewer not as the real (physical) viewer 
who can resist or respond differently to what is projected in the film, but as an “ideal 
viewer” who is able to discern, react, and distinguish the cinematic mechanisms as 
described above. 
In presenting law under the light of performance and performativity, I also 
emphasize the ways in which High Heels integrates the actions of the on-screen judge 
and his sense of justice within the aesthetic realm of the viewer. For these purposes, I 
focus on the aesthetics of exaggeration, style, excess, artificiality, parody, and 
incongruity, which play a key part in Judge Domínguez’s performance as a female 
impersonator, and place him, and thus the law, in the realm of camp aesthetics.41 In 
particular, I argue that Judge Domínguez’s campy performance invites viewers to see the 
law from a queer perspective: to challenge “the manifold binarisms (masculine/feminine, 
original/copy, identity/difference, natural/artificial, private/public, etc.) on which [legal] 
                                                 
41 There has been disagreement about the meaning of camp. For Susan Sontag, camp is an 
apolitical and ahistorical aesthetic, a sensibility that emphasizes artifice, style, and extravagance 
over content; for Esther Newton and Jack Babuscio, camp is style, irony, incongruity, humor, and 
theatricality that only exists in the eye of the homosexual beholder; Jonathan Dollimore sees it as 
“a weapon of attack, an oppressive identity inherited as subordination, and hollowing out 
dominant formations responsible for that identity … camp is an invasion and subversion of other 
sensibilities [besides gay sensibility], and works via parody, pastiche, and exaggeration” (in 
Cleto, supra at 224-225); David Bergman sees camp as “a form of historicism viewed 
histrionically;” and while Mark Booth argues that camp celebrates patriarchal oppression, Pamela 
Robertson sees it as a feminist practice: “a female form of aestheticism, related to female 
masquerade and rooted in burlesque, that articulates and subverts the ‘image- and culture-making 
processes’ to which women have traditionally been given access” (Id. at 271). In this study, 
although I rely on Newton and Basbuscio’s notion of camp, I do not see it as an exclusively gay 
sensibility, but, following Robertson, as a “queer discourse” that includes gay- and lesbian-
specific positions, as well as non-gay and non-lesbian ones (Id). 
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epistemic and ontological order arranges and perpetuates itself.”42 The camp aesthetics 
displayed in Judge Domínguez’s performance may lead viewers to reconceptualize “law 
as queer performance,” that is, to examine and question those legal assumptions about 
identity, subjectivity, and judgment. 
 
III. LAW AS MOTHER: ETHICS AND JUSTICE OF CARE 
According to Kamir, High Heels goes a long way to position Letal/Judge 
Domínguez as Rebecca’s surrogate mother.43 Letal is first mentioned when Becky sees 
Letal’s poster announcing his impersonation of Becky as “the real Becky.” But, “[a]ren’t 
I the real Becky?” she asks in dismay, and Rebecca answers that she used to go to see 
Letal’s performance whenever she longed for her. That night, Rebecca takes Becky to 
watch the performance at the Villa Rosa, where Letal imitates Becky’s appearance, 
gestures, voice, and style with great success. Kamir notes that, when the camera cuts to a 
reverse shot of the spectators, “Becky looks at him as a person would at her own distant 
reflection [and] Rebecca looks at him with longing and joy that she cannot express 
towards her mother.”44 After the performance, Letal comes to their table, and Becky and 
Letal perform what Kamir identifies as a bonding ritual—they exchange “body parts” 
(her earrings for one of his fake breasts). 
In turn, Rebecca herself is portrayed as a woman-child: “Our first and lasting  
impression of her, in a long flashback recounting her childhood memories, as she awaits 
                                                 
42 Cleto, supra at 15. As Cleto observes, camp and queer share a common investment: 
“questioning deviations from (and of) the straightness of orthodoxy, . . . devoiding the subject of 
its fullness, and permanence—in other words, of its transcendent immanence.” Id. at 16. 




her mother in the airport, is as a little girl: receiving earrings from her mother, degraded 
by her, worrying over her mother, and deserted by her.”45 Moreover, throughout the film 
we see Rebecca “in reference to her mother: imitating her (through her choices of a 
performing career and of Manuel as a partner), seeking her company (through both 
Manuel and Letal), helping her (by killing Becky’s oppressive husband), and above all 
feeling abandoned, neglected, and rejected by her.”46 Letal/Judge Domínguez is a 
surrogate mother, Kamir argues, “because Rebecca’s need for a mother is so deep.” 
Likewise, their relationship is like a mother-child one: “because she transfers her love for 
her mother to him, he reciprocates and loves her in return;” and “[b]ecause she loves him 
as a child, he sees and bonds with the child in her.”47  
However, things are far more complicated. Kamir remarks that Becky, the 
“original” mother whom Letal imitates, is an uncaring, self-centered, and irresponsible 
“bad” mother. Hence, “[if] Letal were an imitation of this mother, s/he would hardly be a 
good, caring one her/himself, and yet s/he is.”48 Through her relationship with Judge 
Domínguez, Becky undergoes a transformation: she becomes a caring, compassionate, 
and responsible mother. In a sense, “she imitates her double, Letal, the judge, absorbing 
the caring qualities s/he developed earlier while performing Becky’s motherly role. It 
seems that when the law performs a mother’s role, a bad mother can become good.”49  
In a fundamental way, Kamir sees Becky and Letal as adversaries. They are two 
mothers competing “for the child’s love, a love that can only be obtained through 





49 Id. at 276. 
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motherly love and devotion.”50 They each attempt to protect and save her from the 
other—Becky from the law (represented by Judge Domínguez), and Judge Domínguez 
from her painful existence in the shadow of her indifferent mother. The competition 
becomes evident after the bonding ritual between the “two mothers,” when Letal asks 
Rebecca to follow him to his dressing room, where a sexual encounter takes place. In 
Kamir’s view, Letal first consummates his sexual desire for Rebecca, because this is one 
thing that the real Becky cannot offer Rebecca, but he can (Rebecca will get pregnant out 
of this sexual encounter).  
When Judge Domínguez arrests Rebecca and sends her to prison, Becky dedicates 
the song “Think of Me” (“Piensa en mí”) and sings “my life is yours” to her daughter, 
because “such complete support and self-sacrifice only she, not the law, can offer.”51 In 
turn, Judge Domínguez releases Rebecca from jail and, as Letal, promises his life to her 
by singing the same song. In addition, he reveals himself to Rebecca as the father of her 
unborn child and proposes marriage. Thus, he becomes the supportive partner and future 
father of her baby that Becky cannot be.52 Furthermore, by revealing his secret to her 
(Letal and Judge Domínguez are the same man), he offers Rebecca “truth, sincerity, and 
trust.”53 Not surprisingly, following Letal’s revelation as the father of Rebecca’s child, 
Becky offers Rebecca forgiveness and an ultimate sacrifice—she takes responsibility for 
Manuel’s murder. Throughout this competition, Kamir observes that “both mothers 
                                                 
50 Id. at 277. 





improve in response to the needs of the child by becoming more caring and 
compassionate. They also become closer to each other, less readily distinguishable.”54  
Furthermore, Kamir points out that neither the law nor compassion in High Heels 
is portrayed as exclusively maternal. She distinguishes four other roles of Letal/Judge 
Domínguez—as his mother’s son, as Paula’s deserting boyfriend Hugo, and as Rebecca’s 
lover and expectant father. All these complex and different characters are inseparable 
from Judge Domínguez’s role as judge, his criminal investigation, and his quest for truth 
and justice. “His insights, intuition, and emotional responses to characters and situations 
are relevant professional tools and sources of information. They assist him in collecting 
data, assessing it, and arriving at conclusions.”55 For instance, Judge Domínguez 
compares Becky with his own mother who has neglected him for 10 years. Like Rebecca, 
he is protective of his neglectful mother, as well as hurt and angry. Through his 
relationship with his mother, he can recognize Rebecca as a hurt child and understand her 
pain. 
Less positively, in his role as Hugo (a drug addict and police informant), the judge 
treats his girlfriend Paula as an object, to be used and abandoned without explanation. As 
he explains to Rebecca, Paula fell in love with Hugo and tried to help him while he was 
investigating a case. When the case was closed, he simply disappeared. This aspect of 
Judge Domínguez’s character, which is also a part of the law, allows him to recognize 
Manuel’s inhumanity from his own experience.56 Finally, as Rebecca’s lover and 
expectant father, Judge Domínguez is deeply concerned about her well-being, rendering 
                                                 
54 Id. at 277. 
55 Id. at 279. 
56 Id. at 278. 
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him incapable of seeing her guilt. This loving blindness is portrayed as being legitimate 
and helpful in his search for justice.  
According to Kamir, all the conclusions that Judge Domínguez reaches through 
his different impersonations are “true, right, and just precisely because they rely on his 
personal experience as mother, son, man, and father-to-be.”57 Judge Domínguez’s loving 
and compassionate attributes confer in him the ability to fully understand the needs of 
each individual who comes before the law. They “ensure that every person will receive 
equal, compassionate treatment . . . Equality before the law means that each individual 
deserves to be seen, understood, and treated for who s/he is.”58 Kamir remarks that Judge 
Domínguez’s advocacy for a justice of care promotes a feminine worldview that is highly 
subversive in two significant ways: first, care and compassion are portrayed as neither 
biologically female nor male. Second, the justice of care is practiced on a woman who 
has murdered a man. In our patriarchal culture, she observes that judges sometimes feel 
compassion for men who abuse women but they hardly sympathize with women who kill 
men.59 High Heels’ feminism is a one that not only understands Rebecca’s need to kill an 
abusive man (and abused women’s needs in general), but also condones it. 
Kamir argues that High Heels invites the viewer to practice a “participatory 
identification” with Rebecca, and it does so in several connected ways: “by giving 
Rebecca a point of view, by closely aligning the viewer’s point of view with hers, by 
positioning her as the dominant, sympathetic on-screen character, by continuously 
                                                 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 276-279. In contrast, Kamir notes that Manuel “is the only character not allowed a 
childhood, a point of view, or remorse.” (Id. at 281.) After their encounter at the Villa Rosa, Letal 
refers to Manuel as a “monster.” However, his personal antipathy towards the victim does not 
disqualify him as a judge. On the contrary, Kamir agues that this helped him to reach the just 
legal outcome of not prosecuting Rebecca for the murder.  
59 Id. at 281. 
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presenting the child within her, and by looking at her through the eyes of the two mothers 
who love her and seek her love in return.”60 In fact, according to Kamir, the film invites 
us to judge each of the characters (Becky, Eduardo/Letal/Hugo/Judge Domínguez) in the 
same compassionate way. However, this identification with Rebecca is not complete until 
she reveals the truth to her mother—until that moment the viewer does not know whether 
or not she murdered Manuel. In this way, the viewer learns about Rebecca’s crime along 
with Becky, who, at last, remorsefully takes on the role of a good mother.61 In 
constructing a non-judgmental and compassionate cinematic judgment, the film invites 
the viewer to support the legal outcome of not prosecuting Rebecca. 
* * * 
Despite Kamir’s insistence on the law’s necessity to care for and respect each 
person with regard to his or her singularity in order to reach justice, her image of mother 
and compassionate judge remains open to question. It seems that the judge’s ethical 
responsibility to respect the singularity of the other is possible, provided that the other is 
similar to the self, but only to that extent. For instance, in his different roles as a surrogate 
mother, son, Hugo, lover, and father, Judge Domínguez understands what the other feels, 
because of his own similar experiences. In other words, to make sense of the concerns 
and needs of the other, he must first understand the other’s similarity to himself. 
However, what Kamir does not address or explain is what happens when the judge 
encounters a radical other, i.e., an other that is different from the self and whose 
experiences have not been felt (and maybe will not be felt). Thus, by grounding the 
ethical responsibility of the mother judge in what the self and the other share, rather than 
                                                 
60 Id. at 280. 
61 To be exact, we learn of Rebecca’s guilt earlier, when she takes the gun from the television set. 
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focusing on their differences, Kamir privileges sameness over difference and selfness 
over alterity. By not distinguishing between the self and the other, Kamir’s mother judge 
fails to ethically respond to the uniqueness that makes the other different from the self—
the other becomes a reflection of the self. 
Likewise, in constituting a compassionate viewer parallel to the mother judge, 
Kamir imagines a viewer-judge who also fails to respect the singularity of the on-screen 
characters, and consequently to provide justice to them. This is particularly evident in the 
way she interprets the relationship between the characters and the viewer. Kamir sees 
Becky as the imitation of Letal, Letal as the imitation of Becky (being similar to 
Rebecca), Rebecca as the imitation of Becky, and so on. Within this chain of similarities, 
the viewer is also a participant, as he or she is considered an imitation of the on-screen 
mother judge—for instance, the viewer, like Judge Domínguez, may see Rebecca as a 
woman-child and may feel the urge to protect her as a mother would. Yet, it is important 
to note that if Rebecca was the reflection of Becky or Letal/Judge Domínguez (and 
therefore of the viewer), her otherness and singularity would be denied, and the 
conditions for an ethical relation between Rebecca and the viewer would not be possible. 
In addition, in revealing the truth to the viewer (and not to the on-screen judge), the film 
places the viewer in several judging positions that challenge the one-dimensional, 
motherly cinematic judgment that Kamir suggests (a detailed note about this is provided 
in the third section). 
Subsequently, I will explore how the respect of each person in his or her 
singularity is better accomplished by imagining a “performer judge,” whose ethical 
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performances arise from the demand of the other in need, rather than from his/her loving 
and compassionate attributes. 
 
IV. LAW AS PERFORMANCE: ETHICS AND JUSTICE OF OTHERNESS  
Unlike Kamir’s mother judge, whose actions are based on competition (between 
two mothers) and reward (Rebecca’s love), the performer judge acts unconditionally 
upon Rebecca’s specific demands, and morphs himself to satisfy them (rather than to 
collect data and life experiences). Focusing on the shifts in the relationship between 
Judge Domínguez and Rebecca will help us to examine the ethical relation between law 
and the vulnerable other, and the kind of justice produced by their interaction. I take 
Levinas’ work on ethics and the face as my starting point in exploring how ethics arise 
from face-to-face encounters between Letal/Judge Domínguez and Rebecca. I am 
particularly interested in reading how Letal shifts identities (from lover to judge to father-
to-be), and performs each according to Rebecca’s direct demand for an ethical response. 
 
A. Letal As Lover  
Becky’s arrival underscores Manuel’s indifference towards Rebecca. When 
Becky and Manuel first reunite, the film shows them in a flashback, passionately kissing 
on a beach. This image then dissolves into the present with a blue background that 
replicates this idyllic scenery, a view that foreshadows the re-emergence of their past 
relationship. That same night, Rebecca overhears a conversation between the two of 
them, in which Manuel refuses to tell Becky that he loves Rebecca. In spite of it, Rebecca 
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invites her husband and mother to the Villa Rosa nightclub to watch Letal’s 
impersonation of Becky. The mother agrees to attend so that her daughter is not 
disappointed; the husband joins too, but complains that the Villa Rosa is not a place for 
Becky because a transvestite was murdered there (and so he takes a gun with him).  
The scene opens with Letal’s female impersonation of Becky on the stage. When 
the camera cuts to a reverse shot of the three of them, it shows Becky watching the 
performance with narcissism, Rebecca with joy, and Manuel with indifference.62 At one 
point, Rebecca looks to her mother, who is captivated by Letal’s impersonation, but does 
not reciprocate. Rebecca then turns her look towards her husband and notices that Manuel 
is looking at Becky with sexual desire, as is Becky. Rebecca looks at Manuel with pain 
and anger; Manuel looks back at her with disdain and rapidly turns his desiring look 
towards Becky again. In this game of looks, Rebecca’s sexual desires are excluded. The 
emotional intensity of the scene is heightened by the sound of Letal’s lip-synched song, 
“A Year of Love” (“Un año de amor,” by Spanish pop star Luz Casal):63  
Have you ever thought  
what will happen. 
All that we’ll miss? 
How much will you suffer?  
If you go now 
Never again will you find 
Happy times 
You lived with me 
 
[Te has parado a pensar 
Lo que sucederá 
Todo lo que perderemos 
Y lo que sufrirás 
Si ahora tú te vas 
No recuperarás 
                                                 
62 Cf. Kinder, supra at 258. Kinder reads the scene as showing Rebecca’s homoerotic desire for 
her mother. 
63 The song “A Year of Love” was originally composed by Nino Ferrer. 
 
 154
Los momentos felices 
que te hice vivir] 
The song brings back the memory of Manuel and Becky’s past together, as it recounts—
in a typical bolero style—the story of a breakup and the longing for the happy days they 
shared. At the same time, it alludes to Rebecca’s fears that Manuel and Becky rekindle 
their love affair. Feeling isolated and excluded, Rebecca’s only option is to look back at 
Letal, who perceives everything from the stage. In Rebecca’s face, we may read a direct, 
concrete, and personal request: “Comfort me!” addressed to Letal.  
In Levinas’ ethics, the sign of otherness is the face (visage). The face is neither 
the assemblage of brow, nose, eyes, and mouth, nor the representation of the soul, self, or 
subjectivity: “The face eludes every category. It brings together speech and glance, 
saying and seeing, in a unity that escapes the conflict of senses and the arrangement of 
the organs.”64 In the face-to-face encounter between the self and other, the other appears 
in the nakedness and uniqueness of her face and expresses an irreducible, sometimes 
inexpressible, ethical demand: “consider me before you act!” The consideration required 
by her demand is “always to be accounted for prior to any thought of self or own.”65 In 
Levinasian terms, Rebecca’s demand for a specific performance is a demand that “needs 
no excuse or justification;”66 it obliges Letal to answer it and to act upon it immediately.  
  After exchanging mementos with Becky (I will come back to this in the last 
section), Letal acts upon Rebecca’s call when he asks her to follow him to the dressing 
room. Inside, while Rebecca takes out Letal’s feminine garments, Letal tells her that he 
would like to be “more than a mother” to her and initiates a sexual encounter. The sexual 
                                                 
64 Douzinas and Warrington, supra at 164. 
65 Id. at 18. 
66 Id. at 170.  
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intercourse begins with an acrobatic cunnilingus (Rebecca is swinging from an overhead 
pipe) and ends in penetration that leads to Rebecca’s pregnancy. She finds the sexual 
encounter shocking at first, but ends up thoroughly enjoying and admitting her need for 
it. Letal initiates the sexual encounter not with the purpose of “scor[ing] a victory” over 
Becky, but rather to recognize and assert Rebecca’s sexual desires and fill Rebecca’s 
marital void.  
 
B. Letal as Judge 
Rebecca’s isolation from her mother and husband is further emphasized in the 
next scene. Letal, now wearing a beard and acting as Eduardo, is seen at home with his 
bedridden mother. His mother sees in the newspaper a headline about Becky’s first night 
in Madrid and shows it to her son. A close-up of the picture of them calls attention to the 
moment in which Rebecca’s desires are excluded: seated between Becky and Manuel, 
Rebecca looks at Manuel with a face that denotes pain and anger; at the right of the frame 
and facing us, Manuel ignores her. The scene closes with two close-ups: Becky and 
Rebecca back-to-back (a sign of their emotional distance), and Letal noticing Manuel’s 
gun. After this last shot, an extreme close-up of the gun cuts to an inter-title that informs 
the viewers that a month has passed; in the background, we see the image of a house, and 
then a shot is heard. This cut ties together the scene at the Villa Rosa with the criminal 
investigation that follows the gunshot: Rebecca’s face reminds Letal/Judge Domínguez of 
his duty towards her: “consider me before you act!” This demand will guide his 
investigation from then on.  
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After Manuel’s murder, we learn that Letal is also Judge Domínguez. A medium-
long shot shows him with two policemen at the scene where Manuel’s body lies. This 
time, he wears a black suit, dark glasses, and a beard; he is not singing love songs, but 
speaking in forensic terms, in an exaggerated manner: “Mr. Manuel Sancho’s body lies in 
a prone decubitus position and show signs of rigidity.” Domínguez is shown from a low 
camera angle, which creates an impression of height, visually highlighting his role as a 
legal authority. The narrative level, however, subverts this illusion of authority as his own 
assistants repeatedly contest his descriptions of the crime scene. This subversive narrative 
underscores the film’s challenge to the traditional image of the judge who possesses 
uncontested authority and knowledge. 
The purpose of the criminal investigation is at odds with what one might expect; 
Judge Domínguez appears more intent on proving Rebecca’s innocence than on 
investigating what actually happened. For instance, after Rebecca publicly confesses to 
the crime on national TV, the judge persuades her in his office to recant the public 
confession. Judge Domínguez tellingly says: “I want to help you but you must 
cooperate.” Try as he might to persuade Rebecca to recant, he fails and has no other 
option but to imprison her. Rebecca’s arrival at the prison is cross-cut with Becky’s 
successful debut at the theater. The images and sounds of the two contrasting locations, 
prison and theater, are superimposed in the scene: as the prison gates close behind 
Rebecca, which replicate the closing doors of a theater, we hear the audience’s applause 
for Becky’s appearance on the center of the stage of a full theater [Pictures 1 and 2].67 
                                                 
67 In a later musical sequence, several inmates dance in the prison yard, led by lesbian Cimarrona 
(played by well-known Spanish male-to-female transsexual Bibi Andersen, now Bibiana 
Fernández), who has committed a crime just to be closer to her jailed girlfriend. The prison 
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Interestingly, Judge Domínguez watches Becky’s performances (he is seen among the 
audience). Becky dedicates her first song, “Think of me” (“Piensa en mí”) to her 
daughter, who is forced to listen to it on the radio of one of the inmates. At the most 
dramatic moment of the performance, one tear falls in the same exact spot where she left 
a red-lip kiss on the floor at the beginning of the show.  
  
Picture 3.1 Picture 3.2 
The theatricality of all these gestures makes it difficult to interpret whether Becky’s 
support for Rebecca is genuine or fake. It is far more complicated than what Kamir seems 
to acknowledge (in her view, Becky’s act of dedicating her song and lyrics symbolizes 
complete support for her daughter). From the outset, the film presents Becky as a diva 
who is attracted by media and audience appreciation.68 She abandons her daughter to 
pursue her singing career. Upon her return, she is more eager to face the media than to 
see her daughter. Her personal assistant Marga is writing her autobiography, and when 
Judge Domínguez interrogates Becky about her alibi on the night of the murder, she 
                                                                                                                                                 
becomes a performative space where those marginalized subjects (i.e., women, lesbians, 
transsexuals, blacks, gypsies) express themselves despite the efforts to silence them.   
 
68 See Williams, Bruce, The Text in the Third Degree: Gay Camp Recoupment in What Ever 
Happened To ...? and High Heels, vol. 2 New Review of Film and Television Studies 2 (2004): 
pp. 161-79, and Playgrounds of Desire: Almodóvar, Fetishism, and the Male Ideal Ego Vol 52 
Journal of Film and Video no. 2, (2000):  pp. 28-40. 
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answers: “I didn’t kill him. You don’t do that two days before an opening.” Discerning 
between Becky’s on-stage and off-stage performances as well as her theatricality and real 
emotions becomes more complicated when Judge Domínguez suggests that Becky talk to 
Rebecca, to which Becky replies: “When I wake up all I want is to live until 10 p.m. and 
do the only thing I know: perform.”69  
Letal/Judge Domínguez is the legal figure who can create the conditions for an 
honest relationship between the mother and daughter. This is nowhere more evident than 
when Judge Domínguez uses the empty and solemn courtroom (which visually contrasts 
with the earlier image of the glamorous and crowded theater) to bring Becky face-to-face 
with Rebecca. Within the emptiness of the courtroom, Becky can stop pretending 
(acting), and directly ask her daughter for forgiveness. The scene opens with Rebecca, 
who has not been informed about the reason why she has been summoned, entering an 
imposing courtroom. Becky enters next and soon finds her way to the judge’s bench. 
Positioned in the place of the judge and powerfully looking from above, she interrogates 
a visually smaller and powerless Rebecca [Picture 3].  
Becky: “Why did you do it?” 
 Rebecca: “I didn’t kill him, Mom!” 
 Becky: “But you confessed it yourself.” 
Rebecca: “I should have killed him, but I didn’t even get that. My only revenge  
  was to say I did it.”  
Becky: “Why do you torture me? Because I slept with him? Is that why?” 
Rebecca: “Don’t be silly. You weren’t the only one.” 
Becky: “Well, then?” 
 
[Becky: “¿Por qué lo hiciste? 
 Rebecca: “!Yo no lo maté, mama!” 
 Becky: “Pero tú misma lo confesaste. Nadie te obligó.” 
                                                 
69 Furthermore, at one point, when Rebecca wears the earrings Becky bought her as a child, 
hoping she will notice them, Becky pretends to recognize them. Rebecca tells her to stop acting. 
Becky’s theatricality is further emphasized by her artistic name Becky del Páramo—Becky, 
diminutive of Rebecca. 
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Rebecca: “Matarle hubiera sido lo legítimo, pero no me permitisteis ni eso. Mi  
  única venganza ha sido confesarlo, aunque fuera mentira.”  
Becky: “¿Por qué me martirizas, Rebeca? ¿Es por haberme acostado con él? ¿Es  
  por eso?” 
Rebecca: “No digas tonterías. Tú no fuiste la única.” 
Becky: “¿Entonces?”] 
 
Rebecca replies, indirectly, with a question of her own: “Did you see ‘Autumn Sonata’? 
It’s about a great pianist and her mediocre daughter. A story like ours.” In a long 
reference to Ingmar Bergman’s film, Rebecca explains that she has spent all her life 
competing with her mother in everything, but she could win only by marrying Manuel.70 
“We both lost with Manuel,” Becky defends. “Yes, but I married him. You had to prove 
you could take him from me! I knew it, but you had to prove it to me.” The competition 
is not between two mothers, but between mother and daughter. However, something 
unexpected happens at this point. As Becky gets off the judge’s bench, she admits her 
guilt and asks her daughter for forgiveness: “Forgive me, Rebecca. I behaved very badly, 
but what can I do now?” Rebecca replies: “You can only listen.” Rebecca gradually shifts 
positions, visually suggesting that what started as Rebecca’s “trial” is now Becky’s—
Rebecca stands in front of her mother, who now sits as a defendant in front of her. 
Rebecca confesses that she switched her stepfather Alberto’s sleeping pills, seemingly 
causing his death, but she assures her mother that she did it out of her love for her. 
Rebecca makes her way to the judge’s bench and now, from this position, accuses Becky 
of abandoning her: “I wanted you to live your life. You promised me we’d have fun 
together, that we’d never separate. But you lied. And that’s something I’ll never forgive” 
                                                 
70 For Rebecca, as Morgan Rikki notes, “the absence of her mother and her consequent desire for 
affection and attention motivate an emotional attachment which oscillates between obsession . . .  
and psychotic rivalry.” Dress to Kill 1 Sight and Sound 12 (April, 1992): 28-29, at 29. 
 
 160
[Picture 4]. The scene closes with Rebecca leaving a profoundly upset Becky in the 
empty courtroom. 
                 
Picture 3.3 Picture 3.4 
This scene draws the attention to some of the performative aspects of the law in 
three significant ways: first, by leaving the mother and daughter on their own to discuss 
their differences, Judge Domínguez transforms the courtroom into an informal 
performative space of conflict resolution. With the sanction of the law, this performative 
space points to Becky’s assumption of responsibility: she becomes vulnerable, 
acknowledges her (moral) guilt, and for the first time asks Rebecca for forgiveness. In 
turn, Becky’s transformation enables Rebecca to finally confront her mother and to 
demand to be heard—she confesses that she killed Alberto (although she denies having 
killed Manuel) and blames Becky for it. Second, Judge Domínguez’s absence ensures 
that Rebecca’s specific demand is brought before the law and is satisfied—Rebecca’s 
particular motive, history, and need are fully heard by her mother in the legitimizing 
space of the court of law. By giving Rebecca a hearing (i.e., letting her speak), Judge 
Domínguez, the law, indirectly responds to his duty to act upon Rebecca’s call to be 
considered before a judgment or legal decision is taken. The empty courtroom is the 
place of a symbolic trial, not only of Becky being judged by Rebecca, but of this whole 
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process by the viewer. In this scene, cinematic devices such as the camera angle, mise-en- 
scène, etc., and reference to Bergman’s film position the viewer to become the judge of 
the mother’s and daughter’s actions. Rebecca is found “legally” innocent of killing 
Alberto, and Becky is found morally guilty of Rebecca’s criminal acts. The legal function 
of the empty courtroom is to legitimize this symbolic verdict.  
 
C. Judging Law, Performing Justice  
It can be no coincidence that, after Rebecca has been declared (symbolically) 
innocent in the court of law, Judge Domínguez releases her from prison on the grounds of 
insufficient evidence. Judge Domínguez and Rebecca have this conversation shortly after 
her release: 
Judge: “Letal wants you to go to see him tonight.” 
Rebecca: “What for?” 
Judge: “To speak with you, I suppose. You probably have things to tell him, too.” 
Rebecca: “Wrong. I’ve nothing to tell him, he doesn’t interest me.” […] 
Judge: “Why are you so aggressive? Without me, you’d be rotting in jail!”  
Rebecca: . . . “If you freed me because you believe I’m innocent you’re only 
 doing your job.” 
Judge: “I wonder. You never said you were innocent.”    
Rebecca: “I’m innocent.”    
Judge: “Why confess on TV then?”       
Rebecca: “I was desperate and felt guilty.”       
Judge: “A psychiatrist can use that, but I can’t.” 
Rebecca: “You can feel guilty without being guilty, can’t you?” 
Judge: “Of course, but I still don’t understand you.”  
Rebecca: “I don’t understand you.”     
Judge: “That’s called reciprocity.”  
Rebecca: “Why do you help me? Why do you free me, if you’re not sure?”  
Judge: “I know you’re innocent.”       
 Rebecca: “That should be enough.”       
 Judge: “But it isn’t. There are so many things I’d like to ask. But I have no right  
   to, even if I’m the judge.      




[Judge: “Letal quiere que vaya a verle esta noche al Villa Rosa.” 
Rebecca: “¿Para qué?” 
Judge: “Supongo que querrá hablar con usted y me imagino que usted tendrá  
  también cosas que contarle.” 
Rebecca: “Pues imagina mal. Yo ya no tengo nada que contarle. Todo lo que él  
  pueda decirme no me interesa.” […] 
Judge: “¿Pero por qué es tan agresiva conmigo? !Sino fuera por mí todavía estaría 
  pudriéndose en la cárcel!”  
Rebecca: . . . “Supuse que si me ha puesto en libertad es porque pensaba que soy  
 inocente, en cuyo caso solo está cumpliendo con su deber.” 
Judge: “A veces tengo dudas. Todavía no he oído de sus labios que sea inocente”  
Rebecca: “Soy inocente.”    
Judge: “¿Entonces, por qué confesó en televisión?”      
Rebecca: “Estaba desesperada, me sentía culpable.”     
Judge: “Esa explicación es válida para un psiquiatra, pero a mi no me sirve.” 
Rebecca: “Para sentirse culpable no hace falta ser culpable. ¿Entiende eso?” 
Judge: “!Claro que lo entiendo! Es a usted a quien no acabo de entender”  
Rebecca: “Yo tampoco le entiendo a usted.”     
Judge: “Eso se llama reciprocidad”  
Rebecca: “¿Por qué me ha ayudado desde el primer momento? ¿Por qué me ha  
  dejado en libertad si tiene tantas dudas?”   
Judge: “No dudo de su inocencia.”       
 Rebecca: “Con eso debería bastar.”       
 Judge: “Pues no me basta. Hay tantas cosas que no sé y que me gustará   
  preguntarle. Pero no tengo derecho a hacerlo aunque sea el Juez de  
  Instrucción.”        
Rebecca: “En eso estamos de acuerdo”] 
 
This conversation reveals the shifting point of the relationship between Rebecca and 
Letal/Judge Domínguez. This time, he is the one who wants to be heard, and pleads with 
Rebecca to go to see what Letal has to tell her. This positions them as equals: Letal is not 
only a respondent to the demands of the other in need; he is also, like Rebecca, a 
legitimate claimant for the other’s performance.71 Judge Domínguez frees Rebecca not 
because he thinks she is innocent, but because there is no proof of her being guilty. 
Although he wants to know whether Rebecca is legally innocent, he recognizes the limits 
of legal cognition, which prevent him from fully understanding Rebecca (at any rate, not 
as a psychiatrist would). In turn, Rebecca also recognizes and accepts that she does not 
                                                 
71 Douzinas and Warrington, supra at 178. 
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understand him fully. Significantly, their mutual (“reciprocal,” as Judge Domínguez calls 
it) incomprehension is the cause not of conflict but of agreement. In acknowledging the 
other as unfathomable, they establish a non-totalizing asymmetrical relationship between 
each other—the recognition that the other always contains an aspect that cannot be 
grasped in its totality is necessary to an ethics of alterity.72  
In his ethical task, Judge Domínguez’s professional role imposes certain limits on 
his way of responding to the call of the other. As he explains to Rebecca, to believe in her 
innocence is not enough; he still needs to determine her guilt or innocence according to 
the logic of the system. He recognizes that he has no right to ask some questions, even if 
he is the judge. While the judge remains ethically responsible to respond to the request of 
the other, it appears that, to be just, his response cannot breach the limits of legality. This 
dilemma refers to what Derrida calls the aporia of justice: “to act justly you must treat the 
other both as equal and as entitled to the symmetrical treatment of norms and as a totally 
unique person who commands the response of ethical asymmetry.”73 (I will explain later 
whether this reconciliation between the legal and the ethical is possible). 
                                                 
72 As Douzinas and Warrington put it, “[a]n awareness of otherness cannot determine the 
attributes of the other, but it recognizes that there will always be aspects of every other that we 
cannot know.” (Id. at 20.) To understand fully any other’s position is to appropriate that other’s 
position as one’s own, and therefore to deny that other her otherness, difference, and singularity. 
73 Id. at 178. In “Force of Law,” Derrida challenges the correspondence between law and justice. 
By the law (droit, loi) Derrida means a system of rules, norms, and principles to be applied to 
particular cases. By justice, by contrast, he means the “infinite, incalculable, rebellious to rule and 
foreign to symmetry, heterogeneous and heterotropic.” Supra at 22. This idea of justice, he says, 
“is infinite because it is irreducible, irreducible because owed to the other, owed to the other, 
before any contract, because it has come, the other’s coming as the singularity that is always 
other.” (Id. at 25.) It is in his distinction between law and justice that Derrida identifies what he 
calls the “aporia of justice:” It foregrounds the impossibility of reducing the experience of justice 
to the (positive) system of rules. For him, justice is an experience of the impossible, an 
experience that we are not able to experience: “the experience of absolute alterity.” (Id. at 27.) In 
response to Derrida’s aporia of justice, Douzinas and Warrington turn to an eclectic adaptation by 
law of principles from the Aristotelian tradition of practical wisdom and from the Kantian 
tradition of reflective judgment. (Supra at 79.) They propose an aesthetic reflective judgment that 
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Despite Rebecca saying that she was not interested, she finally decides to hear 
what Letal has to tell her. In the same dressing room where they had their first sexual 
encounter, Letal confesses that he and Judge Domínguez are the same person, and 
proposes marriage to Rebecca.74 Perplexed, Rebecca asks: “To marry whom? Hugo, 
Letal, the Judge?” “All of us,” he answers. Next, he takes Rebecca to his hideout, a 
garage where his mother keeps her old stuff. On the way there, he explains how he 
created his multiple identities to infiltrate and investigate criminal cases. He also admits 
that she is the first person he has ever brought there and that not even his own mother 
knows about his impersonations. Rebecca then confronts him and judges his misconduct:  
Rebecca: “How can you lie to everyone?”  
Judge: “But not to you or to me.” 
Rebecca: “What about the people you leave behind? Paula fell in love with one of 
 your characters.”  
Judge: “There won’t be more characters. Now there’s only me. I brought Letal 
 back to explain. The Judge couldn’t. 
 
[Rebecca: “¿No sé cómo puedes vivir así, mintiéndole a todo el mundo?”  
Judge: “A todo el mundo menos a tí y a mí mismo.” 
Rebecca: “¿Y tú nunca piensas en la gente que vas dejando atrás? ¿Gente como 
 Paula que se enamoró de uno de tus personajes?”  
 Judge: “Ya no habrá más personajes. Si yo he vuelto a Letal ha sido para   
  explicártelo todo, desde el juez era muy difícil pero eso se acabó.”] 
 
After being scrutinized by Rebecca, Letal/Judge Domínguez promises that “there 
won’t be more characters, only me.” However, Judge Domínguez continues to perform, 
                                                                                                                                                 
gives the other her due, yet under the auspices of an undetermined universal and a sense of 
“community in a continuous state of formation and dissolution; it is the precondition and horizon 
of judgment but each judgment passed marks the community’s end.” (Id. at 182.) According to 
them, the act of judging in law “must move between the norm and the event in the same way that 
reflective judgments find in each particular the mark of an undetermined universal.” (Id.) Justice 
is therefore “the bringing together of the limited calculability and determinacy of law with the 
infinite openness and contingency of alterity.” (Id. at179.)  
74 Although for most of the film’s spectators it is obvious from the very beginning that they are 




demonstrating that he “exists only through [his] in(de)finite performing roles, the ideal 
sum of which correspond to his own performative ‘identity.”75 After he tells Rebecca that 
he brought Letal back to explain, because the Judge couldn’t, Rebecca and the viewers 
witness yet another metamorphosis: he once again dons the fake beard, dark glasses, and 
the judge’s clothes [Picture 5] and introduces himself as Eduardo, the father of her 
unborn child [Picture 6]. In doing so, Judge Domínguez does not cease in his 
performance: he adds another layer of meaning to it. Judge Domínguez, the law, is the 
sum of all his characters—Letal, the Judge, Eduardo, and father-to-be. 
  
  Picture 3.5   Picture 3.6 
This visual metamorphosis reflects the law’s actual transformation: before 
encountering Rebecca, Judge Domínguez had impersonated different characters with the 
mere purpose of gathering information and experiences for the criminal investigations. 
His impersonations, Rebecca reminds him, did not lead to justice but to abuse: people, 
like Paula, who were unwillingly used as informants and therefore as a means to his end, 
                                                 
75 Cleto, supra at 25. This affirmation is related to camp’s perception of “life as theater” and of 
“being as playing role”: “Depth-anchored subjectivity is dissolved and replaced by . . .  depthless 
foundation of subjectivity as actor (in itself, non-existent without an audience) on the world as 
stage. And as object of camp decoding, the actor exists only through its in(de)finite performing 
roles, the ideal sum of which correspond to his own performative ‘identity,’ personality being 
equal to a co-existence of personae on the stage of Being.” (Id.) The camp notion of life as 
performance is a central aspect in High Heels, which focuses on the dynamics of role playing: 
from gender roles, people’s identities, motherhood, and everyday life to law. 
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rather than as concrete and unique persons. In contrast, after the face-to-face encounter 
with Rebecca, Letal/Judge Domínguez starts performing not according to his 
investigative interests but to Rebecca’s direct and concrete demand, and morphs himself 
accordingly. It is precisely this situated encounter with the unrepeatable, unique demand 
of the other, which makes Judge Domínguez an ethical subject.76 This ethical 
responsibility does not depend on the attributes and experiences of the self, but arises out 
of and from the demand of the vulnerable other.   
Just as Judge Domínguez’s performances have constitutive effects upon Rebecca—
they enable her personal growth—Rebecca’s performances also have constitutive effects 
upon the judge, and open him up to a parallel transformation. The reciprocal yet 
asymmetrical transformation between the judge and Rebecca lead us to reconceptualize 
law in terms of that very performative medium that makes it possible for self and other to 
respond to one another, and to be transformed by this encounter.  
After introducing himself as Eduardo, Judge Domínguez and Rebecca rush into the 
hospital where Becky is in intensive care. At the hospital, Becky’s image is framed 
between the bed curtains, which give the impression that she still is on a stage. When 
Rebecca enters Becky’s room, she closes the curtains for a private conversation behind 
the scenes. Becky asks Rebecca to tell her the truth and Rebecca confesses that she did, in 
fact, kill Manuel. The judge enters the scene and Becky, in what could be considered “the 
performance of a lifetime,” takes the blame for Manuel’s murder. Judge Domínguez 
replies that a confession is not enough, because he needs physical evidence. In a final 
scene, and behind the judge’s back, the film shows mother and daughter conspiring 
together to manipulate the evidence. The viewers (but not the judge) are shown how 
                                                 
76 Douzinas and Warrington, supra at 165. 
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Rebecca gives Becky the gun she used to kill Manuel, and Becky plants her fingerprints 
on it. Eventually, Judge Domínguez relies on the physical evidence that “proves” Becky’s 
guilt and sets Rebecca free. 
Judge Domínguez’s decision not to prosecute Rebecca is both legal and ethical 
(apparently reconciling the aporia of justice). By revealing to the viewer that this “truth” 
is the result of manipulating the system, the film raises the question of justice: is Judge 
Domínguez’s decision not to prosecute Rebecca just—and how are we to determine it? 
To reflect on this question leads us to explore the viewer’s judgment.  
 
V. CINEMATIC JUDGMENT: ETHICS OF RESPONSE  
According to Kamir, High Heels invites the viewer to practice a “participatory 
sympathetic identification” with Rebecca that mediates and shapes the viewer’s process 
of judging. Although each character is scrutinized and examined (i.e., Becky is accused 
of being self-centered and uncaring, and Eduardo of abusing Paula), Kamir argues that 
the film invites the viewer to accept their sincere remorse and to see all but Manuel in 
reference to Rebecca’s forgiving love and vulnerability.77 In constituting a 
nonjudgmental, compassionate, and caring viewer-judge of Rebecca, Becky and 
Eduardo/Letal/Judge Domínguez, the film supports its fictional legal system. The viewer-
judge, like Judge Domínguez, “judges two women through shifting personae and points 
of view, through identification with the involved parties, and through caring for them.”78 
Like the on-screen judge, the viewer investigates, determines relevant facts, and enacts 
the same alternative vision of justice of care—not prosecuting Rebecca for the murder. 
                                                 
77 Kamir, supra at 280-281. 
78 Id. at 279. 
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In exploring the use of mise-en-scène, cinematography, editing, and sound, I 
argue that High Heels places the viewer in several judging positions that challenge the 
one-dimensional compassionate judgment proposed by Kamir. To illustrate my argument, 
I examine the use of two different cinematic techniques: on the one hand, the “direct 
address” (when a character looks directly into the camera, that is, at the viewers); and on 
the other hand, the visual contrast between Rebecca’s face and Becky’s “mask-face.” I 
demonstrate how these cinematic techniques elicit from the viewer an ethics of response 
to alterity, rather than an ethics of care.79 Through the direct address, the film produces a 
face-to-face encounter between the viewer and Rebecca, parallel to the Levinasian face-
to-face encounter between self and other that challenges the participatory sympathetic 
identification that Kamir suggests. The visual facial contrast between Rebecca and Becky 
breaks the mimetic relation between mother and daughter and, in doing so, establishes the 
conditions for an ethical relation between Rebecca and the viewer: If Rebecca were just 
the image or reflection of Becky, her otherness and singularity would be denied, and no 
ethical relation between Rebecca and the viewer would be possible. In the last part of this 
section, I argue that, by revealing what actually happened (Rebecca as the actual killer of 
                                                 
79 In “Reality and its Shadow,” Levinas deprives art of ethics and responsibility. In his view, art 
consists in replacing the object with its image (a shadow, a caricature, a neutralizing vision of the 
object). (La realité et son Ombre 1 Revue des Sciences Humaines 185 (1982): 103-117, at 106, 
112, 111.) It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the ethical or unethical nature of art. In 
accordance with Alex Gerbaz, I claim that, “If responsibility begins with the face-to-face 
encounter, perhaps in the age of the screen and mediated social encounters our sense of 
responsibility is changing. The ubiquity of screens does not mean the end of responsibility . . . ; 
rather, it makes the viewer responsible for reaching beyond the presence of images in order to 
‘see’ and respect the conscious life of others.” (Direct Address, Ethical Imagination, and Errol 
Morris’s Interrotron 12 Film-Philosophy 2 (September 2008): 17-29, at 26.) For discussions on 
the ethical dimension of art from the Levinasian perspective see also Sarah Cooper, Selfless 




Manuel) to the viewer and not to the on-screen judge, the film constructs a cinematic 
judging process that differs from the one presented in the diegesis.  
 
A. Direct Address to the Viewer: Face-to-Face Encounter 
High Heels opens with Rebecca’s image reflected in a glass window of the airport 
where Becky’s plane is about to arrive. The fleeting image cuts to an extreme close-up of 
the side of Rebecca’s face. This is followed by another reflection of Rebecca: in the 
background, her image appears superimposed over people walking in the airport; in the 
foreground, she is seen looking at a small model of it. A low camera angle shows 
Rebecca looking for the arrival time of her mother’s plane on a huge board. While sitting 
in the waiting room, a zoom-in brings her face closer to the viewer so that her expression 
can be seen and her thoughts heard. Rebecca’s face in close-up dissolves into the first 
flashback of her traumatic memory from childhood in the Caribbean, when she lost one 
of the earrings her mother bought for her and Alberto pretended to sell her to the locals. 
The flashback closes with the image of a young Rebecca running away from Becky and 
Alberto. Then, the image dissolves to Rebecca’s adult and suffering face, which directly 
addresses the camera [Picture 7]. Her direct address of the camera is held in close-up, 





In the same shot, Rebecca is shown taking from her handbag those very same 
earrings and putting them on. Then, a close-up of her face dissolves into a second 
flashback. This time, she remembers how she tampered with Alberto’s pills, causing his 
death, after which her mother abandoned her to pursue her acting career in Mexico. Once 
again, the image of a young Rebecca fades out, while the off-screen voice of her mother 
confirms that she is going to abandon her. The scene closes by cutting back to the airport, 
where a guitar case with the name of Becky del Páramo stuck to it slides along the 
baggage carousel and leads directly to the now star-and-diva, Becky.  
 The unusual shot of direct address to the viewer (for there is no other addressee in 
the diegesis) functions as the Levinasian face-to-face encounter between self and other, in 
two interconnected ways: First, by looking directly at the camera, Rebecca makes visible 
the concealed artifice of cinema, and challenges the viewer’s temptation to identify with 
the gaze of the camera. The frontal facial breaks the illusion of the “mirror screen” 
through which the viewer identifies himself or herself as the origin and creator of 
meaning.80 Rebecca’s face, using Alex Gerbaz’s words, expresses “her otherness, alterity, 
and ungraspable subjectivity.”81 It “expresses something that cannot be accounted for 
                                                 
80 According to Jean-Louis Baudry, the darkened and closed ideological space of the cinema 
functions, like the Platonic cave, as a mirror-screen that “reflects images but not ‘reality’” 
(Baudry, Jean-Louis, “Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus,” in Film 
Theory and Criticism, 6th ed. Gerald Mast, Marshall Cohen, Leo Braudy [Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004]: 355-365. at 362). The projector appears as a sort of psychic apparatus 
that confers on the spectator the imaginary position of “transcendental subject,” while at the same 
time it conceals such a position as constructed (Id. 360). For him, cinema is “an apparatus 
destined to obtain a precise ideological effect, necessary to the dominant ideology: creating a 
phantasmatization of the subject, it collaborates with a marked efficacy in the maintenance of 
idealism.” (Id. 364.) The only way to resist the ideological forces of the system and to break 
through their deceptive effects is to make the system’s modes of production obvious (Id. 362-65). 
81 Gerbaz, supra at 20 
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within the totality of the transcendental subject’s intentions;” something irreducible that 
escapes identification.82 Second, by looking back at the viewer, Rebecca openly 
acknowledges the presence of the film viewers. The viewer is confronted with the fact 
that he or she is not only the subject of perception but also the object of perception. 
Rebecca’s direct address confronts the viewer and puts his or her “all-perceiving” self in 
question.83 That is, it challenges the illusory totality of the viewer’s act of perception.84 
The direct shot of the face establishes the conditions for a face-to-face encounter 
between Rebecca and the viewer: it prevents both Rebecca’s reduction to a mere image to 
be looked at, and the viewer’s maintenance of a transcendental self. By reaching out from 
the diegesis of the film, Rebecca appears in the uniqueness and singularity of her face, 
and expresses a direct demand for an ethical response before any judgment is taken by 
the viewer.  
                                                 
82 Id. at 23-24. “Yet [as Gerbaz points out] acknowledgment of this failure to reach complete 
identification, to reduce to presence, is . . . fundamental to an ethics of alterity.” (Id. at 24.) 
83 Christian Metz argues, following Lacan, that cinema offers the spectator the imaginary state of 
wholeness and completion, and that, in order to create such a state of completion cinema uses 
identification and voyeurism. Metz distinguishes what he calls “primary identification” from 
“secondary identification.” He argues that the spectator, first of all, “identifies with himself, with 
himself as a pure act of perception (as a wakefulness, alertness): as the condition of possibility of 
the perceived and hence as a kind of transcendental subject, which comes before every there is.” 
(“Identification, Mirror” in Film Theory and Criticism, 6th ed. Gerald Mast, Marshall Cohen, Leo 
Braudy [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004]: 820-836. at 823.) This primary identification 
makes possible the identification with the characters and the events on the screen (secondary 
identification). For Metz, [t]he practice of the cinema is only possible through the perceptual 
passions: the desire to see (= scopic drive, scopophilia, voyeurism).” (Id. 827.) The voyeur 
possesses the privileged position of looking without being noticed (the object of perception does 
not know that it is being watched).  
84 Finally, in presenting Rebecca as the bearer of the look, the direct address undermines the 
patriarchal cinematic tendency (in particular, classic Hollywood cinema) to position the woman 
as a passive object to be looked at by the active male gaze of the viewer. In Visual Pleasure and 
Narrative Cinema, Laura Mulvey recognizes three types of “gaze,” each relating the desire for the 
images on the screen from different points of view: that of the camera, that of the characters 
looking at one another, and that of the spectator. For Mulvey, cinema constitutes its scopic 
spectator as masculine, and its object as feminine. In Film Theory and Criticism, 6th ed. Gerald 




B. Face and Mask-face 
The opening emphasis on Rebecca’s face is contrasted with the contrary 
technique of depriving the viewer of a clear view of Becky’s face. Becky is first seen 
(both in the first flashback and upon her arrival at the airport) wearing a large red hat, big 
sunglasses, and heavy makeup that barely allows the viewers to see her face. Immediately 
after encountering Rebecca, Becky takes a small mirror from her bag to touch up her 
makeup, and an extreme close-up shows a distorted reflection of her face at the same time 
that she inquires about the presence of the press [Picture 8]. The camera tilts up from 
Becky’s grotesque facial reflection to Rebecca’s face. Rebecca proudly replies that she 
kept it secret that Becky was coming back; a blurry image of Becky’s red hat occupies 
half of the frame, pointing to Becky’s incapacity to emotionally connect with her 
daughter. Becky complains she wanted “more expectation.” Rebecca answers, with tears 
in her eyes, that she was full of expectation.  
Becky’s distorted facial reflection in the mirror visually reveals what Luce 
Irigaray calls a “masquerade of femininity,” by which “the woman loses herself, and 
loses herself by playing on her femininity.”85 This idea of the masquerade becomes 
particularly apparent in the scene in which Becky appears, applying a facial mask in front 
of a mirror, and indifferently talks about her “successful” encounter with Rebecca with 
her personal assistant Margarita [Picture 9].  
                                                 
85 Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which is Not One, Catherine Porter, trans. (Cornell UP, Ithaca, 1985, at 
84).  For a similar argument in another of Almodóvar’s film, see Alejandro Yarza’s brilliant 
analysis of Almodóvar’s film Entre Tinieblas in Un canibal en Madrid: la sensibilidad camp y el 
reciclaje de la historia en el cine de Pedro Almodóvar (Madrid: Libertarias, 1999).  
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While this is happening, Rebecca appears on TV as the news anchor, but self-
conscious of the fact that her mother is watching, she cannot contain her laughter while 
referring to the casualties of a terrorist attack. Embarrassed, Becky complains that she 
would have preferred not to have seen her daughter. The camera cuts from Becky’s 
mask-face to a television screen where two Asian women appear, applying makeup on 
their faces in extreme close-up. Another shot reveals Manuel as the viewer of such 
images, while a voice-over coming from the television program comments on the images 
of the Asian women: “the music and the dance were at the monarchy’s service for 
centuries. Most of the performers of the opera of the masks are women.” Not 
surprisingly, at this precise point Becky arrives at Manuel’s (and Rebecca’s) house, and 
Manuel turns his gaze towards her. Thus, mise-en-scène, sound, and editing connect the 
two scenes: by applying the mask on her face (the masquerade of femininity) like the 
women at the service of the monarchy on the television screen, Becky appears 
subordinated to the patriarchal order represented by Manuel. Within the diegetic space, 
Becky epitomizes Laura Mulvey’s idea of the woman’s “to-be-looked-at-ness.”  
  
Picture 3.8 Picture 3.9 
The visual contrast between Rebecca’s face and Becky’s mask-face throughout 
the film challenges the mimetic relation between mother and daughter, and establishes a 
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key difference between them: while Becky represents the celebration and naturalization 
of patriarchy, Rebecca appears as the victim of such patriarchy. This differentiation 
creates a different ethical relation for the viewer with Rebecca.  
The facial contrast between Rebecca and Becky is reiterated in the last part of the 
film, significantly, when Rebecca explains the motives for killing her husband to her 
mother (and the viewer). The scene opens inside the ambulance where we see Becky with 
an oxygen mask on her face and Rebecca holding her hand at her side [Picture 10]. Becky 
asks Rebecca for the forensic details of the murder because the judge does not seem 
convinced by her confession. Rebecca then explains the motives of the killing: She asked 
Manuel if he wanted her to shoot herself or die of an overdose, and Manuel replied that 
he would not give a damn about how she died. Becky interrupts Rebecca and tells her to 
go directly to the “heavy part” because that is what the judge will want to know: “How 
far away were when you fired . . . did he fall forward or backward.” Rebecca puts the 
oxygen mask back into Becky’s face and explains that Manuel’s insensitivity to her threat 
of killing herself was the last straw for her: she explains how she pulled the trigger, shot, 
and killed Manuel. Throughout the entire scene, Becky is seen with her face covered by 
the mask, taking it off only to ask questions or make comments to Rebecca. The scene 
closes with Becky telling her daughter that she should find a better way than murder to 





Although Becky is sick and dying, the grotesque image of her face with the oxygen 
mask visually deprives her of vulnerability, and, therefore, of the potential for an ethical 
relation with the viewer. Becky’s mask-face reminds the viewer that she is the cause of 
Rebecca’s criminal acts and invites the viewer to detach and distance him/herself from 
her. This contradicts Kamir’s reading of the scene, because for her, Becky’s identification 
with her daughter’s pain and humiliation influences the viewer to judge Rebecca 
accordingly (Kamir focuses exclusively on the narrative level of the scene). As she puts 
it, “[l]earning of the killing in this context, the viewer is influenced by the dying, 
remorseful mother’s attitude. The viewer joins her in the impulse to protect Rebecca, 
save her, and compensate for all the emotional abuse she has suffered all her life.”86  
To the viewer the visual technique of the mask-face deflects the view from Becky 
and directs it towards listening to Rebecca’s particular motive, history, and pain for the 
murder without the mediation of her mother. Shifting the attention towards Rebecca, the 
film invites the viewer to fulfill his or her ethical obligation to respect Rebecca’s specific 
history and motive before any judgment is taken. Like the on-screen performer-judge, the 
responsibility of the viewer towards Rebecca starts with her demand for an ethical 
response and concludes with its satisfaction. 
 
C. Truth and Justice. 
While High Heels calls upon the viewer to respect and fulfill Rebecca’s ethical 
demand like the on-screen judge by revealing the “truth” to the viewer and not to the 
                                                 
86 Kamir, supra at 280. 
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judge, the film constitutes a viewer-judge different from the one on-screen. However, the 
film invites them to reach the same decision, which is the non-prosecution of Rebecca for 
the murder. Richard Sherwin distinguishes, in regard to legal storytelling, three different 
forms of truth (factual, legal, and symbolic) that can help us to examine this issue.87 
According to Sherwin,  
Factual truth tells us what actually happened as a matter of historical accuracy. 
Whose testimony can be believed, what the physical evidence shows, how the 
elements of proof add up in the course of establishing who is to blame. . . . Legal 
truth, however, . . . says that there are times when general concepts and abstract 
principles of law may be more important than particular facts. . . . Symbolic truth . . 
. has the power to transcend particular facts and even particular laws. In this way, 
like legal truth, symbolic truth may ask a decision maker to sacrifice particular facts 
for the sake of something larger. But like factual truth it also seeks to root the truth 
not in some counterintuitive generality but in a specific human reality—albeit a 
higher human reality than ordinary facts typically allow.88  
 
Unlike the on-screen judge who believes that Becky’s guilt and Rebecca’s 
innocence have been determined according to what the physical evidence shows (factual 
truth) as well as following the rules (legal truth), the viewer knows that justice has not 
been legally attained, because the evidence has been manipulated. By calling attention to 
Rebecca’s motives for the killing of Manuel, High Heels encourages the viewer-judge to 
consciously sacrifice particular facts and laws for the more important sake of Rebecca. 
Put differently, it asks the viewer to judge Rebecca according to the symbolic and not to 
the factual and legal truth, which is to see her actions as (symbolically) destroying the 
oppressive patriarchal social and cultural order represented by Manuel. By asking the 
viewer to accept Becky’s admission of guilt (as complicit in this order, and responsible 
for Rebecca’s suffering), Manuel’s death does not go unpunished.  
                                                 
87 Richard K. Sherwin, When Law Goes Pop: The Vanishing Line Between Law and Popular 
Culture (University of Chicago Press, 2000).  




VI. CAMP AESTHETICS: LAW AS QUEER  
In “Strange Encounters,” law and film scholars Ruth Buchanan and Rebecca 
Johnson suggest that focusing on the affective dimensions of thought produced through 
the combination of word, image, and sound in film opens up both critical and 
transformative possibilities for Law-and-Film scholarship.89 Their interest is less “in 
understanding how film’s special effects are produced than in understanding how various 
cinematic techniques work through us to produce affects, be they terror, elation, 
confusion, or grief.”90 In particular, they focus on the ways film might “challenge or 
destabilize dominant ‘structures of feeling,’ revealing new potential subjectivities and 
ways of being in the world.” And further, which is “the place of affect in the constitution 
of legal subjectivities”?91 Following Buchanan and Johnson’s suggestion, I explore how 
the camp aesthetics of Letal/Judge Domínguez’s female impersonations reveal new 
subjectivities that invite the viewer to examine and question the dominant assumptions 
about identity upon which traditional legal systems are grounded.92 I then show how the 
                                                 
89 “Encounters: Exploring Law and Film in the Affective Register,” 46 Studies in Law, Politics, 
and Society (2009): 33-60. Buchanan and Johnson differentiate affect from emotion—our pre-
cognitive responses to particular combinations of word/image/sound. For an overview of the law-
and-film scholarship see, for instance: Law and Film: Introduction, Stefan Machura & Peter 
Robson, eds. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001); Law’s Moving Image Leslie J. Moran et al., 
eds. (London; Portland, OR.: Cavendish Publishing, 2004); In The Grip of The Law: Trials, 
Prisons, And The Space Between, Monika Fludernik and Greta Olson, eds. (Frankfurt; New York: 
Peter Lang, 2004); Law on the Screen, Austin Sarat et al., eds. (Calif.: Stanford University Press, 
2005). 
90 Buchanan and Jonhson, supra at 39. 
91 Id. 
92 As Alejandro Yarza observes, “camp is situational, it emerges from the interrelation between 
two different elements in a concrete historical situation. Camp does not exist a priori, it emerges 
as effect of a specific situation that links an object with whom recreates it; that’s why it requires 
the active participation of the spectator.” supra at 20. 
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interaction between the camp aesthetics of the judge and the viewer reconceptualize law 
as queer performance.93 
Cultural anthropologist Esther Newton notes that “the role of the female 
impersonator is directly related to both the drag queen and camp roles in the homosexual 
subculture.”94 As she explains, the main opposition around which the homosexual world 
revolves is masculine-feminine; and one way of presenting such opposition through one’s 
person is drag. Yet, Newton argues that while all female impersonators are drag queens in 
the context of the homosexual subculture, not all of them are camp: “Both the drag queen 
and the camp are expressive performing roles, and both specialize in transformation. But 
the drag queen is concerned with masculine-feminine transformation, while the camp is 
concerned with what might be called a philosophy of transformations and incongruity.”95 
Camp uses the incongruity as a creative “strategy for a situation.”96 Taking Newton’s 
notion of camp a step further, Jack Babuscio and Judith Butler highlight its subversive 
aspect. For Babuscio, camp is subversive because it “forces the spectator to detach from 
the heterosexual viewpoint of conventional standards: masculinity (including sexual 
dominance over women) is “natural” and appropriate for men, and femininity (including 
sexual submissiveness toward men) is “natural” and appropriate for women.97 For Butler, 
drag “fully subverts the distinction between inner and outer psychic space and effectively 
mocks both the expressive model of gender and the notion of a true gender identity . . .  
                                                 
93 For queer in law see, for instance, Sexuality in the Legal Arena, eds. Carl Franklin Stychin and 
Didi Herman (London: The Athlone Press, 2000). 
94 In Cleto, supra at 98.  
95 Id. at 102. 
96 Id. 
97 In Cleto, supra at 123. 
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In imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself.”98 
Letal’s drag impersonation of Becky is camp in the terms established above.  
The first time Letal physically appears on the screen is at the Villa Rosa gay night 
club, performing an impersonation of Becky in drag. Letal’s performance is presented in 
two scenes: one takes place onstage, the other offstage. The first scene opens with Letal 
emerging from behind the curtains, followed by the camera in a long take as he moves to 
the center of the stage. Letal performs an old song of a younger Becky, while imitating in 
detail her gestures, style, and costume—he wears a red miniskirt, full make-up, long 
gloves, dangling earrings, a wig, and high heels [Picture 11]. With sexualized gestures 
and exaggerated expressions, he flaunts his femininity to the men he encounters on his 
way to the stage. In the stylized backdrop, traditional flamenco dancers contrast with 
Letal’s masculine features and big stature. A reverse shot shows Becky in close-up 
captivated and flattered by his impersonation. Then, an over-the-shoulder shot shows 
three other female impersonators singing along with Letal, imitating his moves and 
expressions from their front-row table. Another close-up of Becky’s face emphasizes her 
pleasure on seeing her imitation. The scene closes with a zoom-out of Letal at the center 
of the stage.  
 
                                                 
98 In Cleto, supra at 363-364 (emphasis in the original). 
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   Picture 3.11 
The opening of the second scene reiterates that of the former, signaling to the 
viewer that what follows is part of the same performance. The scene opens with Letal, 
emerging from behind the curtains followed by the camera as he moves towards Becky’s 
table and sits facing her. Then, the following conversation takes place: 
Letal: “I hope you are not upset.”  
Becky: “Why?”  
Letal: “You may not like the imitations.”  
Becky: “They flatter me. I feel so young, so absurd. Let me look at you. You 
 don’t look like me but the gestures are mine.”  
Letal: “I tried to copy your style. It made you unique.” 
Becky: “I still am. But you can’t be a pop singer at my age. I’ve become a living  
  legend.” 
 Letal: “I’m more into your early years. Wigs, miniskirts, platform shoes. Your  
  spirit, your style.” 
 
[Letal: “¿Espero que no te haya molestado?”  
Becky: “¿Molestarme, por qué?”  
Letal: “Hay gente que no le gusta nada que la imiten.”  
Becky: “A mí me halaga, me hace sentir tan joven y tan absurda. A ver, deja que 
 te mire. De cerca no te me pareces mucho, pero los gestos son míos.”  
Letal: “He tratado de imitar tu espíritu, tu estilo. Eso que te hizo única.” 
Becky: “Todavía lo soy. Pero he cambiado, no se puede seguir siendo una   
  cantante pop a mi edad, con el tiempo me he convertido en una gran dama  
  de la canción.” 
 Letal: “Pero a mí me va más lo antiguo. Los pelucones, la minifalda, el   
  plataformón. Tu espíritu, tu estilo.”] 
 
Through Letal’s drag impersonation, Becky becomes a camp icon in the 
homosexual subculture. Letal’s drag performance, however, is not a misogynistic 
representation of Becky (or women in general), but a parodic stylized appropriation of 
her femininity (as Letal implies, when he tells Becky that he tries to copy the style that 
made her unique—wigs, miniskirts, and platform shoes). Letal’s exaggerated and stagy 
style, gestures and expressions, and excessive makeup and feminine attire, in fact evoke a 
woman who is already a distortion or a masquerade of femininity; they exaggerate what 
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is already an exaggeration.99 Letal’s campy impersonation of Becky subverts the erotic 
scenario of woman-as-spectacle, of woman-to-be-looked-at, forcing the viewer to 
examine and critically detach from Becky’s celebration of patriarchy.100   
 After the above conversation, the camera moves to the right to shift the viewer’s 
attention to Rebecca and Manuel, who are sitting on Becky’s side. As soon as Rebecca 
introduces Manuel to Letal, they have a confrontational encounter: Manuel asks Letal 
what his real name is, while simultaneously staring at his crotch. The camera tilts up from 
Letal’s crotch (the same crotch Rebecca will undress moments later backstage) to a close-
up of Letal’s face. Letal then replies that he is whatever he wants to call him, but that his 
friends call him (dropping his voice) “Letal.” A close-up of his face shows him staring at 
Manuel’s gun. Evoking the former shot, the camera tilts up from Manuel’s gun (the same 
gun Rebecca will use to kill Manuel) to his face in close-up. In return, Manuel asks if 
Letal’s name is male or female. Letal answers that it depends, but for him, he is a man. 
While Manuel demonstrates his “maleness” by showing his gun, Letal shows his by 
suddenly dropping the level of his voice.101 The comic incongruence produced by Letal’s 
vocal dropping is Letal’s campy strategy to deal with Manuel’s homophobic attitude 
towards him.102 Camp, through its comic incongruity, forces the viewers to detach from 
                                                 
99 Marcia Pally, The Politics of Passion: Pedro Almodóvar and the Camp Aesthetic 10 Cineaste 1 
(1990), at 84.  
100 Andrew Ross, in Cleto, supra at 324.  
 101 The equation of penis and gun as a sign of masculinity is also parodized in the film—Manuel 
is killed by his own gun. See: Zorach, Rebecca, ‘Tu imagen divina’: The Fetishism of the Femme 
and Her Secret in Pedro Almodóvar’s Tacones lejanos, 10 Torre de Papel 1 (2000): 120-33. at 
129. 
102 As Babuscio observes, “in order for an incongruous contrast to be ironic it must, in addition to 
being comic, affect one as ‘painful’—though not so painful as to neutralize the humor. . . . Humor 
constitutes the strategy of camp.” (In Cleto, supra at 126).  
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and question Manuel’s hostile position, and to reflect about and align with Letal’s 
marginal one.  
The scene closes with Becky and Letal exchanging mementos (one earring and a 
fake “breast”). As Newton remarks, one part of the performance of the female 
impersonator is to make the opposition between the female “appearance” and the male 
“reality” evident. One way to do this is to pull out one fake “breast” and show it to the 
audience. By showing his fake breast to the audience, Letal reveals that his appearance is 
an illusion; it says that sex role behavior is an appearance that can be manipulated at 
will.103 In addition, by breaking the illusion of femininity, Letal frees himself from other 
impersonators as the immediate reference group (for instance, the anonymous female 
impersonators that imitated his performance) and, more specifically, from Becky. In so 
doing, he positions himself as the drag impersonator to the viewers.104 
The fact that Judge Domínguez is first seen in his role of drag performer within 
the context of the homosexual subculture is highly subversive. It replaces the dominant 
legal assumptions of a fixed and given identity (unity, unicity, stability, permanence, 
depth, and heterosexuality) with fluid and performative identities (multiplicity, diversity, 
instability, change, surface, and queerness).105 This idea of fluidity and performativity is 
reinforced throughout the film through Judge Domínguez’s multiple characters: he goes 
from Letal’s exaggerated femininity (he wears full makeup, miniskirt, and high heels) to 
Eduardo’s ambiguity (he is seen half in drag), and then to Domínguez’s extreme 
masculinity (he wears sunglasses, a beard, and a suit).106 This rejection of legal 
                                                 
103 In Cleto, supra at 101. 
104 Id. at 105. 
105 Cleto, supra at 14. 
106 Judge Domínguez’s excess of masculinity could be read as camp, as self-parody. 
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assumptions about identity challenges the exclusive categorical oppositions 
(masculine/feminine, original/copy, identity/difference, natural/artificial, private/public, 
heterosexual/homosexual, etc.) upon which the legal epistemic is grounded.  
By re-imagining law from a queer perspective, the film opens up the possibility 
for an aesthetic judgment that takes seriously the call of those marginal subjects (such as 
lesbians, homosexuals, transvestites, transsexuals, women, etc.) that have been 
traditionally excluded from the law. It enables them to express and assert their otherness 
and difference, at the same time that it forces the viewer to respect and be responsive to 
their alterity. High Heels, in other words, transforms the law into a queer performance 
that recognizes and includes new subjectivities that disrupt the hierarchy that privileges 
masculinity, heterosexuality, and patriarchy.  
 
VII. LGBT IN SPAIN TODAY  
 Since High Heels re-imagined law as queer in 1991, LGBT organizations have 
witnessed a profound transformation of Spanish society, from the repeal of Franco’s 
discriminatory laws in 1995, to the official expunge of the police records of homosexuals 
imprisoned during Franco’s dictatorship in 2001, to the declaration in 2004 of the 
Socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero “in recognition of all persons who 
during Franco regime suffered persecution and imprisonment for their sexual orientation 
or identity.” In addition, the rights of economic compensation and pension were granted 
to homosexuals, transsexuals, and other minorities (prostitutes) who had been persecuted 
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by the laws of Vagrancy and Dangerousness and the Social Rehabilitation Law.107 At 
last, the Spanish Parliament passed the Same-sex Marriage Law (Ley 13/2005, July 1st), 
which amends the Civil Code in order to permit same-sex marriages.108 The law provides 
same-sex married couples the same rights of inheritance, adoption, divorce, and tax 
benefits as heterosexual marriages. More recently, Congress passed the Law of Gender 
Identity (Ley 3/2007, March 15) allowing transgendered persons to change their legal 
name and gender in all public documents.109 These dramatic changes in favor of the 
recognition of rights of the LGBT community have taken place despite the fierce 
opposition of the conservative political parties, such as Partido Popular (PP), and the 
head of Catholic hierarchy, for whom marriage is based on the unbreakable union of man 
and woman and same-sex marriage threatens to break the traditional and fundamental 
institution of family.110  
                                                 
107 See “Indemnización para los presos homosexuales del franquismo” 
http://www.gaybarcelona.net/actualidad/062005/5.htm; “El Congreso pedirá una indemnización 
para los Gays, Lesbianas y Transexuales Presos del Franquismo,” EL País, 12 noviembre 2004 
108 See Appendix.  
109 LEY 3/2007, de 15 de marzo, reguladora de la rectificación registral de la mención relativa al 
sexo de las personas. (BOE no 65 March 16 2007 11253). 
110 See, for example, the note by the Executive Committee of the Spanish Episcopal Conference 
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11364 LEY 13/2005, de 1 de julio, por la que se modifica el Código Civil en materia de 
derecho a contraer matrimonio. 
 
JUAN CARLOS I 
REY DE ESPAÑA 
 
A todos los que la presente vieren y entendieren. 
Sabed: Que las Cortes Generales han aprobado y Yo vengo en sancionar la siguiente ley. 
 
I 
 La relación y convivencia de pareja, basada en el afecto, es expresión genuina de 
la naturaleza humana y constituye cauce destacado para el desarrollo de la personalidad, 
que nuestra Constitución establece como uno de los fundamentos del orden político y la 
paz social. En consonancia con ello, una manifestación señalada de esta relación, como es 
el matrimonio, viene a ser recogida por la Constitución, en su artículo 32, y considerada, 
en términos de nuestra jurisprudencia constitucional, como una institución jurídica de 
relevancia social que permite realizar la vida en común de la pareja. 
 Esta garantía constitucional del matrimonio tiene como consecuencia que el 
legislador no podrá desconocer la institución, ni dejar de regularla de conformidad con 
los valores superiores del ordenamiento jurídico, y con su carácter de derecho de la 
persona con base en la Constitución. Será la ley que desarrolle este derecho, dentro del 
margen de opciones abierto por la Constitución, la que, en cada momento histórico y de 
acuerdo con sus valores dominantes, determinará la capacidad exigida para contraer 
matrimonio, así como su contenido y régimen jurídico. 
 La regulación del matrimonio en el derecho civil contemporáneo ha reflejado los 
modelos y valores dominantes en las sociedades europeas y occidentales. Su origen 
radica en el Código Civil francés de 1804, del que innegablemente trae causa el español 
de 1889. En este contexto, el matrimonio se ha configurado como una institución, pero 
también como una relación jurídica que tan sólo ha podido establecerse entre personas de 
distinto sexo; de hecho, en tal diferencia de sexo se ha encontrado tradicionalmente uno 
de los fundamentos del reconocimiento de la institución por el derecho del Estado y por 
el derecho canónico. Por ello, los códigos de los dos últimos siglos, reflejando la 
mentalidad dominante, no precisaban prohibir, ni siquiera referirse, al matrimonio entre 
personas del mismo sexo, pues la relación entre ellas en forma alguna se consideraba que 
pudiera dar lugar a una relación jurídica matrimonial. 
 Pero tampoco en forma alguna cabe al legislador ignorar lo evidente: que la 
sociedad evoluciona en el modo de conformar y reconocer los diversos modelos de 
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convivencia, y que, por ello, el legislador puede, incluso debe, actuar en consecuencia, y 
evitar toda quiebra entre el Derecho y los valores de la sociedad cuyas relaciones ha de 
regular. En este sentido, no cabe duda de que la realidad social española de nuestro 
tiempo deviene mucho más rica, plural y dinámica que la sociedad en que surge el 
Código Civil de 1889. La convivencia como pareja entre personas del mismo sexo basada 
en la afectividad ha sido objeto de reconocimiento y aceptación social creciente, y ha 
superado arraigados prejuicios y estigmatizaciones. 
 Se admite hoy sin dificultad que esta convivencia en pareja es un medio a través 
del cual se desarrolla la personalidad de un amplio número de personas, convivencia 
mediante la cual se prestan entre sí apoyo emocional y económico, sin más trascendencia 
que la que tiene lugar en una estricta relación privada, dada su, hasta ahora, falta de 
reconocimiento formal por el Derecho. 
 Esta percepción no sólo se produce en la sociedad española, sino también en 
ámbitos más amplios, como se refleja en la Resolución del Parlamento Europeo, de 8 de 
febrero de 1994, en la que expresamente se pide a la Comisión Europea que presente una 
propuesta de recomendación a los efectos de poner fin a la prohibición de contraer 




 La Historia evidencia una larga trayectoria de discriminación basada en la 
orientación sexual, discriminación que el legislador ha decidido remover. El 
establecimiento de un marco de realización personal que permita que aquellos que 
libremente adoptan una opción sexual y afectiva por personas de su mismo sexo puedan 
desarrollar su personalidad y sus derechos en condiciones de igualdad se ha convertido en 
exigencia de los ciudadanos de nuestro tiempo, una exigencia a la que esta ley trata de 
dar respuesta. 
 Ciertamente, la Constitución, al encomendar al legislador la configuración 
normativa del matrimonio, no excluye en forma alguna una regulación que delimite las 
relaciones de pareja de una forma diferente a la que haya existido hasta el momento, 
regulación que dé cabida a las nuevas formas de relación afectiva. Pero, además, la 
opción reflejada en esta ley tiene unos fundamentos constitucionales que deben ser 
tenidos en cuenta por el legislador. Así, la promoción de la igualdad efectiva de los 
ciudadanos en el libre desarrollo de su personalidad (artículos 9.2 y 10.1 de la 
Constitución), la preservación de la libertad en lo que a las formas de convivencia se 
refiere (artículo 1.1 de la Constitución) y la instauración de un marco de igualdad real en 
el disfrute de los derechos sin discriminación alguna por razón de sexo, opinión o 
cualquier otra condición personal o social BOE núm. 157 Sábado 2 julio 2005 23633 
(artículo 14 de la Constitución) son valores consagrados constitucionalmente cuya 
plasmación debe reflejarse en la regulación de las normas que delimitan el estatus del 
ciudadano, en una sociedad libre, pluralista y abierta. 
 Desde esta perspectiva amplia, la regulación del matrimonio que ahora se instaura 
trata de dar satisfacción a una realidad palpable, cuyos cambios ha asumido la sociedad 
española con la contribución de los colectivos que han venido defendiendo la plena 
equiparación en derechos para todos con independencia de su orientación sexual, realidad 
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que requiere un marco que determine los derechos y obligaciones de todos cuantos 
formalizan sus relaciones de pareja. 
 En el contexto señalado, la ley permite que el matrimonio sea celebrado entre 
personas del mismo o distinto sexo, con plenitud e igualdad de derechos y obligaciones 
cualquiera que sea su composición. En consecuencia, los efectos del matrimonio, que se 
mantienen en su integridad respetando la configuración objetiva de la institución, serán 
únicos en todos los ámbitos con independencia del sexo de los contrayentes; entre otros, 
tanto los referidos a derechos y prestaciones sociales como la posibilidad de ser parte en 
procedimientos de adopción. 
 Asimismo, se ha procedido a una imprescindible adaptación terminológica de los 
distintos artículos del Código Civil que se refieren o traen causa del matrimonio, así 
como de una serie de normas del mismo Código que contienen referencias explícitas al 
sexo de sus integrantes. 
 En primer lugar, las referencias al marido y a la mujer se han sustituido por la 
mención a los cónyuges o a los consortes. En virtud de la nueva redacción del artículo 44 
del Código Civil, la acepción jurídica de cónyuge o de consorte será la de persona casada 
con otra, con independencia de que ambas sean del mismo o de distinto sexo. 
 Subsiste no obstante la referencia al binomio formado por el marido y la mujer en 
los artículos 116, 117 y 118 del Código, dado que los supuestos de hecho a que se 
refieren estos artículos sólo pueden producirse en el caso de matrimonios heterosexuales. 
 Por otra parte, y como resultado de la disposición adicional primera de la presente 
ley, todas las referencias al matrimonio que se contienen en nuestro ordenamiento 
jurídico han de entenderse aplicables tanto al matrimonio de dos personas del mismo 
sexo como al integrado por dos personas de distinto sexo. 
  
Artículo único. Modificación del Código Civil en materia de derecho a contraer 
matrimonio. 
 
El Código Civil se modifica en los siguientes términos: 
Uno. Se añade un segundo párrafo al artículo 44, con la siguiente redacción: «El 
matrimonio tendrá los mismos requisitos y efectos cuando ambos contrayentes sean del 
mismo o de diferente sexo.» 
Dos. El artículo 66 queda redactado en los siguientes términos: «Artículo 66. 
Los cónyuges son iguales en derechos y deberes.»  
Tres. El artículo 67 queda redactado en los siguientes términos: «Artículo 67. Los 
cónyuges deben respetarse y ayudarse mutuamente y actuar en interés de la familia.» 
Cuatro. El primer párrafo del artículo 154 queda redactado en los siguientes 
términos: «Los hijos no emancipados están bajo la potestad de sus progenitores.» 
Cinco. El primer párrafo del artículo 160 queda redactado en los siguientes 
términos: «Los progenitores, aunque no ejerzan la patria potestad, tienen el derecho de 
relacionarse con sus hijos menores, excepto con los adoptados por otro o conforme a lo 
dispuesto en resolución judicial.» 
Seis. El párrafo 2.º del artículo 164 queda redactado en los siguientes términos: 
«2.º Los adquiridos por sucesión en que uno o ambos de los que ejerzan la patria potestad 
hubieran sido justamente desheredados o no hubieran podido heredar por causa de 
indignidad, que serán administrados por la persona designada por el causante y, en su 
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defecto y sucesivamente, por el otro progenitor o por un administrador judicial 
especialmente nombrado.» 
Siete. El apartado 4 del artículo 175 queda redactado en los siguientes términos: 
«4. Nadie puede ser adoptado por más de una persona, salvo que la adopción se realice 
conjunta o sucesivamente por ambos cónyuges. El matrimonio celebrado con 
posterioridad a la adopción permite al cónyuge la adopción de los hijos de su consorte. 
En caso de muerte del adoptante, o cuando el adoptante sufra la exclusión prevista en el 
artículo 179, es posible una nueva adopción del adoptado.» 
Ocho. El apartado 2 del artículo 178 queda redactado en los siguientes términos: 
«2. Por excepción subsistirán los vínculos jurídicos con la familia del progenitor que, 
según el caso, corresponda: 1.º Cuando el adoptado sea hijo del cónyuge del adoptante, 
aunque el consorte hubiere fallecido. 2.º Cuando sólo uno de los progenitores haya sido 
legalmente determinado, siempre que tal efecto hubiere sido solicitado por el adoptante, 
el adoptado mayor de doce años y el progenitor cuyo vínculo haya de persistir.» 
Nueve. El párrafo segundo del artículo 637 queda redactado en los siguientes 
términos: «Se exceptúan de esta disposición las donaciones hechas conjuntamente a 
ambos cónyuges, entre los cuales tendrá lugar aquel derecho, si el donante no hubiese 
dispuesto lo contrario.» 
Diez. El artículo 1.323 queda redactado en los siguientes términos: 
«Artículo 1.323. Los cónyuges podrán transmitirse por cualquier título bienes y derechos 
y celebrar entre sí toda clase de contratos.» 
Once. El artículo 1.344 queda redactado en los siguientes términos: «Artículo 
1.344. Mediante la sociedad de gananciales se hacen comunes para los cónyuges las 
ganancias o beneficios obtenidos indistintamente por cualquiera de ellos, que les serán 
atribuidos por mitad al disolverse aquella.» 
Doce. El artículo 1.348 queda redactado en los siguientes términos: «Artículo 
1.348. Siempre que pertenezca privativamente a uno de los cónyuges una cantidad o 
crédito pagadero en cierto número de años, no serán gananciales las sumas que se cobren 
en los plazos vencidos durante el matrimonio, sino que se estimarán capital de uno u otro 
cónyuge, según a quien pertenezca el crédito.» 
Trece. El artículo 1.351 queda redactado en los siguientes términos: «Artículo 
1.351. Las ganancias obtenidas por cualquiera de los cónyuges en el juego o las 
procedentes de otras causas que eximan de la restitución pertenecerán a la sociedad de 
gananciales.» 
Catorce. El artículo 1.361 queda redactado en los siguientes términos: «Artículo 
1.361. Se presumen gananciales los bienes existentes en el matrimonio mientras no se 
pruebe que pertenecen privativamente a uno de los dos cónyuges.» 
Quince. El párrafo 2.º del artículo 1.365 queda redactado en los siguientes 
términos: «2.º En el ejercicio ordinario de la profesión, arte u oficio o en la 
administración ordinaria de los propios bienes. Si uno de los cónyuges fuera comerciante, 
se estará a lo dispuesto en el Código de Comercio.» 
Dieciséis. El artículo 1.404 queda redactado en los siguientes términos: 
«Artículo 1.404. Hechas las deducciones en el caudal inventariado que prefijan los 
artículos anteriores, el remanente constituirá el haber de la sociedad de gananciales, que 
se dividirá por mitad entre los cónyuges o sus respectivos herederos.» 
Diecisiete. El artículo 1.458 queda redactado en los siguientes términos: 
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«Artículo 1.458. Los cónyuges podrán venderse bienes recíprocamente.» 
 
Disposición adicional primera. Aplicación en el ordenamiento. 
 
Las disposiciones legales y reglamentarias que contengan alguna referencia al 
matrimonio se entenderán aplicables con independencia del sexo de sus integrantes. 
 
Disposición adicional segunda. Modificación de la Ley de 8 de junio de 1957, sobre el 
Registro Civil. 
 
Uno. El artículo 46 queda redactado en los siguientes términos: 
«Artículo 46. La adopción, las modificaciones judiciales de capacidad, las declaraciones 
de concurso, ausencia o fallecimiento, los hechos relativos a la nacionalidad o vecindad 
y, en general, los demás inscribibles para los que no se establece especialmente que la 
inscripción se haga en otra Sección del Registro, se inscribirán al margen de la 
correspondiente inscripción de nacimiento. Cuantos hechos afectan a la patria potestad, 
salvo la muerte de los progenitores, se inscribirán al margen de la inscripción de 
nacimiento de los hijos.» 
 
Dos. El artículo 48 queda redactado en los siguientes términos: «Artículo 48. La 
filiación paterna o materna constará en la inscripción de nacimiento a su margen, por 
referencia a la inscripción de matrimonio de los padres o por inscripción del 
reconocimiento.» 
 
Tres. El artículo 53 queda redactado en los siguientes términos: «Artículo 53. Las 
personas son designadas por su nombre y apellidos, correspondientes a ambos 
progenitores, que la Ley ampara frente a todos.» 
 
Disposición final primera. Título competencial. 
 
Esta ley se dicta al amparo de la competencia exclusiva del Estado en materia de 
legislación civil reconocida por el artículo 149.1.8.ª de la Constitución española sin 
perjuicio de la conservación, modificación y desarrollo por las Comunidades Autónomas 
de los derechos civiles, forales o especiales, allí donde existan y de las normas aprobadas 
por éstas en desarrollo de sus competencias en Derecho Civil. 
 
Disposición final segunda. Entrada en vigor. 
 
La presente ley entrará en vigor el día siguiente al de su publicación en el 
«Boletín Oficial del Estado». Por tanto, Mando a todos los españoles, particulares y 




Valencia, 1 de julio de 2005. 
 
JUAN CARLOS R. 
 
El Presidente del Gobierno,  
 





Through the analysis of legal, visual, and literary texts, this work has traced the 
limitations of democracy and law in contemporary Spain, and, by extension, in the larger 
European context. The aim has been to provide the tools to rethink and reconceptualize 
law and democracy in a way that promotes the rights of the marginal other. By analyzing 
Alex de la Iglesia’s film La Comunidad in the context of Aznar’s neoliberal economic 
policies and the European politics of consensus, I have shown how the interplay of the 
power of the State and the power of the market leads to the depoliticization of the people, 
and reduces democracy to the management and administration of economic interests. As 
an alternative, I have proposed a model of democracy that contingently opens a space for 
the political action of those who are excluded from the “consensus democracy.” 
Secondly, I have demonstrated, through a comparative analysis between Beltenebros and 
the recent Law of Historical Memory, that in order for Spain to achieve reconciliation 
and justice, there must be accountability and ethical responsibility towards the forgotten 
victims of Francoism. Despite the law’s intentions, the law of historical memory becomes 
a commemorative site for the Spanish Transition, which was accomplished precisely at 
the cost of forgetting the past. The novel, by contrast, brings to light the traces of the 
victims of Francoism, and offers strategies for undertaking a responsible historical 
memory. Finally, through the analysis of Pedro Almodóvar’s film Tacones Lejanos, I 
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have suggested to re-imagine law in a way that does justice to the difference and 
singularity of those marginal subjects that have been traditionally excluded from the law.  
At the dawn of the 21st century, global economic crisis, terrorism, religious 
fanaticism, immigration, and multiculturalism bring new challenges for law, democracy, 
and justice. These challenges lead to other questions that are the natural extension of this 
dissertation: what are the implications of the financial and economic crisis for 
democracy? What is the political and legal impact of counter-terrorism policies and 
strategies? How does the rhetoric of counter terrorism affect the notion of justice? Which 
are the ethical and aesthetical dimensions of terror and violence? What do the current 
policies of immigration say about the European project of unification? How will the 
diversity of cultures and religious practices (i.e., the prohibition of wearing the Burka, the 
building of Mosques) affect the internal configuration of the EU’s member states and 
their democratic principles? What kind of alternative notions and images of democracy, 
law, and justice do cultural works offer as a response to these news challenges? These are 
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